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24 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rotellogreen2 sentences2007See State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. 1984); Finlan v. Peavy , 205 S.W.3d 647, 654 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (both noting that hearing on motion to reinstate is the same hearing with the same burden of proof as a hearing before dismissal). 2007See State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex.1984); Fin lan v. Peavy, 205 S.W.3d 647, 654 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (both noting that hearing on motion to reinstate is the same hearing with the same burden of proof as a hearing before dismissal). | 6 | 6 |
Finlan v. Peavygreen2 sentences2007See State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. 1984); Finlan v. Peavy , 205 S.W.3d 647, 654 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (both noting that hearing on motion to reinstate is the same hearing with the same burden of proof as a hearing before dismissal). 2007See State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex.1984); Fin lan v. Peavy, 205 S.W.3d 647, 654 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (both noting that hearing on motion to reinstate is the same hearing with the same burden of proof as a hearing before dismissal). | 4 | 4 |
Texas Sting, Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, Inc.green2 sentences2005Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 165 ; Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713 ; Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Tex. Sting, 82 S.W.3d at 649-50. 2004See Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713 ; Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Texas Sting, 82 S.W.3d at 649-50 . | 1 | 2 |
Binner v. Limestone Countygreen2 sentences2005Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 165 ; Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713 ; Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Tex. Sting, 82 S.W.3d at 649-50. 2004See Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713 ; Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Texas Sting, 82 S.W.3d at 649-50 . | 1 | 2 |
Cotten v. Brileygreen1 sentence2025See Cotten, 517 S.W.3d at 184 . -9- 04-24-00384-CV At the reinstatement hearing, Sullivan made several factual statements about Gallagher’s health and how it negatively affected his ability to work on Strom’s case. | 1 | 1 |
Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidtgreen1 sentence2018Compare Resurgence Fin., L.L.C. , 2009 WL 1875568 , at *2 (holding that an oral hearing is required once the motion to reinstate is filed) with Weir v. Abebe Baraki and Khorshid , No. 05-07-00223-CV, 2008 WL 588917 , *2 (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar. 5, 2008, no pet) (mem. op.) and Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v. Schmidt , 76 S.W.3d 53 , 57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (court of appeals cannot reverse unless the record shows the plaintiff specifically requested a hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Raul Morales-Izquierdo v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Generalgreen1 sentence2013See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(5)[3]; Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 , 34–35 (2006); see also Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The scope of a reinstatement inquiry under [section 1231(a)(5)] is much narrower, and can be performed like any other ministerial enforcement action. | 1 | 1 |
In Re GMSgreen1 sentence2012Wells Fargo argues that “[c]ourts warn . . . that depriving Wells Fargo the right to a new trial ‘because it did not file the request with the trial court clerk or based on some other imperfection with the request is to evaluate [sic] form over substance, which this Court should not do.’” Wells Fargo cites Gavrel v. Rodriguez, 225 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Tex. -5- 04-11-00527-CV App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) and In re G.M.S., 991 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) to support its argument that its failure to timely request a reporter’s record should not preclude its | 1 | 1 |
Herrera v. Riveragreen1 sentence2012Herrera v. Rivera, 281 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding “since there is no record before us of the motion to dismiss for want of prosecution hearing, we indulge every presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings and presume that the evidence before the trial court was adequate to support its decision.); Allen v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Bentley Laboratories, Inc.green1 sentence2012Herrera v. Rivera, 281 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding “since there is no record before us of the motion to dismiss for want of prosecution hearing, we indulge every presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings and presume that the evidence before the trial court was adequate to support its decision.); Allen v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Gavrel v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2012Wells Fargo argues that “[c]ourts warn . . . that depriving Wells Fargo the right to a new trial ‘because it did not file the request with the trial court clerk or based on some other imperfection with the request is to evaluate [sic] form over substance, which this Court should not do.’” Wells Fargo cites Gavrel v. Rodriguez, 225 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Tex. -5- 04-11-00527-CV App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) and In re G.M.S., 991 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) to support its argument that its failure to timely request a reporter’s record should not preclude its | 1 | 1 |
Wentworth v. Meyergreen1 sentence2012See Wentworth v. Meyer , 839 S.W.2d 766, 778 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (“A motion for rehearing does not afford a litigant an opportunity to raise new issues, especially after the case has been briefed, argued, and decided on other grounds.”); Morrison v. Chan , 699 S.W.2d 205 , 206–07 (Tex. 1985) (holding that court of appeals did not err in refusing to reverse the case on a point raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing). [4] Under the plain language of the statute, section 762 is only available when a guardian has been removed under either subsection (6) or (7) of sect | 1 | 1 |
Cappetta v. Hermesgreen1 sentence2008Cappetta v. Hermes, 222 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Goff v. Branchgreen1 sentence2001The court further quoted with approval the San Antonio court’s opinion in Goff, in which the court stated: “[We] can find no authority for a court to invoke for the first time, without prior notice, its inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution in a reinstatement hearing clearly involving only the review of a dismissal order under Tex.R.Civ.P. 165a(1).” Id. at 631 (quoting Goff v. Branch, 821 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied)). | 1 | 1 |
McConnell v. Maygreen1 sentence1999See McConnell v. May, 800 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Banda v. Garcia Ex Rel. Garciagreen2 sentences1998See Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (when attorney places opposing counsel and trial court on notice that its recitations of fact to the court are intended as evidence, and opposing counsel fails to object to trial court's failure to administer oath to attorney, the trial court may consider an attorney's unsworn testimony as evidence). [3] Perrin Oaks, Ltd. conveyed one-third of each of the notes to each of the three general partners comprising the general partnership that was Perrin Oak's general partner. 1998See Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (when attorney places opposing counsel and trial court on notice that its recitations of fact to the court are intended as evidence, and opposing counsel fails’ to object to trial court’s failure to administer oath to attorney, the trial court may consider an attorney’s unsworn testimony as evidence). . | 1 | 1 |
Burns v. Drew Woods, Inc.green1 sentence1997See Clark v. Yarbrough, 900 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied); Burns v. Drew Woods, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.App.—Waco 1995, writ denied). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Yarbroughgreen1 sentence1997See Clark v. Yarbrough, 900 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied); Burns v. Drew Woods, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.App.—Waco 1995, writ denied). | 1 | 1 |
Mandujano v. Olivagreen2 sentences1991Mandujano, 755 S.W.2d at 514; TEX. 1991Mandu-jano, 755 S.W.2d at 514. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Manning v. North
green
2 sentences2005Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 165 ; Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713 ; Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Tex. Sting, 82 S.W.3d at 649-50. 2004See Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713 ; Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Texas Sting, 82 S.W.3d at 649-50 . | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Jimenez v. Transwestern Property Co.
green
2 sentences2005Jimenez, 999 S.W.2d at 129 (citing State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex.1984)). 2005Jiminez , 999 S.W.2d at 129 (citing State v. Rotello , 671 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. 1984)). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Federal Lanes, Inc. v. City of Houston
green
1 sentence2025P. 306a(5); the motion to reinstate was not verified;2 and—even if plenary power had not been lost on May 14, 2025—the trial court did not hold a reinstatement hearing before granting the motion.3 2 The Munozes refer us to Federal Lanes, Inc. v. City of Houston, 905 S.W.2d 686 , 689–90 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied), in which the court held that a joint unverified motion to reinstate was the equivalent of a stipulation and thus tantamount to a verified motion to reinstate. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dueitt v. Arrowhead Lakes Property Owners, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015The court noted that a motion to reinstate “ensures that the dismissed party has received due process, because participation in the reinstatement hearing cures any due process concerns.” Id. 2015The court determined that the plaintiffs had received due process because they “received adequate notice” of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and they had the opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss “which is all that due process requires.” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Memorial Hospital of Galveston County v. Gillis
green
2 sentences2015The notice of the judgment or acquired actual Page 2 741 S.W.2d 364 , *; 1987 Tex. LEXIS 391 , **; 31 Tex. Sup. J. 77 knowledge of the signing and that this reinstatement hearing. 2015The notice of the judgment or acquired actual Page 2 741 S.W.2d 364 , *; 1987 Tex. LEXIS 391 , **; 31 Tex. Sup. J. 77 knowledge of the signing and that this reinstatement hearing. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales
green
1 sentence2013See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(5)[3]; Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 , 34–35 (2006); see also Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The scope of a reinstatement inquiry under [section 1231(a)(5)] is much narrower, and can be performed like any other ministerial enforcement action. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Morrison v. Chan
green
1 sentence2012See Wentworth v. Meyer , 839 S.W.2d 766, 778 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring) (“A motion for rehearing does not afford a litigant an opportunity to raise new issues, especially after the case has been briefed, argued, and decided on other grounds.”); Morrison v. Chan , 699 S.W.2d 205 , 206–07 (Tex. 1985) (holding that court of appeals did not err in refusing to reverse the case on a point raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing). [4] Under the plain language of the statute, section 762 is only available when a guardian has been removed under either subsection (6) or (7) of sect | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Steward v. Colonial Casualty Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2005Steward, 143 S.W.3d at 165 ; Binner, 129 S.W.3d at 713 ; Manning, 82 S.W.3d at 715 ; Tex. Sting, 82 S.W.3d at 649-50. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equipment
green
1 sentence2001The court further quoted with approval the San Antonio court’s opinion in Goff, in which the court stated: “[We] can find no authority for a court to invoke for the first time, without prior notice, its inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution in a reinstatement hearing clearly involving only the review of a dismissal order under Tex.R.Civ.P. 165a(1).” Id. at 631 (quoting Goff v. Branch, 821 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Steere v. State Bar of Texas
neutral
1 sentence1989However, the five year waiting period of the old reinstatement rule (Art. 12, Sec. 28), was found not to be unconstitutional in Steere v. State Bar of Texas, 464 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Averitt v. Bruton Paint & Floor Co.
green
2 sentences1989It has been suggested that the result reached by our majority is dictated by Averitt v. Bruton Paint & Floor Co., 773 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.App.Dallas, 1989). 1989It has been suggested that the result reached by our majority is dictated by Averitt v. Bruton Paint & Floor Co., 773 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.App.—Dallas, 1989). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.