last day hearing in New York

2005Next, petitioner’s claim that he was impermissibly denied the right to call a particular witness at the first hearing is unpreserved since he did not attend on the last day of the hearing (see Matter of Cowart v Pico, 213 AD2d 853, 855 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 812 [1995]).

1999By refusing to attend the last day of the hearing, petitioner waived notification that confidential information was received that day (see, Matter of Tifer v Coughlin, 214 AD2d 1036, 1037 ; see also, Matter of Cowart v Pico, 213 AD2d 853 , lv denied 85 NY2d 812 ; cf., Matter of Freeman v Coughlin, 138 AD2d 824 ).

2026The mother offered no excuse, let alone a reasonable excuse, for her failure to appear on the last day the hearing, and thus, it was within the court's discretion to deny an adjournment ( see Matter of Jayden J. [Florence J.] , 184 AD3d 527, 527 [1st Dept 2020], lv dismissed 35 NY3d 1099 [2020]).

2025The Hearing Officer further found [*4]that petitioner had engaged in uncharged misconduct by lying in a complaint he had filed regarding the April 2023 incident, dishonesty that emerged when petitioner admitted to it on the last day of the hearing. [FN2] Our review of the Hearing Officer's report reflects, however, that he appropriately relied upon that finding in assessing petitioner's credibility as a witness and in discerning the appropriate penalty ( see Matter of Bigelow v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Gouverneur , 63 NY2d 470, 474-475 [1984]; Matter of Hardy v Kraham , 224 AD3d 946 ,

2025School Dist. , 209 AD2d 852, 853 [3d Dept 1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 804 [1995]; Matter of Murano v Village of Goshen , 193 AD2d 1011, 1011 [3d Dept 1993]).

2025School Dist. , 209 AD2d 852, 853 [3d Dept 1994], lv denied 85 NY2d 804 [1995]; Matter of Murano v Village of Goshen , 193 AD2d 1011, 1011 [3d Dept 1993]).

2017Moreover, although the father did not appear on the last day of the hearing, his counsel had made a written request for an adjournment earlier that day and thereafter appeared in court to reiterate such request (see Matter of Manning v Sobotka, 107 AD3d 1638, 1639 [2013]; Matter of Erie County Dept. of Social Servs. v Thompson, 91 AD3d 1327, 1328 [2012]; Matter of Cassandra M., 260 AD2d 961, 962-963 [1999]). 1 Because there was no default, the father was not required to move to vacate the Support Magistrate’s order and to file objections to the denial of such motion with Family Court.

2017Accordingly, Family Court properly reviewed the record before the Support Magistrate to determine whether to confirm the finding of a willful violation on the merits (cf. Matter of Manning v Sobotka, 107 AD3d at 1638 ; see generally Family Ct Act § 439 [a], [e]).

2017Moreover, although the father did not appear on the last day of the hearing, his counsel had made a written request for an adjournment earlier that day and thereafter appeared in court to reiterate such request (see Matter of Manning v Sobotka, 107 AD3d 1638, 1639 [2013]; Matter of Erie County Dept. of Social Servs. v Thompson, 91 AD3d 1327, 1328 [2012]; Matter of Cassandra M., 260 AD2d 961, 962-963 [1999]). 1 Because there was no default, the father was not required to move to vacate the Support Magistrate’s order and to file objections to the denial of such motion with Family Court.

2017Moreover, although the father did not appear on the last day of the hearing, his counsel had made a written request for an adjournment earlier that day and thereafter appeared in court to reiterate such request (see Matter of Manning v Sobotka, 107 AD3d 1638, 1639 [2013]; Matter of Erie County Dept. of Social Servs. v Thompson, 91 AD3d 1327, 1328 [2012]; Matter of Cassandra M., 260 AD2d 961, 962-963 [1999]). 1 Because there was no default, the father was not required to move to vacate the Support Magistrate’s order and to file objections to the denial of such motion with Family Court.

2016The court also properly, in effect, dismissed Pidot’s oral application to reschedule the primary election, as that relief was not requested in his petition, and, in fact, was not sought until the last day of the hearing, two days after Pidot’s counsel had represented to the court that he was not asking the court to decide “whether an election is held or not” but merely to determine “whether there’s valid petitions or not” (see Matter of Messina v Albany County Bd. of Elections, 66 AD3d 1111, 1114-1115 [2009]).

2006Under these circumstances, we find that it was timely (see Matter of Reed v Selsky, 9 AD3d 710, 711 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 611 [2004]).

1995We note that by refusing to attend the last day of the hearing, petitioner waived any procedural challenges (see, Matter of Cotton v Coughlin, 167 AD2d 584 ), including his challenge to respondent’s failure to contact another inmate who had been released to immigration authorities (see, supra; see also, Matter of Cowart v Coughlin, 194 AD2d 1036, 1037 ).

1983Although plaintiff waived her right to alimony payments during the period from December 10, 1971 to April 22, 1980 by failing to demand such payments, “[a]s to the payments accruing after the demand, as evidenced by [the bringing of the motion], the waiver was executory” and should have been held to have been withdrawn by service of the order to show cause (Kott v Kott, supra; see, also, Matter of Robinson v Robinson, supra).

1983The trial court erred, however, when it denied the plaintiff wife’s motion for alimony arrears for the period from April 22, 1980, the date her motion was made, to March 31,1981 , the last day of the hearing.