Hunter motion in Ohio

2024“An abuse of 5 discretion is present when a trial court’s decision ‘is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by evidence, or grossly unsound.’” Id., quoting Menke v. Menke, 2015-Ohio-2507 , ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). {¶9} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Hunter’s motion for leave to file a motion for new trial without holding a hearing.

2023The board did compare the facts of Hunter’s case to others involving more egregious misconduct—Terry, McAuliffe, and Gallagher—but those comparison cases all involved the more severe sanction of disbarment and were used to illustrate why disbarment is not appropriate in Hunter’s case. {¶ 37} Hunter asserts that her conduct is more appropriately compared to the conduct at issue in Disciplinary Counsel v. Schmidt, 134 Ohio St.3d 557 , 2012- Ohio-5712, 983 N.E.2d 1310 .

2023The board did compare the facts of Hunter’s case to others involving more egregious misconduct—Terry, McAuliffe, and Gallagher—but those comparison cases all involved the more severe sanction of disbarment and were used to illustrate why disbarment is not appropriate in Hunter’s case. {¶ 37} Hunter asserts that her conduct is more appropriately compared to the conduct at issue in Disciplinary Counsel v. Schmidt, 134 Ohio St.3d 557 , 2012- Ohio-5712, 983 N.E.2d 1310 .

2021However, as fully discussed above, this Court already 13 determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Hunter’s motion for new trial for other reasons articulated in Petro, supra, at syllabus, regarding Mr. Hunter’s failure to show Ms. Jackson’s affidavit, in conjunction with his own affidavit: (1) disclose a strong probability that they will change the result if a new trial is granted; and (2) do not merely impeach or contradict the former evidence.

2015Rather, its opposition to granting Hunter’s motion consists of two parts: first, that Hunter failed to seek a waiver of court costs at the time of sentencing, so the imposition of court costs was res judicata; second, to the extent Hunter relied on R.C. 2947.23(C) as giving the court jurisdiction to modify the court costs, reliance on the statute was misplaced because the statute was not enacted until the day after the court imposed Hunter’s costs and the statute’s use would entail a forbidden, retroactive application of the statute. {¶6} The state’s res judicata argument made below was based

2015Rather, its opposition to granting Hunter’s motion consists of two parts: first, that Hunter failed to seek a waiver of court costs at the time of sentencing, so the imposition of court costs was res judicata; second, to the extent Hunter relied on R.C. 2947.23(C) as giving the court jurisdiction to modify the court costs, reliance on the statute was misplaced because the statute was not enacted until the day after the court imposed Hunter’s costs and the statute’s use would entail a forbidden, retroactive application of the statute. {¶6} The state’s res judicata argument made below was based

2015Rather, its opposition to granting Hunter’s motion consists of two parts: first, that Hunter failed to seek a waiver of court costs at the time of sentencing, so the imposition of court costs was res judicata; second, to the extent Hunter relied on R.C. 2947.23(C) as giving the court jurisdiction to modify the court costs, reliance on the statute was misplaced because the statute was not enacted until the day after the court imposed Hunter’s costs and the statute’s use would entail a forbidden, retroactive application of the statute. {¶6} The state’s res judicata argument made below was based

2013“If this is done beyond [the] danger of reasonable misunderstanding, the purpose of the notice of appeal is accomplished.” Maritime Mfrs., Inc. v. Hi-Skipper Marina, 70 Ohio St.2d 257, 259 , 436 N.E.2d 1034 (1982). {¶11} The notice of appeal Hunter filed on January 28, 2013, indicated that he was appealing the trial court’s entry of conviction and sentence from December 3, 2012.

2013“If this is done beyond [the] danger of reasonable misunderstanding, the purpose of the notice of appeal is accomplished.” Maritime Mfrs., Inc. v. Hi-Skipper Marina, 70 Ohio St.2d 257, 259 , 436 N.E.2d 1034 (1982). {¶11} The notice of appeal Hunter filed on January 28, 2013, indicated that he was appealing the trial court’s entry of conviction and sentence from December 3, 2012.

2012State v. Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 19 , 716 N.E.2d 1126 (1999) (citing United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 597 [6th Cir.1990]). {¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Hunter’s challenge in his direct appeal to counsel’s effectiveness in counseling his jury waiver.

2012State v. Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 19 , 716 N.E.2d 1126 (1999) (citing United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 597 [6th Cir.1990]). {¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Hunter’s challenge in his direct appeal to counsel’s effectiveness in counseling his jury waiver.

2012Id. at 49 . {¶13} The Tyrrell case is distinguishable from Hunter’s claim because we have no evidence of a defective canopy or that BP employees knew about any defective condition or had superior knowledge of any condition that would create a hazard to the business invitees frequenting the store. {¶14} Hunter would have knowledge imputed to BP based on her discovery of salt on the sidewalk in front of the store.

2011First, Hunter argues that the trial court erred in denying a defense request for disclosure of the state’s rebuttal witnesses. {¶ 134} “The criterion for determining whether the state should have provided the name of a witness called for rebuttal is whether the state reasonably should have anticipated that it was likely to call the witness, whether during its case in chief or in rebuttal.” State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 423 , 613 N.E.2d 212 . {¶ 135} Following the defense motion for the names of rebuttal witnesses, the state responded that it was unable to provide this informatio

2011First, Hunter argues that the trial court erred in denying a defense request for disclosure of the state’s rebuttal witnesses. {¶ 134} “The criterion for determining whether the state should have provided the name of a witness called for rebuttal is whether the state reasonably should have anticipated that it was likely to call the witness, whether during its case in chief or in rebuttal.” State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 423 , 613 N.E.2d 212 . {¶ 135} Following the defense motion for the names of rebuttal witnesses, the state responded that it was unable to provide this informatio

2011The State cites State v. Marbury, Montgomery App. No. 19226, 2004-Ohio-1817 , for –5– that proposition. {¶ 20} A close examination of State v. Marbury discloses that the two defenses are not always inconsistent.

2006O'Linn, supra, citing Greenwald v. Wisconsin (1968), 390 U.S. 519 , 20 L.Ed.2d 77 , 88 S.Ct. 1152 ; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164 . {¶ 29} At the hearing on Hunter's motion to suppress, Officer Skiba testified that Hunter was shaken up, but was coherent and appeared to understand her rights.

2006O'Linn, supra, citing Greenwald v. Wisconsin (1968), 390 U.S. 519 , 20 L.Ed.2d 77 , 88 S.Ct. 1152 ; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164 . {¶ 29} At the hearing on Hunter's motion to suppress, Officer Skiba testified that Hunter was shaken up, but was coherent and appeared to understand her rights.

2006O'Linn, supra, citing Greenwald v. Wisconsin (1968), 390 U.S. 519 , 20 L.Ed.2d 77 , 88 S.Ct. 1152 ; State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164 . {¶ 29} At the hearing on Hunter's motion to suppress, Officer Skiba testified that Hunter was shaken up, but was coherent and appeared to understand her rights.