reinstatement hearing in New York

1992Public Officers Law § 30 (1) (e), which provides that every office shall be vacant upon the conviction of a public officer of a felony or a crime involving a violation of his or her oath of office, was amended to correct what the courts had previously found to be an unnecessarily harsh result occurring when a non-elected official was in fact cleared of any wrongdoing, but was left without the right to obtain back pay or lost benefits (see, Matter of Briggins v McGuire, 67 NY2d 965 ; Matter of Toro v Malcolm, 44 NY2d 146 ).

1989Legal philosophers have long wrestled, not with whether the wrong should be righted, but with how best to do so (see Nixon, Voltaire and the Calas Case [1962], p 198; Borchard, Convicting the Innocent, Errors in Criminal Justice [1932], p 37).” (44 NY2d, supra, at 154 [dissenting opn].) In Matter of Briggins v McGuire ( 67 NY2d 965 ), a decision issued approximately one year prior to the 1987 amendment, the Court of Appeals held that a police officer who had been convicted of a felony, was not entitled to a reinstatement hearing, even though the conviction was ultimately reversed and the indic

2009In so ruling, the Court stated, in pertinent part: “[T]he Hearing Panel may wish to fashion an additional recommendation in its report for appropriate relief in light of the punishment respondent has already absorbed (see, Matter of Kuba, 162 AD2d 30 )” (id. at 141).

2007Co., L.L.C. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 11 AD3d 370 [1st Dept 2004] [determination was not arbitrary and capricious since there was a “rational basis” in the record supporting it].) Public Officers Law § 30 (1) (e), moreover, provides that an officer removed from the job solely because of a conviction “may apply for reinstatement . . . upon [its] reversal.” The officer is entitled to a reinstatement hearing, the record of which “shall include the final judgment of the court which reversed . . . such conviction and may also include the entire employment history of the ap

2003Matter of Walters, 206 AD2d 590 [1994]).

1991The former may, for example, consider evidence in mitigation of the seriousness of the allegations (see, Matter of Levy, 37 NY2d 279 ), whereas the latter is primarily a forum for establishing compliance with the disciplinary order as well as present character and fitness to resume the practice of law (Matter of Persky, 92 AD2d 372 ; 22 NYCRR 603.14 [b]).

1991The former may, for example, consider evidence in mitigation of the seriousness of the allegations (see, Matter of Levy, 37 NY2d 279 ), whereas the latter is primarily a forum for establishing compliance with the disciplinary order as well as present character and fitness to resume the practice of law (Matter of Persky, 92 AD2d 372 ; 22 NYCRR 603.14 [b]).

1986The question is whether Briggins, a detective with civil service tenure (see, Economico v Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120, 125, 126 ), had a property interest in his position — as determined by New York law — which entitled him to a reinstatement hearing under the due process guarantee of the Federal Constitution when it was determined that he had been convicted of conduct which was not a crime (see, Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341 ; Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 ; Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 ; Economico v Village of Pelham, supra, at pp 125, 127).

1986Here, the issue is not back pay or the vacatur of a public office, but a reinstatement hearing — i.e., whether the New York Legislature could have intended that Public Officers Law § 30 (1) (e) should be applied to deny Briggins a property interest sufficient to warrant due process protection (see, Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341 , supra; Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 , supra; Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 541 , supra; Economico v Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120, 125, 127 , supra; see also, Greene v McGuire, 683 F2d 32, 35 [2d Cir], supra).

1986The question is whether Briggins, a detective with civil service tenure (see, Economico v Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120, 125, 126 ), had a property interest in his position — as determined by New York law — which entitled him to a reinstatement hearing under the due process guarantee of the Federal Constitution when it was determined that he had been convicted of conduct which was not a crime (see, Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341 ; Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 ; Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 ; Economico v Village of Pelham, supra, at pp 125, 127).

1986Here, the issue is not back pay or the vacatur of a public office, but a reinstatement hearing — i.e., whether the New York Legislature could have intended that Public Officers Law § 30 (1) (e) should be applied to deny Briggins a property interest sufficient to warrant due process protection (see, Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341 , supra; Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 , supra; Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 541 , supra; Economico v Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120, 125, 127 , supra; see also, Greene v McGuire, 683 F2d 32, 35 [2d Cir], supra).

1986The question is whether Briggins, a detective with civil service tenure (see, Economico v Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120, 125, 126 ), had a property interest in his position — as determined by New York law — which entitled him to a reinstatement hearing under the due process guarantee of the Federal Constitution when it was determined that he had been convicted of conduct which was not a crime (see, Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341 ; Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 ; Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564 ; Economico v Village of Pelham, supra, at pp 125, 127).

1914Following the reinstatement of the doctrine of Charitable Uses it was said in Matter of Shattuck, 193 N. Y. 446 , that, notwithstanding that act, a trust may he so indefinite and uncertain in its purpose as to be impossible of administration..