reasonable opportunity challenge (California) · Go Syfert
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reasonable opportunity challenge in California

9 California opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Reygoza v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1992–2004
2 sentences

2004As noted in Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 523 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 390 ], requiring a defendant to file a peremptory challenge too early “defeats the purpose of section 170.6 [which is] to provide the defendant a reasonable opportunity to challenge a known trial judge.

2004As noted in Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 523 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 390 ], requiring a defendant to file a peremptory challenge too early “defeats the purpose of section 170.6 [which is] to provide the defendant a reasonable opportunity to challenge a known trial judge.

23
People v. Brittany L.green
calctapp · 2002 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2015(See In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ] [“statutory directive is meant to afford the minor a reasonable opportunity to challenge the accuracy or validity of the victims’ claimed losses.

2015(See In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 ] [“statutory directive is meant to afford the minor a reasonable opportunity to challenge the accuracy or validity of the victims’ claimed losses.

12
People v. Resendezgreen
calctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021(People v. Resendez, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 113 [“ ‘ “ ‘[w]hatever the specific procedural safeguards required at a sentencing hearing concerning restitution, fundamental fairness must be assured . . . [and the] . . . defendant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issue of restitution’ ” ’ ”].) As discussed above, defendant can still dispute the restitution amount ordered, so there has been no due process violation yet.

11
Blethen v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurancegreen
cal · 1926 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973
2 sentences

1973Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 91, 102-103 [ 243 P. 431 ].) As is pointed out in the main opinion, my concern is based upon more recent decisions which hold that a person may not constitutionally be deprived of “property” without notice and a reasonable opportunity to challenge the prospect.

1973Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 91, 102-103 [ 243 P. 431 ].) As is pointed out in the main opinion, my concern is based upon more recent decisions which hold that a person may not constitutionally be deprived of “property” without notice and a reasonable opportunity to challenge the prospect.

11
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay Viewgreen
scotus · 1969 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973
2 sentences

1973Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 91, 102-103 [ 243 P. 431 ].) As is pointed out in the main opinion, my concern is based upon more recent decisions which hold that *125 a person may not constitutionally be deprived of "property" without notice and a reasonable opportunity to challenge the prospect. ( Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337, 341-342 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 349, 353-354 , 89 S.Ct. 1820 ].

1973Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 91, 102-103 [ 243 P. 431 ].) As is pointed out in the main opinion, my concern is based upon more recent decisions which hold that *125 a person may not constitutionally be deprived of "property" without notice and a reasonable opportunity to challenge the prospect. ( Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337, 341-342 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 349, 353-354 , 89 S.Ct. 1820 ].

11
Randone v. Appellate Departmentgreen
cal · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1973–1973
2 sentences

1973See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 540, 547-552 [ 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 488 P.2d 13 ]; Adams v. Egley (S.D.Cal. 1972) 338 F. Supp. 614 , 618-619 and authorities cited.) I recognize that these decisions are factually distinguishable; my concern arises from the broad constitutional principles they define, not from any apposite facts.

1973See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 540, 547-552 [ 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 488 P.2d 13 ]; Adams v. Egley (S.D.Cal. 1972) 338 F. Supp. 614 , 618-619 and authorities cited.) I recognize that these decisions are factually distinguishable; my concern arises from the broad constitutional principles they define, not from any apposite facts.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates green
cal · 1985
1 sentence

1986(Id. at p. 883.) The Court of Appeal concluded that “the abuse of discretion here involved was not respondent court’s finding of good faith based on the evidence before it, but rather its refusal to postpone the hearing on the good faith of [the] settlement with plaintiffs until such time as [the nonsettling defendant] could complete pertinent discovery directed to those factors enumerated in Tech-Bilt, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d 488 .” (Id. at p. 897.) We likewise believe Curtis must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the proportionality of the settlement consistent with the Suprem

11986–1986
Goldberg v. Kelly green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1982The major thrust of the opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. 254 , is that welfare recipients be afforded a reasonable opportunity for a hearing before their benefits are terminated.

1982The major thrust of the opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. 254 , is that welfare recipients be afforded a reasonable opportunity for a hearing before their benefits are terminated.

11982–1982
Adams v. Egley green
casd · 1972
1 sentence

1973See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 540, 547-552 [ 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 488 P.2d 13 ]; Adams v. Egley (S.D.Cal. 1972) 338 F. Supp. 614 , 618-619 and authorities cited.) I recognize that these decisions are factually distinguishable; my concern arises from the broad constitutional principles they define, not from any apposite facts.

11973–1973

Where else courts name it

MS 45 (1989–2026) MI 36 (1985–2026) NY 14 (1967–2024) PA 11 (1974–2025) CA 9 (1973–2026) AR 9 (1980–2021) AK 6 (1986–2012) TX 5 (1990–2021) FL 4 (2004–2014) DC 4 (1976–1998) KY 3 (2002–2015) KS 3 (1986–2025) MD 2 (1991–2013) VT 2 (2020–2025) LA 2 (1985–2014) WI 2 (1994–2010) MA 2 (1985–2014) NJ 2 (1961–1978) IL 2 (1990–2005) OR 2 (1900–1955)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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