Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimagreen2 sentences2020(See FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384-385 [defendant’s laundry list of 16 affirmative defenses which essentially stated the name of the defense and that it barred recovery did not raise any issues of material fact that plaintiffs were required to disprove].) Western alleged 35 such affirmative defenses in such boilerplate fashion, and provided no facts during discovery to support any defense. 2020(See FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384-385 [defendant’s laundry list of 16 affirmative defenses which essentially stated the name of the defense and that it barred recovery did not raise any issues of material fact that plaintiffs were required to disprove].) Western alleged 35 such affirmative defenses in such boilerplate fashion, and provided no facts during discovery to support any defense. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hillred2 sentences2018(Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 3 .) The misconduct or error claimed by Rodriguez is classified as “vouching” for a witness, which is an instance of a broader classification of improper prosecutorial arguments relying on evidence not admitted at trial. 2018(Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 3 .) The misconduct or error claimed by Rodriguez is classified as “vouching” for a witness, which is an instance of a broader classification of improper prosecutorial arguments relying on evidence not admitted at trial. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Boltongreen2 sentences2018(People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213-214 (Bolton).) For this reason it has been said that “prosecutorial error” would be a better name for the doctrine. 2018(People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213-214 (Bolton).) For this reason it has been said that “prosecutorial error” would be a better name for the doctrine. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hansenred2 sentences2007(People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 311 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 ] (Hansen).) “The name of the doctrine derived from the characterization of the assault as an offense that ‘merged’ with the resulting homicide.” (Ibid.) *983 In Ireland , the California Supreme Court discussed the merger rule. 2007(People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 311 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 ] (Hansen).) “The name of the doctrine derived from the characterization of the assault as an offense that ‘merged’ with the resulting homicide.” (Ibid.) *983 In Ireland , the California Supreme Court discussed the merger rule. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Carrgreen1 sentence2026It requires that the perpetrator actually and personally harbor malice.” (Carr, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) “The name of the doctrine is confusing, since implied malice also incorporates the idea of ‘natural and probable consequences,’ but the two concepts are distinct. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Riverared1 sentence2023“Before Senate Bill No. 1437, ‘the natural and probable consequences doctrine was an exception to the actual malice requirement’—i.e., the requirement of either express or implied malice.” (Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 231.) “The name of the doctrine is confusing, since implied malice also incorporates the idea of ‘natural and probable consequences,’ but the two concepts are distinct. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gentilered1 sentence2021(Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 653 .) In addition, if a person commits murder with the intent to kill, but “the intent to kill is not formed after premeditation and deliberation, the murder is of the second degree.” (Ibid.) Before Senate Bill No. 1437, “the natural and probable consequences doctrine was an exception to the actual malice requirement”—i.e., the requirement of either express or implied malice. 10 (People v. Clements (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 597 , 610 (Clements); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847 (Gentile).) The name of the doctrine is confusing, since implied malice a | 1 | 1 |
People v. Danielgreen1 sentence2021Whereas implied malice is based on “the ‘natural and probable consequences’ of a defendant’s own act,” the natural and probable consequences doctrine was “a theory of vicarious liability under which ‘[a]n aider and abettor [was] guilty not only of the intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the target crime actually commit[ted] (the nontarget crime)’ ”—including murder—“ ‘that [was] a natural and probable consequence of the target crime.’ ” (Daniel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 677, fn. 4.) “Because a nontarget murder ‘ “[was] unintended, the mens rea of the aider | 1 | 1 |
Atwater v. City of Lago Vistagreen1 sentence2016(Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 323, 339-345 ; People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 606-619 ; see People v. 7 Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721 [during traffic stop, officers were entitled to arrest defendant and search him incident to that arrest when he failed to provide valid registration to officers and gave a false name in violation of Veh. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reddgreen1 sentence2016(Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 323, 339-345 ; People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 606-619 ; see People v. 7 Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721 [during traffic stop, officers were entitled to arrest defendant and search him incident to that arrest when he failed to provide valid registration to officers and gave a false name in violation of Veh. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Zapienred1 sentence2009(Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 961.) There was no evidence in the record that the investigator had listened to the tape and, hence, no evidence of an invasion of the attorney-client relationship. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Poseygreen2 sentences2009As we recently explained, Zapien declared that “in order to avoid dismissal of a criminal action because of prosecutorial destruction of evidence, the People must prove facts, by a preponderance of the evidence, establishing that the destruction of the *769 evidence did not prejudice the defendant.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 212 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 , 82 P.3d 755 ], italics added.) In Zapien , one of the prosecutors had directed the chief investigator to listen to a cassette tape found in a sealed envelope bearing the name of the defense attorney and report what was on the tape; t 2009As we recently explained, Zapien declared that “in order to avoid dismissal of a criminal action because of prosecutorial destruction of evidence, the People must prove facts, by a preponderance of the evidence, establishing that the destruction of the *769 evidence did not prejudice the defendant.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 212 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 , 82 P.3d 755 ], italics added.) In Zapien , one of the prosecutors had directed the chief investigator to listen to a cassette tape found in a sealed envelope bearing the name of the defense attorney and report what was on the tape; t | 1 | 1 |
Ramona v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen2 sentences1999L. & Health at pages 74 (“The ‘pristine,’ ‘frozen mammoth’ hypothesis of repressed memories is without scientific or systematic empirical evidence to support it.”) and 80 (“The problem, most authorities conclude is not that victims of traumatic experiences cannot remember, but that they cannot forget!”). 13 The evolution of the name of the test in California for the admissibility of scientific evidence from Frye to Kelly-Frye to Kelly has been nicely traced in Ramona v. Superior Court (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 107, 116-117 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 766 ]. 14 Recovered memories of sexual abuse by parents in 1999L. & Health at pages 74 (“The ‘pristine,’ ‘frozen mammoth’ hypothesis of repressed memories is without scientific or systematic empirical evidence to support it.”) and 80 (“The problem, most authorities conclude is not that victims of traumatic experiences cannot remember, but that they cannot forget!”). 13 The evolution of the name of the test in California for the admissibility of scientific evidence from Frye to Kelly-Frye to Kelly has been nicely traced in Ramona v. Superior Court (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 107, 116-117 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 766 ]. 14 Recovered memories of sexual abuse by parents in | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (1961) 365 U.S. 127 [ 5 L.Ed. 464 ] and United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965) 381 U.S. 657 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 626 ].) 5 that [State Fund] implemented a ‘blanket denial’ of H-Wave requests implicitly concedes that an administrative review process has been conducted. . . . 2004Conf. v. Noerr (1961) 365 U.S. 127 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 464 , 81 S.Ct. 523 ], and Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965) 381 U.S. 657 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 626 , 85 S.Ct. 1585 ], 2 Crisp also abstained from voting—during votes on one or more unspecified dates—on more than 100 JEDEC ballots, thereby “abstaining from disclosing Rambus’ patents, and pending patent applications, covering JEDEC compliant standardized DRAM technologies.” 3 In connection with this allegation, Holiday alleged that “Rambus’ patent infringement action against Infineon Technologies went to trial in the United States District Court for the East | 2 | 2004–2015 |
United Mine Workers v. Pennington
green
2 sentences2015Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (1961) 365 U.S. 127 [ 5 L.Ed. 464 ] and United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965) 381 U.S. 657 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 626 ].) 5 that [State Fund] implemented a ‘blanket denial’ of H-Wave requests implicitly concedes that an administrative review process has been conducted. . . . 2015Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (1961) 365 U.S. 127 [ 5 L.Ed. 464 ] and United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965) 381 U.S. 657 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 626 ].) 5 that [State Fund] implemented a ‘blanket denial’ of H-Wave requests implicitly concedes that an administrative review process has been conducted. . . . | 2 | 2004–2015 |
People v. Clements
green
1 sentence2021(Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 653 .) In addition, if a person commits murder with the intent to kill, but “the intent to kill is not formed after premeditation and deliberation, the murder is of the second degree.” (Ibid.) Before Senate Bill No. 1437, “the natural and probable consequences doctrine was an exception to the actual malice requirement”—i.e., the requirement of either express or implied malice. 10 (People v. Clements (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 597 , 610 (Clements); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847 (Gentile).) The name of the doctrine is confusing, since implied malice a | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Gonzalez
red
1 sentence2021(Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 653 .) In addition, if a person commits murder with the intent to kill, but “the intent to kill is not formed after premeditation and deliberation, the murder is of the second degree.” (Ibid.) Before Senate Bill No. 1437, “the natural and probable consequences doctrine was an exception to the actual malice requirement”—i.e., the requirement of either express or implied malice. 10 (People v. Clements (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 597 , 610 (Clements); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847 (Gentile).) The name of the doctrine is confusing, since implied malice a | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. McKay
green
1 sentence2016(Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 323, 339-345 ; People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 606-619 ; see People v. 7 Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721 [during traffic stop, officers were entitled to arrest defendant and search him incident to that arrest when he failed to provide valid registration to officers and gave a false name in violation of Veh. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Mattison
green
2 sentences2003Taylor reasoned in essence that the Ireland test could "potentially encompass[ ] all felonies closely related to a homicide (and therefore possibly every felony inherently dangerous to human life)." ( People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 314 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 , discussing Taylor.) Taylor formulated an alternative test for merger: the offense would not merge "`if the act causing the death [is] committed with a collateral and independent felonious design'" ( People v. Taylor, supra, at p. 61 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 697 , italics omitted), that is, "the felony was not done with the 2003Taylor reasoned in essence that the Ireland test could "potentially encompass[ ] all felonies closely related to a homicide (and therefore possibly every felony inherently dangerous to human life)." ( People v. Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 314 , 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 , discussing Taylor.) Taylor formulated an alternative test for merger: the offense would not merge "`if the act causing the death [is] committed with a collateral and independent felonious design'" ( People v. Taylor, supra, at p. 61 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 697 , italics omitted), that is, "the felony was not done with the | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2003The name of the doctrine derived from the characterization of the assault as an offense that `merged' with the resulting homicide." ( Id. at p. 311, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 .) Courts and commentators reasoned that because "a homicide generally results from the commission of an assault," the "application of the felony-murder rule to felonious assaults would usurp most of the law of homicide, relieve the prosecution in the great majority of homicide cases of the burden of having to prove malice in order to obtain a murder conviction, and thereby frustrate the Legislature's intent to p 2003The name of the doctrine derived from the characterization of the assault as an offense that `merged' with the resulting homicide." ( Id. at p. 311, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 .) Courts and commentators reasoned that because "a homicide generally results from the commission of an assault," the "application of the felony-murder rule to felonious assaults would usurp most of the law of homicide, relieve the prosecution in the great majority of homicide cases of the burden of having to prove malice in order to obtain a murder conviction, and thereby frustrate the Legislature's intent to p | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.