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11 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1875–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pearsongreen2 sentences2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k 2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k | 2 | 3 |
People v. Torresgreen2 sentences2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k 2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k | 2 | 3 |
People v. Meisslergreen2 sentences2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k 2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k | 2 | 3 |
Port Washington Union Free School District v. Port Washington Teachers Ass'ngreen2 sentences1997The Third Department noted that "Before courts may intervene in the name of the doctrine, the public policy at issue must be 'a strong one, amounting to gross illegality or its equivalent’, generally to be found in a 'readily identifiable source in the statutes or common-law principles’ ” (Matter of Board of Educ. [McGinnis], supra, at 333-334, citing Matter of Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v Port Washington Teachers Assn., 45 NY2d 411, 422 ). 1984Before courts may intervene in the name of the doctrine, the public policy at issue must be “a strong one, amounting to gross illegality or its equivalent”, generally to be found in a “readily identifiable source in the statutes or common-law principles” (Matter of Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v Port Washington Teachers Assn., 45 NY2d 411, 422 [Breitel, Ch. | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012The right safeguarded by the name requirement is the right that is protected by the constitutional requirement of a warrant (US Const 4th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 12)—the right to have a “neutral and detached magistrate” (Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14 [1948]) sign the warrant to search one’s house. 2012The right safeguarded by the name requirement is the right that is protected by the constitutional requirement of a warrant (US Const 4th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 12)—the right to have a “neutral and detached magistrate” (Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14 [1948]) sign the warrant to search one’s house. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pattersongreen1 sentence2012Finally, contrary to our dissenting colleague, suppression is warranted because the name requirement of GPL 690.45 (1) “operates directly to protect and preserve a constitutionally guaranteed right of the citizen” (People v Patterson, 78 NY2d 711, 717 [1991]; see also People v Greene, 9 NY3d 277, 280-281 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Greenegreen1 sentence2012Finally, contrary to our dissenting colleague, suppression is warranted because the name requirement of GPL 690.45 (1) “operates directly to protect and preserve a constitutionally guaranteed right of the citizen” (People v Patterson, 78 NY2d 711, 717 [1991]; see also People v Greene, 9 NY3d 277, 280-281 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultzgreen1 sentence1975The concerns expressed by Justice Powell in California Bankers Assn. v Shultz ( 416 US 21, 78-79 [concurring opn]) were grounded in First and Fifth Amendment concerns of "associations, and beliefs”. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k 2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k | 3 | 2015–2015 |
People v. McCarthy
neutral
2 sentences2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k 2015As the court noted in its suppression decision, at no time did defendant “give nonsensical or otherwise inappropriate answers to questions, nor did he ramble or rant on unrelated topics.” Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s cognitive ability was not so impaired as to render him unable to make voluntary and trustworthy statements (see generally People v Meissler, 305 AD2d 724, 725-726 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 644 [2003]; People v Mercado, 198 AD2d 380 , 381 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 927 [1994]; People v Pearson, 106 AD2d 588, 588-589 [1984]), or to waive his Miranda rights k | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Glauber v. Glauber
green
1 sentence1997In 1993, the Court of Appeals closed the door on arbitration relating to custody of and visitation with children (Glauber v Glauber, supra). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Bell
green
1 sentence1984In People v Bell ( 38 NY2d 116, 120 ) the Court of Appeals restated that “[t]rial courts are entrusted ‘to give adequate and balanced instructions to the jury in a criminal case’ ”. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Huntley
green
1 sentence1976Appellant, whose prior conflict with the law provided the name for the hearing now held to initially determine the voluntariness of a confession (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 ), appeals from a judgment convicting him, after a jury trial, of the crimes of criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth and sixth degrees. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Doe v. Bolton
red
2 sentences1975At his patient’s behest, Dr. Schulman did not file a pregnancy termination certificate: Petitioners argue that the name requirement violates a woman’s qualified right to an abortion enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v Wade ( 410 US 113 ) and Doe v Bolton ( 410 US 179 ); and they claim, additionally, that it violates the right to privacy "connected with the use of an individual’s name.” Section 204.03 of the New York City Health Code provides that a termination of pregnancy occurring in New York City shall be reported to the Department of Health within 24 hours of the termina 1975Section 204.05 of the code vests the New York City Board of Health with the authority to prescribe the form and content of the certificate. 1 Finally, and of particularly significant importance here, section 204.07 of the code, as amended by resolution of the Board of Health (pursuant to section 1706 of the New York City Charter), effective November 24, 1973, provides that: "The certificate of termination of pregnancy shall not be subject to subpoena or to inspection by persons other than the Commissioner or authorized personnel of the Department.” The record indicates that these provisions of | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Laird v. Tatum
green
1 sentence1975Petitioners advance only unsubstantiated allegations of subjective chill, from which no actual chilling effect can logically be inferred (cf. Laird v Tatum, 408 US 1, 13-14 ). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Roe v. Wade
red
2 sentences1975At his patient’s behest, Dr. Schulman did not file a pregnancy termination certificate: Petitioners argue that the name requirement violates a woman’s qualified right to an abortion enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v Wade ( 410 US 113 ) and Doe v Bolton ( 410 US 179 ); and they claim, additionally, that it violates the right to privacy "connected with the use of an individual’s name.” Section 204.03 of the New York City Health Code provides that a termination of pregnancy occurring in New York City shall be reported to the Department of Health within 24 hours of the termina 1975Section 204.05 of the code vests the New York City Board of Health with the authority to prescribe the form and content of the certificate. 1 Finally, and of particularly significant importance here, section 204.07 of the code, as amended by resolution of the Board of Health (pursuant to section 1706 of the New York City Charter), effective November 24, 1973, provides that: "The certificate of termination of pregnancy shall not be subject to subpoena or to inspection by persons other than the Commissioner or authorized personnel of the Department.” The record indicates that these provisions of | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People ex rel. Columbia Chemical Co. v. O'Brien
neutral
1 sentence1915Columbia Co. v. O'Brien, 101 App. Div. 296 ; Corning Glass Works v. Corning Cut Glass Co., 197 N. Y. 173 .) It is quite probable that the Secretary of State was misled by the prefix of the name New York, and did not discover that the plaintiff had been incorporated under identically the same name with the exception of the prefix. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Corning Glass Works v. Corning Cut Glass Co.
neutral
1 sentence1915Columbia Co. v. O'Brien, 101 App. Div. 296 ; Corning Glass Works v. Corning Cut Glass Co., 197 N. Y. 173 .) It is quite probable that the Secretary of State was misled by the prefix of the name New York, and did not discover that the plaintiff had been incorporated under identically the same name with the exception of the prefix. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Hubbell v. Cramp
neutral
1 sentence1875In construing the act of 1841 the chancellor, in Hubbell v. Cramp, 11 Paige, 310 , held, that the omission, by mistake of the debtor, of the name or claim of a creditor could not invalidate the discharge as to such creditor. | 1 | 1875–1875 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.