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11 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eagles Five, LLC v. Lawtongreen1 sentence2022See Eagles Five, 250 Or App at 424-25 (reviewing evidence of the parties’ intent in 1988, when the property was severed and conveyed, as the “central issue” on an implied easement claim). *827 expected to have9 —defendants failed to prove that fact and, accordingly, failed to prove the need for the easement as a factor in their favor.10 Defendants have not identified any other factors as weighing in favor of an implied easement, but we have reviewed all of the factors. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Schuhgreen1 sentence2020Cf. Thompson, 286 Or at 214 (in which necessity was the “cor- nerstone” of the plaintiff’s implied-easement claim). | 1 | 1 |
Garrett v. Muellergreen1 sentence2016See Garrett, 144 Or App at 341 (prior use is one factor among many relevant to an implied easement claim); see also Venture Properties, Inc., 223 Or App at 336 (stating directed verdict standard under ORCP 54 B(2)). | 1 | 1 |
Dayton v. Jordangreen1 sentence2016As we have explained, in evaluating implied easement claims, no one factor has controlling effect; if a claimant produces other relevant evidence in support of an implied easement claim, the court must consider it. 280 Or App at 242-43; see also Dayton I, 279 Or App at 754-55 ; Eagles Five, LLC, 250 Or App at 424. | 1 | 1 |
Venture Properties, Inc. v. Parkergreen1 sentence2016See Garrett, 144 Or App at 341 (prior use is one factor among many relevant to an implied easement claim); see also Venture Properties, Inc., 223 Or App at 336 (stating directed verdict standard under ORCP 54 B(2)). | 1 | 1 |
Bloomfield v. Weaklandgreen2 sentences2016See Bloomfield v. Weakland, 193 Or App 784 , 92 P3d 749 (2004) (Bloomfield I), aff'd on other grounds, 339 Or 504 , 123 P3d 275 (2005) (Bloomfield II); Bloomfield III, 224 Or App 433 . 2016See Bloomfield v. Weakland, 193 Or App 784 , 92 P3d 749 (2004) (Bloomfield I), aff'd on other grounds, 339 Or 504 , 123 P3d 275 (2005) (Bloomfield II); Bloomfield III, 224 Or App 433 . | 1 | 1 |
Bloomfield v. Weaklandgreen2 sentences2016See Bloomfield v. Weakland, 193 Or App 784 , 92 P3d 749 (2004) (Bloomfield I), aff'd on other grounds, 339 Or 504 , 123 P3d 275 (2005) (Bloomfield II); Bloomfield III, 224 Or App 433 . 2016See Bloomfield v. Weakland, 193 Or App 784 , 92 P3d 749 (2004) (Bloomfield I), aff'd on other grounds, 339 Or 504 , 123 P3d 275 (2005) (Bloomfield II); Bloomfield III, 224 Or App 433 . | 1 | 1 |
Cheney v. Muellergreen2 sentences2012See id. (“manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance” is one factor that may be important in implying an easement). 2012The factors to be considered “are variables rather than absolutes and [n]one can be given a fixed value.” Id. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Here, with respect to the central issue in an implied easement claim — the intent of the parties — the trial court found that in 1988 (as well as 1995) “there was an implied intent that Defendants would have a continued right to transport water across Plaintiffs’ RV property to the pump house[.]” As part of its determination that the parties intended an easement for the 1973 pipeline, the court found that the evidence was “clear” that defend | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dayton v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2024While evidence of prior use “cannot of itself establish an easement,” it “strongly support[s] an implied easement claim, because prior use consistent with a claim provides a firm basis from which to infer intent.” Dayton v. Jordan, 280 Or App 236, 242 , 381 P3d 1041 (2016). *211 The record does not establish use of the flag stem to access parcel 2 until after the 1997 conveyance had occurred. 2024While evidence of prior use “cannot of itself establish an easement,” it “strongly support[s] an implied easement claim, because prior use consistent with a claim provides a firm basis from which to infer intent.” Dayton v. Jordan, 280 Or App 236, 242 , 381 P3d 1041 (2016). *211 The record does not establish use of the flag stem to access parcel 2 until after the 1997 conveyance had occurred. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
King v. Talcott
green
2 sentences1990In King v. Talcott, 80 Or App 701, 705-06 , 723 P2d 1058 , rev den 302 Or 158 (1986), we drew a distinction between a reformation claim and an implied easement claim. 1990In King v. Talcott, 80 Or App 701, 705-06 , 723 P2d 1058 , rev den 302 Or 158 (1986), we drew a distinction between a reformation claim and an implied easement claim. | 2 | 1988–1990 |
Ellis v. Abbott
green
2 sentences1988Thus, defendant’s successful defense against the implied easement claim did not amount to an enforcement of the covenant. “2 The court held: “ ‘[A] vendee who, after an unavailing notice to his vendor, unsuccessfully defends the title that has been warranted to him is entitled to recover from the vendor as a part of the damages the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees for making the defense.’ 69 Or at 240 . 1986Affirmed on appeal; on cross-appeal, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for award of attorney fees on the reformation claim only. 1 This document was labeled “Judgment Order.” The Oregon Supreme Court has stated: “The term ‘judgment order’ has no meaning and should not be used. ‘Judgment’ and ‘order’ are two separate terms and have different meanings.” Ensley v. Fitzwater, 293 Or 158 , 162 n 2, 645 P2d 1062 (1982). 2 The court held: “[A] vendee who, after an unavailing notice to his vendor, unsuccessfully defends the title that has been warranted to him is entitled to recover from | 2 | 1986–1988 |
Dressler v. Isaacs
green
1 sentence2020Reasonable necessity is a line drawn somewhere between literal necessity and mere convenience, being driven by policy considerations, but ultimately being judged by “what a reasonable grantee would be justified in expecting as a part of his bargain when he purchases land under the particular circumstances.” Dressler, 217 Or at 598-99 . “[R]easonable necessity should not be grounded in mere convenience, but rather in the necessity appearing from the apparent purpose, the adaptability, and the known use to which the property is to be put.” Manusos, 263 Or App at 733 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Manusos v. Skeels
green
1 sentence2020Reasonable necessity is a line drawn somewhere between literal necessity and mere convenience, being driven by policy considerations, but ultimately being judged by “what a reasonable grantee would be justified in expecting as a part of his bargain when he purchases land under the particular circumstances.” Dressler, 217 Or at 598-99 . “[R]easonable necessity should not be grounded in mere convenience, but rather in the necessity appearing from the apparent purpose, the adaptability, and the known use to which the property is to be put.” Manusos, 263 Or App at 733 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Williams v. SALEM WOMEN'S CLINIC
green
1 sentence2020Because that evidence provides “some basis” for the implied easement claim, it was not “ ‘entirely devoid’ of support when it was made.” Williams, *261 245 Or App at 484 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bloomfield v. Weakland
green
1 sentence2016See Bloomfield v. Weakland, 193 Or App 784 , 92 P3d 749 (2004) (Bloomfield I), aff'd on other grounds, 339 Or 504 , 123 P3d 275 (2005) (Bloomfield II); Bloomfield III, 224 Or App 433 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ensley v. Fitzwater
green
2 sentences1986Affirmed on appeal; on cross-appeal, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for award of attorney fees on the reformation claim only. 1 This document was labeled “Judgment Order.” The Oregon Supreme Court has stated: “The term ‘judgment order’ has no meaning and should not be used. ‘Judgment’ and ‘order’ are two separate terms and have different meanings.” Ensley v. Fitzwater, 293 Or 158 , 162 n 2, 645 P2d 1062 (1982). 2 The court held: “[A] vendee who, after an unavailing notice to his vendor, unsuccessfully defends the title that has been warranted to him is entitled to recover from 1986Affirmed on appeal; on cross-appeal, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for award of attorney fees on the reformation claim only. 1 This document was labeled “Judgment Order.” The Oregon Supreme Court has stated: “The term ‘judgment order’ has no meaning and should not be used. ‘Judgment’ and ‘order’ are two separate terms and have different meanings.” Ensley v. Fitzwater, 293 Or 158 , 162 n 2, 645 P2d 1062 (1982). 2 The court held: “[A] vendee who, after an unavailing notice to his vendor, unsuccessfully defends the title that has been warranted to him is entitled to recover from | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.