9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1908–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. DiRienzogreen2 sentences2013See State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 374 , 251 A.2d 99 (1969) (“possession of recently stolen property permits an inference that the possessor knew that the property had been stolen, unless the possession is satisfactorily accounted for”); State v. Raster, 69 N.J.Super. 504, 507-08 , 174 A.2d 486 (App.Div.1961) (construing N.J.S.A. 2A:139-1, the predecessor of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b), as creating “a permissive presumption of guilty knowledge from the mere possession of stolen goods” if the defendant received the goods within one year of the time they were stolen). 2013See State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 374 , 251 A.2d 99 (1969) (“possession of recently stolen property permits an inference that the possessor knew that the property had been stolen, unless the possession is satisfactorily accounted for”); State v. Raster, 69 N.J.Super. 504, 507-08 , 174 A.2d 486 (App.Div.1961) (construing N.J.S.A. 2A:139-1, the predecessor of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b), as creating “a permissive presumption of guilty knowledge from the mere possession of stolen goods” if the defendant received the goods within one year of the time they were stolen). | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.W.green2 sentences1993See A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 614-15 , 512 A.2d 438 . 1993See A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 614-15 , 512 A.2d 438 . | 1 | 1 |
ROSENBERG BY ROSENBERG v. Cahillgreen2 sentences1988In view of the permissive standard that governs a trial court’s disposition of motions for summary judgment, Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 327 (1985), we will not preclude the plaintiffs from amending their complaint to plead specifically a claim for relief based on N.J.S.A. 59:4-4. 1988In view of the permissive standard that governs a trial court's disposition of motions for summary judgment, Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 327 (1985), we will not preclude the plaintiffs from amending their complaint to plead specifically a claim for relief based on N.J.S.A. 59:4-4. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vigoritogreen1 sentence1961State v. Vigorito, 2 N.J. 185, 188 (1949); State v. Vitale, 35 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vitalegreen1 sentence1961State v. Vigorito, 2 N.J. 185, 188 (1949); State v. Vitale, 35 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
O'Brien v. Boston & Albany Railroadgreen1 sentence1908See, also, O’Brien v. Boston and Albany Railroad Co., 138 Mass. 387 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
green
1 sentence2025We reverse, applying the permissive standard afforded to plaintiff in the pleading stage by Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989), and find plaintiff has adequately pled facts in her complaint setting forth prima facie CEPA and common law wrongful termination. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rogers v. Cape May County Office
green
1 sentence2018The purpose of the amendment to the TCA "was to raise the bar for the filing of a late notice from A-1353-17T1 3 a permissive standard, which required the movant to demonstrate only sufficient reasons for delay, to a more demanding standard, now requiring that the sufficient reasons for late filing must constitute extraordinary circumstances. " Ibid. (internal quotations and citation omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
D.D. v. University of Medicine & Dentistry
green
1 sentence2018Trial courts must assess claims of extraordinary circumstances consistent with this legislative framework to avoid "excessive or inappropriate exceptions." See D.D., 213 N.J. at 149 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown
green
2 sentences2013Res ipsa loquitur “in effect creates a permissive presumption that a set of facts furnish reasonable grounds for the inference that if due care had been exercised by the person having control of the instrumentality causing the injury, the mishap would not have occurred.” Szalontai, supra, 183 N.J. at 398 , 874 A.2d 507 (quoting Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 288-89 , 471 A.2d 25 ). 2013Res ipsa loquitur “in effect creates a permissive presumption that a set of facts furnish reasonable grounds for the inference that if due care had been exercised by the person having control of the instrumentality causing the injury, the mishap would not have occurred.” Szalontai, supra, 183 N.J. at 398 , 874 A.2d 507 (quoting Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 288-89 , 471 A.2d 25 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Szalontai v. Yazbo's Sports Café
green
2 sentences2013Res ipsa loquitur “in effect creates a permissive presumption that a set of facts furnish reasonable grounds for the inference that if due care had been exercised by the person having control of the instrumentality causing the injury, the mishap would not have occurred.” Szalontai, supra, 183 N.J. at 398 , 874 A.2d 507 (quoting Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 288-89 , 471 A.2d 25 ). 2013Res ipsa loquitur “in effect creates a permissive presumption that a set of facts furnish reasonable grounds for the inference that if due care had been exercised by the person having control of the instrumentality causing the injury, the mishap would not have occurred.” Szalontai, supra, 183 N.J. at 398 , 874 A.2d 507 (quoting Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 288-89 , 471 A.2d 25 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Laster
green
2 sentences2013See State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 374 , 251 A.2d 99 (1969) (“possession of recently stolen property permits an inference that the possessor knew that the property had been stolen, unless the possession is satisfactorily accounted for”); State v. Raster, 69 N.J.Super. 504, 507-08 , 174 A.2d 486 (App.Div.1961) (construing N.J.S.A. 2A:139-1, the predecessor of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b), as creating “a permissive presumption of guilty knowledge from the mere possession of stolen goods” if the defendant received the goods within one year of the time they were stolen). 2013See State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 374 , 251 A.2d 99 (1969) (“possession of recently stolen property permits an inference that the possessor knew that the property had been stolen, unless the possession is satisfactorily accounted for”); State v. Raster, 69 N.J.Super. 504, 507-08 , 174 A.2d 486 (App.Div.1961) (construing N.J.S.A. 2A:139-1, the predecessor of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b), as creating “a permissive presumption of guilty knowledge from the mere possession of stolen goods” if the defendant received the goods within one year of the time they were stolen). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Zwirn v. County of Hudson
green
2 sentences2008Thus, in Zwirn v. County of Hudson, 137 N.J.Super. 99, 101 , 347 A. 2d 822 (Law Div.1975), plaintiffs counsel was mislead unintentionally by county police officers about the ownership of the road where plaintiffs decedent's accident occurred. 2008Thus, in Zwirn v. County of Hudson, 137 N.J.Super. 99, 101 , 347 A. 2d 822 (Law Div.1975), plaintiffs counsel was mislead unintentionally by county police officers about the ownership of the road where plaintiffs decedent's accident occurred. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.