proceeds claim in Oklahoma

1999Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Associates Transports, Inc., 1973 OK 62 , 512 P.2d 137, 140 .

1995Oklahoma law has also consistently required that every action be prosecuted by the “real party in interest,” that is, the party legally entitled to the proceeds of a claim in litigation. 12 O.S. § 2017(A); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Associates Transports, Inc., 512 P.2d 137 (Okla.1973); C & C Tile Co., Inc. v. Independent School Dist.

1997Co. v. Associates Transports, Inc., Okl., 512 P.2d 137, 140 (1973)) or the party that has "the right to receive and control the fruits and benefits of the litigation.” Schoenfeld v. Blair, Old., 366 P.2d 414, 415 (1961).

1997Co. v. Associates Transports, Inc., Okl., 512 P.2d 137, 140 (1973)) or the party that has "the right to receive and control the fruits and benefits of the litigation." Schoenfeld v. Blair, Okl., 366 P.2d 414, 415 (1961).

1992Great Western Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cozard, 417 P.2d 575, 578 (Okla.1966). 2 “The real party in interest is the party legally entitled to the proceeds of a claim in litigation.” Aetna Casualty & Sur.

1973The United States Supreme Court stated the rationale for the rule in Neblett v. MacFarland, 92 U.S. 101, 103 , 23 L.Ed. 471, 472 (1876): "* * * The court proceeds on the principle that, as the transaction ought never to have taken place the parties are to be placed as far as possible in the situation in which they would have stood if there had never been any such transaction." The cause is therefore reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to assess the value of the land in question and the annual rental value thereof.

1973The United States Supreme Court stated the rationale for the rule in Neblett v. MacFarland, 92 U.S. 101, 103 , 23 L.Ed. 471, 472 (1876): "* * * The court proceeds on the principle that, as the transaction ought never to have taken place the parties are to be placed as far as possible in the situation in which they would have stood if there had never been any such transaction." The cause is therefore reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to assess the value of the land in question and the annual rental value thereof.

1963See Schmidt et al. v. Nash, 203 Okl. 21 , 217 P.2d 830 and McMahan et al. v. McCafferty, 205 Okl. 656 , 240 P.2d 443 .

1963See Schmidt et al. v. Nash, 203 Okl. 21 , 217 P.2d 830 and McMahan et al. v. McCafferty, 205 Okl. 656 , 240 P.2d 443 .

1963See Schmidt et al. v. Nash, 203 Okl. 21 , 217 P.2d 830 and McMahan et al. v. McCafferty, 205 Okl. 656 , 240 P.2d 443 .

1963See Schmidt et al. v. Nash, 203 Okl. 21 , 217 P.2d 830 and McMahan et al. v. McCafferty, 205 Okl. 656 , 240 P.2d 443 .

1963See A. Helm & Son v. Briley, 17 Okl. 314 , 87 P. 595 , where it was said in the second paragraph of the syllabus that “Under the requirement of the Oklahoma statute that a demurrer shall specify distinctly the grounds therefor, a question of defect of parties, which is made a ground of demurrer, cannot be raised under a general demurrer alleging simply a want of facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” Since the conclusion reached herein will necessitate trial of the case below, we point out that on repeated occasions we have held that the “real party in interest” is the one entitled to t

1963See A. Helm & Son v. Briley, 17 Okl. 314 , 87 P. 595 , where it was said in the second paragraph of the syllabus that “Under the requirement of the Oklahoma statute that a demurrer shall specify distinctly the grounds therefor, a question of defect of parties, which is made a ground of demurrer, cannot be raised under a general demurrer alleging simply a want of facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” Since the conclusion reached herein will necessitate trial of the case below, we point out that on repeated occasions we have held that the “real party in interest” is the one entitled to t