permissive presumption (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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permissive presumption in Pennsylvania

11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1983–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen
scotus · 1979 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1983–2000
2 sentences

1986All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree. 18 P.S. § 4701. [**] A permissive presumption “allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof ... of the basic one and ... places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. at 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d at 792 . [***] The testimony in this case revealed that appellant shot the victim in the head.

1986All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree. 18 P.S. § 4701. [**] A permissive presumption “allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof ... of the basic one and ... places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. at 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d at 792 . [***] The testimony in this case revealed that appellant shot the victim in the head.

34
Leary v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1969 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1983–1986
2 sentences

1986Such a presumption certainly was not harmful to appellant, but was, if anything beneficial to him under the 1939 Penal Code.[*] As to the first paragraph quoted above, we find that the effect of the whole charge was to create merely a permissive presumption of malice.[**] For example, the trial court specifically stated the following in its charge: Now, the use of a weapon such as a firearm, against a vital part of a person’s body, such as the head or chest, is a fact from which you may infer the existence of malice.[***] A permissive presumption is constitutionally valid if it can “be said wi

1986Such a presumption certainly was not harmful to appellant, but was, if anything beneficial to him under the 1939 Penal Code.[*] As to the first paragraph quoted above, we find that the effect of the whole charge was to create merely a permissive presumption of malice.[**] For example, the trial court specifically stated the following in its charge: Now, the use of a weapon such as a firearm, against a vital part of a person’s body, such as the head or chest, is a fact from which you may infer the existence of malice.[***] A permissive presumption is constitutionally valid if it can “be said wi

22
Commonwealth v. Allbeckgreen
pasuperct · 1998 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2000–2003
2 sentences

2003Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Allbeck, 715 A.2d 1213, 1216 (Pa.Super.1998)). ¶ 17 Turning once again to the case at bar, it is undisputed' that Freidl was stopped at 1:23 a.m. and immediately transported to a DUI processing center.

2000Id., at 1216 (quoting County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). ¶ 24 In Commonwealth v. Kelly, 555 Pa. 382 , 724 A.2d 909 (1999), the Supreme Court explained the difference between a mandatory presumption and a permissive inference: A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the state proves certain predicate facts.

12
Commonwealth v. All That Certain Lot or Parcel of Land Located at 605 University Drivegreen
pa · 2014 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See 605 University Drive, 104 A.3d at 428 . (“[T]he civil nature of the proceeding brings forfeiture squarely within the ambit of the Rules when there is no conflict with the specific procedure of the Forfeiture Act, notwithstanding the technical differences between a complaint and petition.”).

11
Chester Upland School District v. Yesavagegreen
pacommwct · 1994 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005Chester Upland School District v. Yesavage, supra, at 1323 (the trial court did not err in allowing the filing of a pleading 10 months after the filing of the complaint).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Marlette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green
pa · 2012
1 sentence

2024Id.

12024–2024
Commonwealth v. Hall green
pa · 2003
1 sentence

2022Accordingly, we agree that the trial court - 10 - J-S12027-22 issued a permissive instruction and, therefore, Appellant’s due process claim turns upon whether, “under the facts of the case, there [was] no rational way the trier [of fact] could make the connection permitted by the inference.” Hall, supra at 546 .

12022–2022
Smith v. Allwright green
scotus · 1944
1 sentence

2021Id. at 666 .

12021–2021
City of Pittsburgh v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green
pa · 2013
2 sentences

2016A permissive presumption is a “logical tool” that permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to proceed “from one fact to another, if the trier believes that the weight of the evidence and the experiential accuracy of the inference warrant so doing.” City of Pittsburgh, 67 A.3d at 1204 .

2016A permissive presumption is a "logical tool” that permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to proceed "from one fact to another, if the trier believes that the weight of the evidence and the experiential accuracy of the inference warrant so doing.” City of Pittsburgh, 67 A.3d at 1204 .

12016–2016
Fisher v. Hill green
pa · 1951
2 sentences

2005The Supreme Court in Fisher v. Hill, 368 Pa. 53 , 81 A.2d 860 (1951), confirms that the 20-day rule under Pa.R.C.P. 1026 is not mandatory, but a permissive rule and late filing is acceptable as long as the opposing party is not prejudiced and justice requires, which is left to the court’s discretion.

2005The Supreme Court in Fisher v. Hill, 368 Pa. 53 , 81 A.2d 860 (1951), confirms that the 20-day rule under Pa.R.C.P. 1026 is not mandatory, but a permissive rule and late filing is acceptable as long as the opposing party is not prejudiced and justice requires, which is left to the court’s discretion.

12005–2005
Commonwealth v. Murray green
pasuperct · 2000
1 sentence

2003Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Allbeck, 715 A.2d 1213, 1216 (Pa.Super.1998)). ¶ 17 Turning once again to the case at bar, it is undisputed' that Freidl was stopped at 1:23 a.m. and immediately transported to a DUI processing center.

12003–2003
Commonwealth v. Kelly green
pa · 1999
2 sentences

2000Id., at 1216 (quoting County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). ¶ 24 In Commonwealth v. Kelly, 555 Pa. 382 , 724 A.2d 909 (1999), the Supreme Court explained the difference between a mandatory presumption and a permissive inference: A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the state proves certain predicate facts.

2000Id., at 1216 (quoting County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2213 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). ¶ 24 In Commonwealth v. Kelly, 555 Pa. 382 , 724 A.2d 909 (1999), the Supreme Court explained the difference between a mandatory presumption and a permissive inference: A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the state proves certain predicate facts.

12000–2000

Where else courts name it

IA 80 (1984–2026) IL 60 (1980–2023) TX 56 (1952–2025) CA 38 (1920–2025) GA 31 (1979–2025) NY 25 (1957–2023) KS 14 (1980–2023) AZ 14 (1981–2024) PA 11 (1983–2024) FL 11 (1967–2017) LA 11 (1979–2020) OH 10 (1982–2022) MI 9 (1953–2015) NJ 9 (1908–2025) WI 7 (1909–2022) WA 6 (1974–2010) WV 6 (1967–2003) VA 6 (1918–2024) NC 6 (1980–2018) AL 6 (1992–2015) MT 6 (1963–1990) DC 5 (1987–2021) CO 5 (1985–2025) WY 5 (1983–2015) CT 5 (1980–2024) TN 4 (1958–2007) MA 4 (1975–2013) MN 3 (1997–2013) DE 3 (1990–2025) MS 3 (1974–1999) VT 3 (1971–2021) NM 3 (1989–2016) NV 2 (1966–1992) AR 2 (1998–1998) HI 2 (1987–2007) UT 2 (2025–2025) NH 2 (2019–2019) RI 2 (1993–1997) ND 2 (1989–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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