excise privilege in Pennsylvania

1964The Commonwealth’s contention is two-fold: (a) that the nature of an inheritance tax is such that it is “really not a tax at all in the ordinary meaning of the word, but rather a distributive share of the estate which the State retains for itself” and an inheritance tax is not “a tax on the decedent’s property ... or on the transaction of transferring it . . . but an excise on the privilege of inheritance” (Tack’s Estate, 325 Pa. 545, 548 , 191 A. 155 ) and, therefore, an inheritance tax is not a “State tax” within the language of the exemption clause of §18; (b) even if such exemption clause

1964The Commonwealth’s contention is two-fold: (a) that the nature of an inheritance tax is such that it is “really not a tax at all in the ordinary meaning of the word, but rather a distributive share of the estate which the State retains for itself” and an inheritance tax is not “a tax on the decedent’s property ... or on the transaction of transferring it . . . but an excise on the privilege of inheritance” (Tack’s Estate, 325 Pa. 545, 548 , 191 A. 155 ) and, therefore, an inheritance tax is not a “State tax” within the language of the exemption clause of §18; (b) even if such exemption clause

1971An illustration of this difficulty may be found in the recent case of National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 604 , 98 A. 2d 182 , in which this Court held that a tax on the privilege of transacting business was an excise tax, and was not duplicative of the corporate net income tax, or of the State’s capital stock tax, or of its foreign corporation franchise tax, because those taxes were property taxes, whereas the challenged Philadelphia ordinance .tax was an excise or privilege tax.

1971An illustration of this difficulty may be found in the recent case of National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 604 , 98 A. 2d 182 , in which this Court held that a tax on the privilege of transacting business was an excise tax, and was not duplicative of the corporate net income tax, or of the State’s capital stock tax, or of its foreign corporation franchise tax, because those taxes were property taxes, whereas the challenged Philadelphia ordinance .tax was an excise or privilege tax.

1971Subsequent to the National Biscuit decision, supra, however, this Court held, in Commonwealth v. National Biscuit Co., 390 Pa. 642 , 136 A. 2d 821 (1957), that the foreign corporation franchise tax is an excise tax.

1971Subsequent to the National Biscuit decision, supra, however, this Court held, in Commonwealth v. National Biscuit Co., 390 Pa. 642 , 136 A. 2d 821 (1957), that the foreign corporation franchise tax is an excise tax.

1959It is really not a tax at all in the ordinary meaning of the word, but rather a distributive share of the estate which the State retains for itself’ ”: Graham Estate, 358 Pa. 383 .

1956In Tack’s Estate, 325 Pa. 545 (1937), the Supreme Court held that whatever the name used in the Pennsylvania statute, an inheritance tax “is not, in its essence, a tax on the decedent’s property or any component part of it, or on the transaction of transferring, it . . . but is an excise on the privilege of inheritance.” This principle has also been declared in Shugars v. Chamberlain Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 284 Pa. 200 (1925); Kirkpatrick’s Estate, 275 Pa. 271 (1922).

1956In Tack’s Estate, 325 Pa. 545 (1937), the Supreme Court held that whatever the name used in the Pennsylvania statute, an inheritance tax “is not, in its essence, a tax on the decedent’s property or any component part of it, or on the transaction of transferring, it . . . but is an excise on the privilege of inheritance.” This principle has also been declared in Shugars v. Chamberlain Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 284 Pa. 200 (1925); Kirkpatrick’s Estate, 275 Pa. 271 (1922).

1940It is true that this tax is an excise or privilege tax, sometimes called a license tax, and that “the validity of the transaction is conditioned on the operator’s setting aside for the city the tax imposed as one of the conditions of conducting the transaction within the city limits”: Philadelphia v. Samuels, supra, p. 326 .

1938They are indirect rather than direct -taxes, and are in the nature of an excise tax rather than a property tax,” citing, inter alia, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 , and Finnen’s Est., 196 Pa. 72 , 46 A. 269 .

1938They are indirect rather than direct -taxes, and are in the nature of an excise tax rather than a property tax,” citing, inter alia, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 , and Finnen’s Est., 196 Pa. 72 , 46 A. 269 .

1938They are indirect rather than direct -taxes, and are in the nature of an excise tax rather than a property tax,” citing, inter alia, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 , and Finnen’s Est., 196 Pa. 72 , 46 A. 269 .

1934The fees are not an excise on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, but are based on actual expenses incident to maintaining highways, enforcing statutes, etc.: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 , 5 S. Ct. 826 , 29 L. ed. 158; Di Santo v. Pa. 273 U. S. 34 , 47 S. Ct. 267 , 71 L. ed. 524; American Motor Coach System, Inc. *293 v. Phila. et al., 18 F. (2d) 991 (D.

1934The fees are not an excise on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, but are based on actual expenses incident to maintaining highways, enforcing statutes, etc.: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 , 5 S. Ct. 826 , 29 L. ed. 158; Di Santo v. Pa. 273 U. S. 34 , 47 S. Ct. 267 , 71 L. ed. 524; American Motor Coach System, Inc. *293 v. Phila. et al., 18 F. (2d) 991 (D.

1934The fees are not an excise on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, but are based on actual expenses incident to maintaining highways, enforcing statutes, etc.: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 , 5 S. Ct. 826 , 29 L. ed. 158; Di Santo v. Pa. 273 U. S. 34 , 47 S. Ct. 267 , 71 L. ed. 524; American Motor Coach System, Inc. *293 v. Phila. et al., 18 F. (2d) 991 (D.

1934The fees are not an excise on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, but are based on actual expenses incident to maintaining highways, enforcing statutes, etc.: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa. 114 U. S. 196 , 5 S. Ct. 826 , 29 L. ed. 158; Di Santo v. Pa. 273 U. S. 34 , 47 S. Ct. 267 , 71 L. ed. 524; American Motor Coach System, Inc. *293 v. Phila. et al., 18 F. (2d) 991 (D.