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14 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Burton v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2026Comm., 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172 (1989). {¶ 23} Because a VSSR is a penalty, it must be strictly construed, and all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer. 2009Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172 , 545 N.E.2d 1216 , declared that because an award for a VSSR was a penalty against the employer, specific safety requirements “must be strictly construed, and all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer.” (Emphasis added.) ITE does not deny that Ohio Adm.Code 4123:l-5-14(G)(l) applies to the load-carrying equipment at issue. | 2 | 6 |
Thompson Electric, Inc. v. Bank Onegreen1 sentence2024“To construe or interpret what is already plain is not interpretation but legislation, which is not the function of courts.” Thompson Elec. v. Bank One, 37 Ohio St.3d 259, 264 (1988). {¶ 15} Because an award for a VSSR is a penalty against the employer, specific safety requirements “must be strictly construed, and all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer.” State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Lamp v. J.A. Croson Co.green1 sentence2008Lamp , at 81. {¶ 43} Moreover, because a VSSR award is a penalty, the rule of strict construction applies and all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety rule must be resolved in the employer's favor. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Sanor Sawmill, Inc. v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences2006Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2004-Ohio-718 , at ¶ 14 , 25, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that: * * * Because an additional award for a VSSR is, however, a penalty, it requires strict construction of the safety requirement, and "all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer." State ex rel. 2004Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2004-Ohio-718 , the Ohio Supreme Court stated, at ¶ 14, 25: * * * Because an additional award for a VSSR is, however, a penalty, it requires strict construction of the safety requirement, and "all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer." State ex rel. | 2 | 2004–2006 |
State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co.
green
1 sentence2022Id., citing State ex rel. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State ex rel. American Home Products Corp. v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence2021Comm. (1986), 39 Ohio St.3d 317 , ("[b]ecause a VSSR award is a penalty…it must be strictly construed and all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its applicability to the employer."). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State ex rel. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. v. Lancaster
green
2 sentences2017Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. v. Lancaster , 22 Ohio St.3d 191 , 193, 489 N.E.2d 288 (1986). {¶ 28} Whether the commission has granted or denied a VSSR award, we must deny a writ of mandamus that would substitute our judgment for the commission's judgment if there is a "bona fide difference of opinion as to the interpretation of the safety requirement in question." State ex rel. 2017Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. v. Lancaster , 22 Ohio St.3d 191 , 193, 489 N.E.2d 288 (1986). {¶ 28} Whether the commission has granted or denied a VSSR award, we must deny a writ of mandamus that would substitute our judgment for the commission's judgment if there is a "bona fide difference of opinion as to the interpretation of the safety requirement in question." State ex rel. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State Ex Rel. Richmond v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2017Comm. , 139 Ohio St.3d 157 , 2014-Ohio-1604 , 10 N.E.3d 683 , ¶ 25, 28. {¶ 27} Applying that stringent, deferential standard, we have required a claimant challenging the commission's denial of a VSSR award to "establish that his or her injury resulted from the employer's failure to comply with a specific safety requirement" while construing "all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard * * * against its applicability to the employer." State ex rel. 2017Comm. , 139 Ohio St.3d 157 , 2014-Ohio-1604 , 10 N.E.3d 683 , ¶ 25, 28. {¶ 27} Applying that stringent, deferential standard, we have required a claimant challenging the commission's denial of a VSSR award to "establish that his or her injury resulted from the employer's failure to comply with a specific safety requirement" while construing "all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation of the safety standard * * * against its applicability to the employer." State ex rel. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State Ex Rel. Wilms v. Blake
green
2 sentences2017Wilms v. Blake , 144 Ohio St. 619 , 627, 60 N.E.2d 308 (1945). {¶ 29} The Ohio Constitution demands no less deference, and it probably demands more. 2017Wilms v. Blake , 144 Ohio St. 619 , 627, 60 N.E.2d 308 (1945). {¶ 29} The Ohio Constitution demands no less deference, and it probably demands more. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State ex rel. Trydle v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1991Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 257 , 61 O.O.2d 488 , 291 N.E.2d 748 , paragraph one of the syllabus, that: “The term ‘specific requirement’ * * * does not comprehend a general course of conduct or general duties or obligations flowing from the relation of employer and employee, but embraces such lawful, specific and definite requirements or standards of conduct as are prescribed by statute or by orders of the Industrial Commission, and which are of a character plainly to apprise an employer of his legal obligation toward his employees.” In that an award for a violation of a specific safety requir 1991Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 257 , 61 O.O.2d 488 , 291 N.E.2d 748 , paragraph one of the syllabus, that: “The term ‘specific requirement’ * * * does not comprehend a general course of conduct or general duties or obligations flowing from the relation of employer and employee, but embraces such lawful, specific and definite requirements or standards of conduct as are prescribed by statute or by orders of the Industrial Commission, and which are of a character plainly to apprise an employer of his legal obligation toward his employees.” In that an award for a violation of a specific safety requir | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State Ex Rel. Watson v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence1989Watson, supra, at 358, 29 OBR at 487, 505 N.E. 2d at 1019 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |