79 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2008–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Byrd v. Hallgreen2 sentences2014“It is not enough for the moving party to challenge the nonmoving party to ‘put up or shut up’ or even to cast doubt on a party’s ability to prove an element at trial.” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 .8 “If the moving party is unable to make the required showing, then its motion for summary judgment will fail.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). 2013“It is not enough for the moving party to challenge that nonmoving party to ‘put up or shut up’ or even to cast doubt on a party’s ability to prove an element at trial.” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 . 11 “If the moving party is unable to make the required showing, then its motion for summary judgment will fail.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn.1993)). | 52 | 53 |
Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co.red2 sentences2015The dissent does not explain how a grant of summary judgment based on the passage of a discovery cutoff date would square with a core holding in Hannan—that it is “not enough for the moving party to challenge the nonmoving party to „put up or shut up‟ or even to cast doubt on a party‟s ability to prove an element at trial” and that it will not suffice for the moving party to “simply show that the nonmoving party „lacks evidence to prove an essential element of its claim.‟” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 . 2015The dissent does not explain how a grant of summary judgment based on the passage of a discovery cutoff date would square with a cox-e holding in Hannan—that it is “not enough for the moving party to challenge the nonmoving party to ‘put up or shut up’ or even to cast doubt on a party’s ability to prove an element at trial and that it will not suffice for the moving party to simply show that the nonmoving party ‘lacks evidence to prove an essential element of its claim.’ ” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 . | 4 | 77 |
Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2012Instead, the moving party must “either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense.” Id. (quoting Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000)). 2011Rather, the moving party must “either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense.” Id. (quoting Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000)). | 4 | 5 |
McCarley v. West Quality Food Servicegreen2 sentences2014If the moving party does make a properly supported motion, “[t]he non-moving party must then establish the existence of the essential elements of the claim.” McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998). 2013If the moving party does make a properly supported motion, “[t]he non-moving party must then establish the existence of the essential elements of the claim.” McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn.1998). | 3 | 4 |
Melton v. BNSF Railway Co.green1 sentence2019See Melton v. BNSF Ry., 322 S.W.3d 174, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co.red2 sentences2015The dissent does not explain how a grant of summary judgment based on the passage of a discovery cutoff date would square with a core holding in Hannan—that it is “not enough for the moving party to challenge the nonmoving party to „put up or shut up‟ or even to cast doubt on a party‟s ability to prove an element at trial” and that it will not suffice for the moving party to “simply show that the nonmoving party „lacks evidence to prove an essential element of its claim.‟” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 . 2015The dissent does not explain how a grant of summary judgment based on the passage of a discovery cutoff date would square with a cox-e holding in Hannan—that it is “not enough for the moving party to challenge the nonmoving party to ‘put up or shut up’ or even to cast doubt on a party’s ability to prove an element at trial and that it will not suffice for the moving party to simply show that the nonmoving party ‘lacks evidence to prove an essential element of its claim.’ ” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 . | 1 | 77 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tennie Martin, et.al. v. Southern Railway Company, et.al.
green
2 sentences2014“It is not enough for the moving party to challenge the nonmoving party to ‘put up or shut up’ or even to cast doubt on a party’s ability to prove an element at trial.” Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 8 .8 “If the moving party is unable to make the required showing, then its motion for summary judgment will fail.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). 2013“If the moving party is unable to make the required showing, then its motion for summary judgment will fail.” Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 83 (citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn. 1993)). | 4 | 2013–2014 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2012Inc., No. E2006-01933-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2262052 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007) (no perm. app. filed) (“[A] defendant seeking summary judgment must actually negate an essential element of the plaintiff's claim . . . before the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is triggered.”). -10- of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.8 The Hibdon Court adopted the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 279–80 (1964)), stating that, where the plaintiff in a defamation case is a public official or public fig 2012Inc., No. E2006-01933-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2262052 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007) (no perm. app. filed) (“[A] defendant seeking summary judgment must actually negate an essential element of the plaintiff's claim . . . before the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is triggered.”). -10- of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.8 The Hibdon Court adopted the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 279–80 (1964)), stating that, where the plaintiff in a defamation case is a public official or public fig | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hibdon v. Grabowski
green
1 sentence2012Inc., No. E2006-01933-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2262052 , at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007) (no perm. app. filed) (“[A] defendant seeking summary judgment must actually negate an essential element of the plaintiff's claim . . . before the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is triggered.”). -10- of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.8 The Hibdon Court adopted the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 279–80 (1964)), stating that, where the plaintiff in a defamation case is a public official or public fig | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Blair v. West Town Mall
green
2 sentences2008Nor has our Court ever followed the standard put forth by Justice Koch in his dissent, that the moving party may simply show that the nonmoving party "lacks evidence to prove an essential element of its claim." See Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 768 ; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88 ; McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 . 2008Nor has our Court ever followed the standard put forth by Justice Koch in his dissent, that the moving party may simply show that the nonmoving party “lacks evidence to prove an essential element of its claim.” See Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 768 ; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88 ; McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.