Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lewisyellow2 sentences2010Yet we found that there was a problem inherent in the Blankenship standard: it was unclear whether, under step one, courts “should contrast the statutory elements in the abstract or consider the particular facts of the case.” Id. 2010Yet we found that there was a problem inherent in the Blankenship standard: it was unclear whether, under step one, courts “should contrast the statutory elements in the abstract or consider the particular facts of the case.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Rancered2 sentences2004Under the first part of the analysis, `the statutorily defined elements of the offenses that are claimed to be of similar import are compared in the abstract. ' (Emphasis sic.) State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632 , 710 N.E.2d 699 , paragraph one of the syllabus." {¶ 10} Applying the first prong of the Blankenship test, this Court finds that the eleven counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor in the present case are not allied offenses. 2004Under the first part of the analysis, `the statutorily defined elements of the offenses that are claimed to be of similar import are compared in the abstract. ' (Emphasis sic.) State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632 , 710 N.E.2d 699 , paragraph one of the syllabus." {¶ 10} Applying the first prong of the Blankenship test, this Court finds that the eleven counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor in the present case are not allied offenses. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2026State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 111 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2009See State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2008-Ohio-4569 , 895 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 39 (holding that R.C. 2903.12(A)(1) and (2) — two subdivisions of aggravated assault — are allied offenses because “[t]hese subdivisions set forth two different forms of the same offense, in each of which the legislature manifested its intent to serve the same interest— preventing physical harm to persons”). {¶ 71} In reviewing the record to determine whether the crimes were committed separately or with a separate animus, we find evidence that defendant’s car struck Special Agent Torsney and then ran into Det. 2009See State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447 , 2008-Ohio-4569 , 895 N.E.2d 149, at ¶ 39 (holding that R.C. 2903.12(A)(1) and (2) — two subdivisions of aggravated assault — are allied offenses because “[t]hese subdivisions set forth two different forms of the same offense, in each of which the legislature manifested its intent to serve the same interest— preventing physical harm to persons”). {¶ 71} In reviewing the record to determine whether the crimes were committed separately or with a separate animus, we find evidence that defendant’s car struck Special Agent Torsney and then ran into Det. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Newark v. Vazirani
red
2 sentences2000For instance, in Newark v. Vazirani (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 81 , the court compared the elements of the offenses by reference to the particular facts alleged in the indictment. 1999For instance, in Newark v. Vazirani (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 81 , the court compared the elements of the offenses by reference to the particular facts alleged in the indictment. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
State v. McKittrick
neutral
1 sentence2016Fairfield No. 11-CA-36, 2011-Ohio-5899 , for the proposition that “[a] valid complaint is a necessary condition precedent for the trial court to obtain jurisdiction in a criminal matter.” Id. at ¶ 14. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Love
green
2 sentences2015He contended that a 25-year registration period would serve no legitimate penological purpose in his case. {¶ 6} The Second District, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that Blankenship’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. {¶ 7} Blankenship appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on his sole proposition of law: “Mandatory sex offender classifications under Senate Bill 10 constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the classification is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense and character of the offender.” 1 2015He contended that a 25-year registration period would serve no legitimate penological purpose in his case. {¶ 6} The Second District, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that Blankenship’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. {¶ 7} Blankenship appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on his sole proposition of law: “Mandatory sex offender classifications under Senate Bill 10 constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the classification is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense and character of the offender.” 1 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Devore
green
2 sentences2015He contended that a 25-year registration period would serve no legitimate penological purpose in his case. {¶ 6} The Second District, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that Blankenship’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. {¶ 7} Blankenship appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on his sole proposition of law: “Mandatory sex offender classifications under Senate Bill 10 constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the classification is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense and character of the offender.” 1 2015He contended that a 25-year registration period would serve no legitimate penological purpose in his case. {¶ 6} The Second District, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that Blankenship’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment. {¶ 7} Blankenship appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on his sole proposition of law: “Mandatory sex offender classifications under Senate Bill 10 constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the classification is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense and character of the offender.” 1 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Graham v. Florida
green
2 sentences2015Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 . {¶ 21} In analyzing Blankenship’s challenge to the registration requirements imposed on him, we must bear in mind the overriding principle that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 59 . 2015Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 . {¶ 21} In analyzing Blankenship’s challenge to the registration requirements imposed on him, we must bear in mind the overriding principle that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 59 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Price
green
2 sentences2012The second part of the Blankenship test requires a consideration of factors specific to an individual’s conduct. {¶ 22} In State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136 , 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph five of the syllabus, this court held that “[a] rape conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1), and a kidnapping conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), are allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(A), and cannot be punished multiply when they are neither committed separately nor with a separate animus as to each within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B).” Despite the state’s 2012The second part of the Blankenship test requires a consideration of factors specific to an individual’s conduct. {¶ 22} In State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136 , 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph five of the syllabus, this court held that “[a] rape conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1), and a kidnapping conviction, pursuant to R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), are allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(A), and cannot be punished multiply when they are neither committed separately nor with a separate animus as to each within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B).” Despite the state’s | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
green
2 sentences2010We determined that we should “settle this issue for Ohio courts, and we believe[d] that comparison of the statutory elements in the abstract is the more functional test, producing ‘clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases.’ ” Id., quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999), 526 U.S. 137, 148 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 . 2010We determined that we should “settle this issue for Ohio courts, and we believe[d] that comparison of the statutory elements in the abstract is the more functional test, producing ‘clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases.’ ” Id., quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999), 526 U.S. 137, 148 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Olah
green
2 sentences2004State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586 , 592 , 2001-Ohio-1641 , 767 N.E.2d 755 , citing Georgeoff v. O'Brien (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 373 , 378 , 663 N.E.2d 1348 . 2004State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586 , 592 , 2001-Ohio-1641 , 767 N.E.2d 755 , citing Georgeoff v. O'Brien (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 373 , 378 , 663 N.E.2d 1348 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Georgeoff v. O'Brien
green
2 sentences2004State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586 , 592 , 2001-Ohio-1641 , 767 N.E.2d 755 , citing Georgeoff v. O'Brien (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 373 , 378 , 663 N.E.2d 1348 . 2004State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586 , 592 , 2001-Ohio-1641 , 767 N.E.2d 755 , citing Georgeoff v. O'Brien (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 373 , 378 , 663 N.E.2d 1348 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Blankenship
green
1 sentence1999If the court finds either that the crimes were committed separately or that there was a separate animus for each crime, the defendant may be convicted of both offenses. [Emphasis sic., id. at 117 .] In the past, the Supreme Court has applied the first step of the two-tiered Blankenship test in two different ways. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.
green
2 sentences1994While GMC would bear the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists on its motion for summary judgment, Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64 , 8 O.O.3d 73 , 375 N.E.2d 46 . 1994While GMC would bear the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists on its motion for summary judgment, Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64 , 8 O.O.3d 73 , 375 N.E.2d 46 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.