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15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Reyes-Perez v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Accord Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 333 (holding consent was given involuntarily when a reasonable person would not have felt they had the choice to withhold consent to search); Reyes-Perez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 312, 315-19 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref'd) (reversing trial court’s suppression ruling because State failed to prove voluntariness of consent to search by clear and convincing evidence). 2003Accord Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 333 (holding consent was given involuntarily when a reasonable person would not have felt they had the choice to withhold consent to search); Reyes-Perez v. State , 45 S.W.3d 312, 315-19 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref'd) (reversing trial court's suppression ruling because State failed to prove voluntariness of consent to search by clear and convincing evidence). | 3 | 3 |
Carmouche v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Accord Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 333 (holding consent was given involuntarily when a reasonable person would not have felt they had the choice to withhold consent to search); Reyes-Perez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 312, 315-19 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref'd) (reversing trial court’s suppression ruling because State failed to prove voluntariness of consent to search by clear and convincing evidence). 2003Accord Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 333 (holding consent was given involuntarily when a reasonable person would not have felt they had the choice to withhold consent to search); Reyes-Perez v. State , 45 S.W.3d 312, 315-19 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref'd) (reversing trial court's suppression ruling because State failed to prove voluntariness of consent to search by clear and convincing evidence). | 3 | 3 |
Neal v. Stategreen2 sentences2015App. 2008); Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 272 (Tex. Crim. 2015App. 2008); Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 272 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Hunter’s analysis began by reprising Briseno’s admonishment: “Although a jury determined the issue of mental retardation in this 21 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 4–5. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 10 (“There was certainly no indication from the Supreme Court in Atkins that the fact of mental retardation is one that a jury, rather than a judge, must make.”). 24 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 132 (Tex. Crim. 2015Hunter’s analysis began by reprising Briseno’s admonishment: “Although a jury determined the issue of mental retardation in this 21 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 4–5. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 10 (“There was certainly no indication from the Supreme Court in Atkins that the fact of mental retardation is one that a jury, rather than a judge, must make.”). 24 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 132 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Brisenogreen2 sentences2015Hunter’s analysis began by reprising Briseno’s admonishment: “Although a jury determined the issue of mental retardation in this 21 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 4–5. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 10 (“There was certainly no indication from the Supreme Court in Atkins that the fact of mental retardation is one that a jury, rather than a judge, must make.”). 24 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 132 (Tex. Crim. 2015Hunter’s analysis began by reprising Briseno’s admonishment: “Although a jury determined the issue of mental retardation in this 21 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 4–5. 22 Id. 23 Id. at 10 (“There was certainly no indication from the Supreme Court in Atkins that the fact of mental retardation is one that a jury, rather than a judge, must make.”). 24 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 132 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Missouri v. Huntergreen2 sentences2013See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 , 103 S.Ct. 673 . 2013See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 , 103 S.Ct. 673 . | 2 | 2 |
Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp.green1 sentence2021See Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydocarbons Corporation, 98 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Awoniyi v. McWilliamsgreen1 sentence2021See In the Matter of the Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716 , 721 (Tex. 2021) (stating that abuse of discretion standard of review applies to trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial); Awoniyi v. McWilliams, 261 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (stating that abuse-of-discretion 5 standard of review applies to review of trial court’s alleged error in failing to grant motion for new trial and allowing the motion to be overruled by operation of law). | 1 | 1 |
Coronado v. Stategreen1 sentence2017“The Confrontation Clause gives a criminal defendant the right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Valle v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See id. at 509–10. | 1 | 1 |
John Anthony Lopez v. Stategreen1 sentence2015App. 2012). 70 Id. 71 Id.; Lopez v. State, 428 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). 72 Riley, 378 S.W.3d 453 at 458. 73 See U.S. CONST. | 1 | 1 |
Riley, Billy Dee Jr.green2 sentences2015Standard of review and applicable law 67 Hunter brief, p. 1. 68 R.R.III:53. 9 When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is brought in a motion for new trial, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.69 The appellate court reverses the trial court’s motion for new trial only if the trial court’s order “was clearly erroneous and arbitrary.”70 The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the ruling and upheld if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.71 Almost total deference must be shown to a Trial Court’s findings 2015Hunter wanted to avoid a trial and try to reunite his family Trial Counsel admitted that he didn’t advise Hunter about the finding the Trial Court was required to make regarding the best interest of the victim in order to place a defendant on deferred probation.91 Nonetheless, this lack of advice didn’t render his Trial Counsel ineffective or Hunter’s plea involuntary in view of their trial strategy and all of Hunter’s admissions and admonishments. 89 See Riley, 378 S.W.3d at 457 . 90 TEX. | 1 | 1 |
State of Texas v. Guerrero, Ex Parte Marcelinogreen1 sentence2015But, yet, I haven't accepted it, no.” 104 R.R.II: 81-82. 18 he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.105 The plea papers show that Hunter’s attorney and the Trial Court verified that Hunter entered his plea voluntarily and knowingly.106 Hunter failed to show a lack of voluntariness in his plea due to his attestation of voluntariness at the original plea hearing.107 In addition, Hunter’s plea was voluntary in light of the testimony that Hunter wanted to avoid a trial in order to spare the victim from going through a trial.108 There wasn’t a reasonable probability or a believable probabilit | 1 | 1 |
El Paso Production Co. v. Valence Operating Co.green1 sentence2011Co. v. Valence Operating Co., 112 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). 3.Application of Law to Facts In his first, third, and fifth issues, Hunter contends the trial court erred by directing a verdict in favor of PK on Hunter’s claim for breach of contract because the evidence shows that upon termination, but prior to Hunter’s election to take the transferred clients, PK committed a material breach by refusing to perform under the letter agreement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Atkins v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2015Proc. art. 11.071 as suggestion that the Court reconsider its previous denial of relief on Hunter’s claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and ordering further proceedings); Ex parte Wesbrook, No. WR–52120–02 (Tex. Crim. 2015Proc. art. 11.071 as suggestion that the Court reconsider its previous denial of relief on Hunter’s claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and ordering further proceedings); Ex parte Wesbrook, No. WR–52120–02 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Ex Parte Hawkins
green
2 sentences2013I do not contend that there is any possibility that State would prevail under a Hunter analysis. 34 Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d at 560 . 35 Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d at 436 n.3. 36 In addition to the fact that the robbery statute contains the “places . . . in fear of” language not present in the assault statute, the robbery statute contains the word “death” not found in the assault statute, and the assault statute contains the phrase “including the person’s spouse” not contained in the robbery statute. 2013I do not contend that there is any possibility that State would prevail under a Hunter analysis. 34 Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d at 560 . 35 Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d at 436 n.3. 36 In addition to the fact that the robbery statute contains the “places . . . in fear of” language not present in the assault statute, the robbery statute contains the word “death” not found in the assault statute, and the assault statute contains the phrase “including the person’s spouse” not contained in the robbery statute. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
De La Paz v. State
green
1 sentence2022A trial court’s ruling is generally considered to fall within this zone if the evidence establishes “1) an extraneous transaction is relevant to a material, non-propensity issue, and 2) the probative value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 3 The specific references in Hunter’s brief pertain to State’s exhibits 22, 26, 27, and 29. 7 confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Scott
green
1 sentence2021Co., 873 S.W.2d at 382 . 7 Under the facts asserted in Hunter’s motion for new trial, Hunter’s attorney actually received in his spam folder the email giving notice of the summary- judgment motion and hearing; therefore, Hunter is not excused from satisfying the second and third Craddock elements. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Eberstein v. Hunter
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bell v. State
green
2 sentences2013I do not contend that there is any possibility that State would prevail under a Hunter analysis. 34 Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d at 560 . 35 Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d at 436 n.3. 36 In addition to the fact that the robbery statute contains the “places . . . in fear of” language not present in the assault statute, the robbery statute contains the word “death” not found in the assault statute, and the assault statute contains the phrase “including the person’s spouse” not contained in the robbery statute. 2013I do not contend that there is any possibility that State would prevail under a Hunter analysis. 34 Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d at 560 . 35 Bell v. State, 693 S.W.2d at 436 n.3. 36 In addition to the fact that the robbery statute contains the “places . . . in fear of” language not present in the assault statute, the robbery statute contains the word “death” not found in the assault statute, and the assault statute contains the phrase “including the person’s spouse” not contained in the robbery statute. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ohio v. Robinette
green
2 sentences2003The State’s Points 1 to 4 The State’s first four points contend that the trial court erred by granting Hunter’s motion to suppress because: (1) the ruling violates the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 , 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); (2) Officer Keller acted reasonably; and (3) the ruling was based on the erroneous conclusion that Hunter’s continued detention exceeded the scope of the stop when, in fact, (4) Hunter’s detention had ended by the time Officer Keller asked for permission to search. 2003The State’s Points 1 to 4 The State’s first four points contend that the trial court erred by granting Hunter’s motion to suppress because: (1) the ruling violates the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 , 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); (2) Officer Keller acted reasonably; and (3) the ruling was based on the erroneous conclusion that Hunter’s continued detention exceeded the scope of the stop when, in fact, (4) Hunter’s detention had ended by the time Officer Keller asked for permission to search. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.