11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Cejagreen2 sentences2018In support of his due process argument, Appellant argues that he "was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself against Cowher's hearsay statement to Depaolis that relayed what [Appellant] allegedly told Cowher." Appellant's Brief at 16 (citing Commonwealth v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 642 (Pa. 1981) ("Due process principles no doubt require that a party be - 10 - J -S80023-17 afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the reliability of adverse hearsay evidence.")).7 In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the trial court properly admitted Cowher's statements implicating Appellant under 2018In support of his due process argument, Appellant argues that he "was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself against Cowher's hearsay statement to Depaolis that relayed what [Appellant] allegedly told Cowher." Appellant's Brief at 16 (citing Commonwealth v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 642 (Pa. 1981) ("Due process principles no doubt require that a party be - 10 - J -S80023-17 afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the reliability of adverse hearsay evidence.")).7 In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the trial court properly admitted Cowher's statements implicating Appellant under | 2 | 3 |
W.L. Ives, M.D. v. BPOA, State Board of Medicinegreen1 sentence2025One hearsay exception provides that a “copy of a record authenticated as provided ‘Walker rule.’” Ives, 204 A.3d at 574 (rejecting the agency’s invocation of Walker because the litigant had objected based on hearsay). | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen1 sentence2011While the referee “need not advise a party on evidentiary questions or on specific points of law,” the referee “must act reasonably in assisting in the development of the necessary facts.” Id. at 260 (first emphasis added); see also, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ceja, 493 Pa. 588, 611-12 , 427 A.2d 631, 643 (1981) (plurality opinion) (stating that *1116 referees have an affirmative duty to afford claimants a reasonable opportunity to challenge hearsay evidence, and that a pro se party must be given “every assistance compatible with the impartial discharge of [the tribunal’s] of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennsylvania State Police v. 139 Horseshoe Corp.
green
2 sentences2025It is inadmissible because “hearsay statements lack guarantees of trustworthiness and cannot be tested by cross-examination,” and due process requires “that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge . . . the reliability of [such] adverse evidence” absent a hearsay exception equivalent to “the guarantees of trustworthiness . . . from a declarant’s presence in court.” Id. (citation modified). 2025It is inadmissible because “hearsay statements lack guarantees of trustworthiness and cannot be tested by cross-examination,” and due process requires “that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge . . . the reliability of [such] adverse evidence” absent a hearsay exception equivalent to “the guarantees of trustworthiness . . . from a declarant’s presence in court.” Id. (citation modified). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. MARMON
green
2 sentences1978This conclusion is supported by our decision in Commonwealth v. Marmon, 210 Pa.Super. 202 (1967), which pre-dated the adoption of Rule 203(c), so that the question of reasonable notice in the usual, preliminary hearing, situation was still determinable on a case by case basis. 1975This conclusion is supported by our decision in Commonwealth v. Marmon, *290 210 Pa. Superior Ct. 202 (1967), which pre-dated the adoption of Rule 203(c), so that the question of reasonable notice in the usual, preliminary hearing, situation was still determinable on a case by case basis. | 2 | 1975–1978 |
Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
1 sentence2018In support of his due process argument, Appellant argues that he "was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself against Cowher's hearsay statement to Depaolis that relayed what [Appellant] allegedly told Cowher." Appellant's Brief at 16 (citing Commonwealth v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 642 (Pa. 1981) ("Due process principles no doubt require that a party be - 10 - J -S80023-17 afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the reliability of adverse hearsay evidence.")).7 In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the trial court properly admitted Cowher's statements implicating Appellant under | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Goldberg v. Kelly
green
2 sentences1993Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). 1993Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mills v. Habluetzel
green
2 sentences1986In Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982) , the Supreme Court held that the period during which support suits can be brought on behalf of illegitimate children must be sufficiently long to allow a reasonable opportunity for the claim to be brought and the limitation on such suits must be substantially related to the state’s interest in avoiding the initiation of stale claims. 1986In Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982) , the Supreme Court held that the period during which support suits can be brought on behalf of illegitimate children must be sufficiently long to allow a reasonable opportunity for the claim to be brought and the limitation on such suits must be substantially related to the state’s interest in avoiding the initiation of stale claims. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Pickett v. Brown
green
2 sentences1986In Mills , the court found a one year statute of limitations to deny equal protection; in Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), the court similarly found that a two year statute of limitations was unconstitutional. 1986In Mills , the court found a one year statute of limitations to deny equal protection; in Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), the court similarly found that a two year statute of limitations was unconstitutional. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Richardson v. Perales
green
1 sentence1985In fact, the employer was not only aware of declarant’s testimony and did not subpoena him, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), but he also stipulated to the admission of his testimony. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Dessus
green
2 sentences1974Commonwealth v. Dessus, 423 Pa. 177 , 224 A.2d 188 (1966). 1974Commonwealth v. Dessus, 423 Pa. 177 , 224 A.2d 188 (1966). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.