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14 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1996–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2020See Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278 , 2015-Ohio-3731, ¶ 29 (“[A] court should avoid reaching constitutional issues if a case can be decided on other grounds.”). {¶10} R.C. 2903.41(A) provides: 4 “Violent offender” means any of the following: (1) A person who on or after the effective date of this section is convicted of or pleads guilty to any of the following: (a) A violation of section 2903.01, 2903.02, 2903.03, 2905.01 of the Revised Code or a violation of section 2905.02 of the Revised Code that is a felony of the second degree; (b) Any 2020See Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278 , 2015-Ohio-3731, ¶ 29 (“[A] court should avoid reaching constitutional issues if a case can be decided on other grounds.”). {¶10} R.C. 2903.41(A) provides: 4 “Violent offender” means any of the following: (1) A person who on or after the effective date of this section is convicted of or pleads guilty to any of the following: (a) A violation of section 2903.01, 2903.02, 2903.03, 2905.01 of the Revised Code or a violation of section 2905.02 of the Revised Code that is a felony of the second degree; (b) Any | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hubbardgreen1 sentence2020See also Hubbard, 2020-Ohio-856, at ¶ 23-24 ; State v. Jarvis, 5th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Dayton v. Galluzzogreen1 sentence2017Montgomery No. 25913, 2014-Ohio-4854, ¶ 8-9, 11 (municipal court had jurisdiction over defendant for committing a traffic offense within its territorial jurisdiction in violation of a city ordinance); Galluzzo, 2014-Ohio-3260, at ¶ 3, 11-12 (municipal court had subject matter corporation within its territory, unless the violation is a civil violation based upon evidence recorded by a traffic law photo-monitoring device and issued pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 4511.093 of the Revised Code or the violation is required to be handled by a parking violations bureau or joint parking violati | 1 | 1 |
Village of St. Paris v. Galluzzogreen1 sentence2017Montgomery No. 25913, 2014-Ohio-4854, ¶ 8-9, 11 (municipal court had jurisdiction over defendant for committing a traffic offense within its territorial jurisdiction in violation of a city ordinance); Galluzzo, 2014-Ohio-3260, at ¶ 3, 11-12 (municipal court had subject matter corporation within its territory, unless the violation is a civil violation based upon evidence recorded by a traffic law photo-monitoring device and issued pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 4511.093 of the Revised Code or the violation is required to be handled by a parking violations bureau or joint parking violati | 1 | 1 |
Ohio State Board of Pharmacy v. Frantzgreen1 sentence2007See, also, Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 143 , 145 . 6 {¶ 48} Thus, under R.C. 119.09 , as a remedy for a witness's disobedience or neglect of a subpoena duces tecum, the board does not have express authority to exclude a witness's testimony at an adjudication hearing as a sanction for refusing to comply with the board's subpoena duces tecum. | 1 | 1 |
Bosher v. Euclid Income Tax Board of Reviewgreen1 sentence2005See Bosher, 99 Ohio St.3d 330 , at ¶ 14 (where the court applies the Revised Code's rule of statutory construction to a city's ordinances). {¶ 43} First, we return to the Supreme Court's statement that zoning resolutions and the like are in derogation of the common law and deprive a property owner of certain uses of his land to which he would otherwise be lawfully entitled. | 1 | 1 |
University Circle, Inc. v. City of Clevelandgreen1 sentence2005See University Circle, 56 Ohio St.2d at 184 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Townsend v. Burke
green
2 sentences2022Because the sentence was within statutory limits, “the severity of the sentence is not a basis for seeking relief on direct appeal.” State v. Holbrook, 3d Dist. Hardin Nos. 6-19-14 and 6-19-15, 2020-Ohio-4100, ¶ 5 , citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 , 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948). {¶21} Furthermore, contrary to Newman’s argument, a review of the record indicates that the trial court considered Newman’s record. 2022Because the sentence was within statutory limits, “the severity of the sentence is not a basis for seeking relief on direct appeal.” State v. Holbrook, 3d Dist. Hardin Nos. 6-19-14 and 6-19-15, 2020-Ohio-4100, ¶ 5 , citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 , 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948). {¶21} Furthermore, contrary to Newman’s argument, a review of the record indicates that the trial court considered Newman’s record. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Holbrook
neutral
1 sentence2022Because the sentence was within statutory limits, “the severity of the sentence is not a basis for seeking relief on direct appeal.” State v. Holbrook, 3d Dist. Hardin Nos. 6-19-14 and 6-19-15, 2020-Ohio-4100, ¶ 5 , citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 , 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948). {¶21} Furthermore, contrary to Newman’s argument, a review of the record indicates that the trial court considered Newman’s record. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Aalim (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2020In making this decision, “the juvenile court shall consider the factors listed in division (D) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code as factors indicating that the motion should be granted, shall consider the factors listed in division (E) of that section as factors indicating that the motion should not be granted, and shall consider whether the applicable factors listed in division (D) of that section outweigh the applicable factors listed in division (E) of that section.” Id. 2020In making this decision, “the juvenile court shall consider the factors listed in division (D) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code as factors indicating that the motion should be granted, shall consider the factors listed in division (E) of that section as factors indicating that the motion should not be granted, and shall consider whether the applicable factors listed in division (D) of that section outweigh the applicable factors listed in division (E) of that section.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Blankenship (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2017The offense of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.04 qualifies as a "sexually oriented offense" under the following circumstances set forth in R.C. 2950.01(A) : (2) * * * when the offender is less than four years older than the other person with whom the offender engaged in sexual conduct, the other person did not consent to the sexual conduct, and the offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2907.02, 2907.03, or 2907.04 of the Revised Code or a violation of former section 2907.12 of the Revised Code ; (3) * * * when 2017The offense of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.04 qualifies as a "sexually oriented offense" under the following circumstances set forth in R.C. 2950.01(A) : (2) * * * when the offender is less than four years older than the other person with whom the offender engaged in sexual conduct, the other person did not consent to the sexual conduct, and the offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2907.02, 2907.03, or 2907.04 of the Revised Code or a violation of former section 2907.12 of the Revised Code ; (3) * * * when | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Barnhouse
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Woods v. Telb
red
2 sentences2013He argues that that part of the trial court’s sentence imposing a license suspension precludes the registrar from complying with R.C. 4511.191(B)(2), and is therefore void as not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms. {¶18} In support, Antol cites to a line of post-release control cases that addressed, on narrow grounds, a trial court’s non-compliance with post-release control statutes: State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 ; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 , 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984), Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). 2013He argues that that part of the trial court’s sentence imposing a license suspension precludes the registrar from complying with R.C. 4511.191(B)(2), and is therefore void as not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms. {¶18} In support, Antol cites to a line of post-release control cases that addressed, on narrow grounds, a trial court’s non-compliance with post-release control statutes: State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 ; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 , 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984), Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2013He argues that that part of the trial court’s sentence imposing a license suspension precludes the registrar from complying with R.C. 4511.191(B)(2), and is therefore void as not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms. {¶18} In support, Antol cites to a line of post-release control cases that addressed, on narrow grounds, a trial court’s non-compliance with post-release control statutes: State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 ; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 , 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984), Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). 2013He argues that that part of the trial court’s sentence imposing a license suspension precludes the registrar from complying with R.C. 4511.191(B)(2), and is therefore void as not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms. {¶18} In support, Antol cites to a line of post-release control cases that addressed, on narrow grounds, a trial court’s non-compliance with post-release control statutes: State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 ; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 , 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984), Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Beasley
red
2 sentences2013He argues that that part of the trial court’s sentence imposing a license suspension precludes the registrar from complying with R.C. 4511.191(B)(2), and is therefore void as not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms. {¶18} In support, Antol cites to a line of post-release control cases that addressed, on narrow grounds, a trial court’s non-compliance with post-release control statutes: State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 ; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 , 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984), Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). 2013He argues that that part of the trial court’s sentence imposing a license suspension precludes the registrar from complying with R.C. 4511.191(B)(2), and is therefore void as not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms. {¶18} In support, Antol cites to a line of post-release control cases that addressed, on narrow grounds, a trial court’s non-compliance with post-release control statutes: State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 ; State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 , 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984), Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Barron
green
1 sentence2012The imposition of a prison term for the post-release control violation shall terminate the period of post-release control for the earlier felony. [Cite as State v. Barron, 2012-Ohio-5787 .] (2) Impose a sanction under sections 2929.15 to 2929.18 of the Revised Code for the violation that shall be served concurrently or consecutively, as specified by the court, with any community control sanctions for the new felony. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Cook
yellow
1 sentence2009In these cases we cited the Supreme Court of Ohio's decisions in Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , and State v. Williams , 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2000-Ohio-428 ; to conclude that classifying an offender under S.B. 10, where the offender committed the acts prior to the effective date of the law, did *Page 8 not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prohibition on retroactive laws, or the Double Jeopardy clauses. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2009In these cases we cited the Supreme Court of Ohio's decisions in Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , and State v. Williams , 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2000-Ohio-428 ; to conclude that classifying an offender under S.B. 10, where the offender committed the acts prior to the effective date of the law, did *Page 8 not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prohibition on retroactive laws, or the Double Jeopardy clauses. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Smith, 1-07-58 (6-30-2008)
green
1 sentence2009A portion of the requirements for a Tier III classification are as follows: (G) "Tier III sex offender/child-victim offender" means any of the following: *Page 7 (1) A sex offender who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, has been convicted of, or has pleaded guilty to any of the following sexually oriented offenses: (a) A violation of section 2907.02 or 2907.03 of the Revised Code; (b) A violation of division (B) of section 2907.05 of the Revised Code; (c) A violation of section 2903.01 , 2903.02 , or 2903.11 of the Revised Code when the violation was committed with a sexual motivation; (d) A v | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Worthy
green
1 sentence2009In these cases we cited the Supreme Court of Ohio's decisions in Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , and State v. Williams , 88 Ohio St.3d 513 , 2000-Ohio-428 ; to conclude that classifying an offender under S.B. 10, where the offender committed the acts prior to the effective date of the law, did *Page 8 not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prohibition on retroactive laws, or the Double Jeopardy clauses. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Matter of Gant, 1-08-11 (10-6-2008)
green
1 sentence2009A portion of the requirements for a Tier III classification are as follows: (G) "Tier III sex offender/child-victim offender" means any of the following: *Page 7 (1) A sex offender who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, has been convicted of, or has pleaded guilty to any of the following sexually oriented offenses: (a) A violation of section 2907.02 or 2907.03 of the Revised Code; (b) A violation of division (B) of section 2907.05 of the Revised Code; (c) A violation of section 2903.01 , 2903.02 , or 2903.11 of the Revised Code when the violation was committed with a sexual motivation; (d) A v | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In re Guardianship of Lombardo
green
2 sentences2002In re Guardianship of Lombardo (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 600, 605 , 716 N.E.2d 189, 193-194 . {¶ 22} R.C. 5703.54 states: “(A) A taxpayer aggrieved by an action or omission of an officer or employee of the department of taxation may bring an action for damages * * * if all the following apply: “(1) In the action or omission the officer or employee frivolously disregards a provision of Chapter 5711., 5733., 5739., 5741., or 5747. of the Revised Code or a rule of the tax commissioner adopted under the authority of one of those chapters; “(2) The action or omission occurred with respect to an audit o 2002In re Guardianship of Lombardo (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 600, 605 , 716 N.E.2d 189, 193-194 . {¶ 22} R.C. 5703.54 states: “(A) A taxpayer aggrieved by an action or omission of an officer or employee of the department of taxation may bring an action for damages * * * if all the following apply: “(1) In the action or omission the officer or employee frivolously disregards a provision of Chapter 5711., 5733., 5739., 5741., or 5747. of the Revised Code or a rule of the tax commissioner adopted under the authority of one of those chapters; “(2) The action or omission occurred with respect to an audit o | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hoge v. Liquor Control Comm.
green
1 sentence2001Hoge v. Liquor Control Comm. (1969), 18 Ohio App.2d 255 ; Our Place. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
In Re Appeal of Mendlowitz
green
2 sentences1996Buckeye Bar v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., supra; In re Appeal of Mendlowitz (1967), 9 Ohio App.2d 83 , 38 O.O.2d 77 , 222 N.E.2d 835 . 1996Buckeye Bar v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., supra; In re Appeal of Mendlowitz (1967), 9 Ohio App.2d 83 , 38 O.O.2d 77 , 222 N.E.2d 835 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.