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11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Anderkin v. Lansdell
green
2 sentences2016In support of this test, the mother in DePalmo argued that “that circumstances at the time of the hearing were substantially similar to those on * * * the date of the original agreement * * *.” Id. at 535 . {¶ 58} The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the use of the dual threshold test. 2003However, the court then held that where there is an agreement under which the custodial parent assumes sole responsibility for support, then there is no "child support order" and thus a dual threshold test applies whereby the court must determine if "the supporting custodial parent's circumstances changed to the extent that that parent can no longer provide the total amount reasonable for support"; or "the noncustodial parent's circumstances have changed substantially and the trial court in its discretion finds it is in the best interests of the children to receive support from that parent." I | 8 | 1995–2016 |
DePalmo v. DePalmo
green
2 sentences2018Id. at ¶ 58. {¶ 19} We made the following observations about the court's rejection of the dual threshold test: First, the court stated [in DePalmo ] that whether a support order is currently in existence "is a distinction without a difference and is immaterial to whether child support should be calculated according to the statutory guidelines." [ DePalmo , 78 Ohio St.3d] at 539, 679 N.E.2d 266 . 1998The dual-threshold test was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio in DePalmo v. DePalmo (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 535 , 539-540 . | 4 | 1998–2018 |
Marker v. Grimm
green
2 sentences1997The appellate court certified the following issue to us: “[WJhether a Trial Court may modify an existing child support arrangement under which the custodial parent assumes sole responsibility for the support of the children when there is no finding under the following dual threshold test: “(A) the supporting custodial parent’s circumstances have changed to the extent that that parent can no longer provide the total amount reasonable for the support of the children, or “(B) the noncustodial parent’s circumstances have changed substantially and the trial court in its discretion finds it is in th 1997The appellate court certified the following issue to us: “[WJhether a Trial Court may modify an existing child support arrangement under which the custodial parent assumes sole responsibility for the support of the children when there is no finding under the following dual threshold test: “(A) the supporting custodial parent’s circumstances have changed to the extent that that parent can no longer provide the total amount reasonable for the support of the children, or “(B) the noncustodial parent’s circumstances have changed substantially and the trial court in its discretion finds it is in th | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Smith v. Collins
green
1 sentence2004The trial court erred in applying the dual threshold test found in Anderkin v. Lansdell (1992), 80 ohio app.3d 687 and Smith v. Collins (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 100 when determining whether there had be [SIC] a change in circumstances warranting a modification of appellant's child support obligation. {¶ 21} "II. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bahgat v. Bahgat
neutral
1 sentence2004Bahgat v. Bahgat (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 291 , 293 ]. {¶ 35} "(B) If the noncustodial parent's circumstances have changed substantially and the trial court in its discretion finds it is in the best interest of the children to receive support from that parent, then the trial court can modify the existing child support arrangement, even though the supporting parent is still able to provide the total amount reasonable for the support of the children." (Emphasis added). {¶ 36} However, the Ohio Supreme Court, in DePalmo v. DePalmo, 78 Ohio St.3d 535 , 1997-Ohio-184 , 679 N.E.2d 266 , rejected the "d | 1 | 2004–2004 |
DePalmo v. DePalmo
green
1 sentence2004Bahgat v. Bahgat (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 291 , 293 ]. {¶ 35} "(B) If the noncustodial parent's circumstances have changed substantially and the trial court in its discretion finds it is in the best interest of the children to receive support from that parent, then the trial court can modify the existing child support arrangement, even though the supporting parent is still able to provide the total amount reasonable for the support of the children." (Emphasis added). {¶ 36} However, the Ohio Supreme Court, in DePalmo v. DePalmo, 78 Ohio St.3d 535 , 1997-Ohio-184 , 679 N.E.2d 266 , rejected the "d | 1 | 2004–2004 |