proceeds claim in New York

2025Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest under CPLR 5001(a) on plaintiff's share of the net proceeds from the sale of the apartment ( see Rubin v Rubin , 1 AD3d 220, 221 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 706 [2004]).

1989There,. the Court of Appeals held that a "drawer of a check may sue a depositary bank which accepts the check and pays out the proceeds in violation of a forged restrictive indorsement * * * based on either money had and received or conversion, at least in those cases in which the indorsement, albeit forged, is nonetheless ‘effective’ ” (supra, 46 NY2d, at 462 ).

1985This right [has been] apparently universally accepted in practice, particularly where the agency [has] obtained as assignment not of the claim itself, but of the proceeds of the claim (NY Legis Ann, 1964, p 316)” (Baker v Sterling, 39 NY2d 397, 404 , supra; see also, Snell v Wyman, 281 F Supp 853 , affd 393 US 323 ).

1976In Hawthorne v Hawthorne ( 13 NY2d 82, 83 ) the question presented was "whether the proceeds of a standard fire insurance policy insuring the interest of plaintiff wife and defendant husband as tenants by the entirety of real property must be divided at the demand of one of the owners or are impressed in equity with the inseverable quality of the ownership of the realty against whose loss they are payable.” The court first reiterated the well settled rule "that there can be no holding by the entirety in personalty”.

1958This motion by plaintiff, for judgment on the pleadings, presents for determination the question whether an act of Congress which states that “ no part of the amount appropriated in this Act shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim ’ ’ prohibits plaintiff from receiving payment for his legal services out of funds of defendant other than the proceeds of the claim. (68 U. S. Stat. A160; Private Law 656, ch. 720.) Since payment of the claim is dependent upon Congressional action, which cannot be compelled, Con

1958This motion by plaintiff, for judgment on the pleadings, presents for determination the question whether an act of Congress which states that “ no part of the amount appropriated in this Act shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim ’ ’ prohibits plaintiff from receiving payment for his legal services out of funds of defendant other than the proceeds of the claim. (68 U. S. Stat. A160; Private Law 656, ch. 720.) Since payment of the claim is dependent upon Congressional action, which cannot be compelled, Con

1958Lines, 43 F. Supp. 94 , affd. on opinion below, 125 F. 2d 551 [C.

1958Lines, 43 F. Supp. 94 , affd. on opinion below, 125 F. 2d 551 [C.

1940In Langley v. Westchester Trust Company ( 180 N. Y. 326 ) language of a residuary clause similar to that in this will is discussed, and we find the following (at p.« 331): “ When he subsequently directs that ‘ whatever moneys may remain in the hands of my said executors after the payment of the foregoing bequests ’ are to be divided and paid out in certain proportions to certain residuary legatees, while it is clear that he intended the specific bequests to take effect, it is equally clear that he intended making a testamentary disposition of all of his estate and such an intention is only eff

1940In Langley v. Westchester Trust Company ( 180 N. Y. 326 ) language of a residuary clause similar to that in this will is discussed, and we find the following (at p.« 331): “ When he subsequently directs that ‘ whatever moneys may remain in the hands of my said executors after the payment of the foregoing bequests ’ are to be divided and paid out in certain proportions to certain residuary legatees, while it is clear that he intended the specific bequests to take effect, it is equally clear that he intended making a testamentary disposition of all of his estate and such an intention is only eff

1940In Langley v. Westchester Trust Company ( 180 N. Y. 326 ) language of a residuary clause similar to that in this will is discussed, and we find the following (at p.« 331): “ When he subsequently directs that ‘ whatever moneys may remain in the hands of my said executors after the payment of the foregoing bequests ’ are to be divided and paid out in certain proportions to certain residuary legatees, while it is clear that he intended the specific bequests to take effect, it is equally clear that he intended making a testamentary disposition of all of his estate and such an intention is only eff

1927(Mellen v. Banning, 72 Hun, 176 .) The power of sale contained in this will is clear and unambiguous and leaves no doubt as to the intention of the testator.

1884(Remick v. Sandford, 120 Mass., 309 ; Heermance v. Taylor, 14 Hun, 149 ; Hewes v. Jordan, 39 Md., 582 ; Curtis v. Pugh, 10 Ad. & Ellis [N. S.], 111; Ham v. Van Orden, 4 Hun. 709 ; and cases before cited.) At the time this agreement was made the appellant had possession of the property as bailee, with full power to sell it and apply the proceeds on his claim, and that relation and right existed at the-time of the sale of the horse, and were necessarily not affected by the agreement in question.