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14 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The People v. Adam Crowdergreen2 sentences2020When offered a chance to speak before the court imposed the mandatory period of postrelease supervision, defense counsel did not object and instead agreed that postrelease supervision was "mandatory." Defendant therefore "had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the same ground now advanced on appeal, or to move to withdraw the plea or otherwise to object to the imposition of postrelease supervision, and he failed to do so" ( People v King , 151 AD3d 1759, 1759 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 981 [2017]; see People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 219-225 [2016] 2017Defendant had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the same ground now advanced on appeal, or to move to withdraw the plea or otherwise to object to the imposition of postrelease supervision, and he failed to do so (see People v Williams, 27 NY3d 212, 214 [2016]; People v Crowder, 24 NY3d 1134, 1136-1137 [2015]). | 5 | 6 |
The People v. Christian Williamsgreen2 sentences2020When offered a chance to speak before the court imposed the mandatory period of postrelease supervision, defense counsel did not object and instead agreed that postrelease supervision was "mandatory." Defendant therefore "had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the same ground now advanced on appeal, or to move to withdraw the plea or otherwise to object to the imposition of postrelease supervision, and he failed to do so" ( People v King , 151 AD3d 1759, 1759 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 981 [2017]; see People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 219-225 [2016] 2017Defendant had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the same ground now advanced on appeal, or to move to withdraw the plea or otherwise to object to the imposition of postrelease supervision, and he failed to do so (see People v Williams, 27 NY3d 212, 214 [2016]; People v Crowder, 24 NY3d 1134, 1136-1137 [2015]). | 5 | 5 |
People v. Loureegreen2 sentences2017Inasmuch as defendant had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of the plea on the ground that the court failed to advise him before he pleaded guilty of the conditional discharge, we conclude that defendant was required to preserve that challenge for our review (see People v Williams, 27 NY3d 212, 219-223 [2016]; People v Crowder, 24 NY3d 1134, 1136-1137 [2015]; People v Murray, 15 NY3d 725, 726-727 [2010]; cf. People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 545-546 [2007]). 2016We conclude on this record that defendant was required to preserve his contention inasmuch as he had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the same ground now advanced on appeal, and that defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review because he did not move to withdraw the plea or otherwise object to the imposition of postrelease supervision (see People v Williams, 27 NY3d 212, 219-220 [2016]; People v Crowder, 24 NY3d 1134, 1136-1137 [2015]; cf. People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 545-546 [2007]). | 3 | 4 |
People v. Naranjogreen2 sentences2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). 2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Redmangreen2 sentences2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). 2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bieganowskigreen2 sentences2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). 2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Hansengreen2 sentences2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). 2016Defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to challenge the disputed information (see People v Bieganowski, 104 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013]; People v Redman, 148 AD2d 966, 966 [1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 745 [1989]), and the court’s handling of his objections satisfied the requirements of due process (see generally People v Hansen, 99 NY2d 339, 345-346 [2003]; People v Naranjo, 89 NY2d 1047, 1049 [1997]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2016We agree with defendant, however, that he was improperly resentenced as a second felony drug offender inasmuch as the predicate conviction relied upon, under indictment No. 07-123, was one for which he was not sentenced until after he committed the instant crime (see Penal Law §§ 70.06 [1] [b] [ii]; 70.70 [1] [b]; People v Thompson, 28 AD3d 498, 498-499 [2006]; People v LaBrone, 261 AD2d 416, 416 [1999]). 2016We agree with defendant, however, that he was improperly resentenced as a second felony drug offender inasmuch as the predicate conviction relied upon, under indictment No. 07-123, was one for which he was not sentenced until after he committed the instant crime (see Penal Law §§ 70.06 [1] [b] [ii]; 70.70 [1] [b]; People v Thompson, 28 AD3d 498, 498-499 [2006]; People v LaBrone, 261 AD2d 416, 416 [1999]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2016We agree with defendant, however, that he was improperly resentenced as a second felony drug offender inasmuch as the predicate conviction relied upon, under indictment No. 07-123, was one for which he was not sentenced until after he committed the instant crime (see Penal Law §§ 70.06 [1] [b] [ii]; 70.70 [1] [b]; People v Thompson, 28 AD3d 498, 498-499 [2006]; People v LaBrone, 261 AD2d 416, 416 [1999]). 2016We agree with defendant, however, that he was improperly resentenced as a second felony drug offender inasmuch as the predicate conviction relied upon, under indictment No. 07-123, was one for which he was not sentenced until after he committed the instant crime (see Penal Law §§ 70.06 [1] [b] [ii]; 70.70 [1] [b]; People v Thompson, 28 AD3d 498, 498-499 [2006]; People v LaBrone, 261 AD2d 416, 416 [1999]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Kinggreen1 sentence2020When offered a chance to speak before the court imposed the mandatory period of postrelease supervision, defense counsel did not object and instead agreed that postrelease supervision was "mandatory." Defendant therefore "had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the same ground now advanced on appeal, or to move to withdraw the plea or otherwise to object to the imposition of postrelease supervision, and he failed to do so" ( People v King , 151 AD3d 1759, 1759 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 981 [2017]; see People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 219-225 [2016] | 1 | 1 |
People v. Murraygreen2 sentences2017Inasmuch as defendant had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of the plea on the ground that the court failed to advise him before he pleaded guilty of the conditional discharge, we conclude that defendant was required to preserve that challenge for our review (see People v Williams, 27 NY3d 212, 219-223 [2016]; People v Crowder, 24 NY3d 1134, 1136-1137 [2015]; People v Murray, 15 NY3d 725, 726-727 [2010]; cf. People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 545-546 [2007]). 2017“By failing to seize upon the[ ] opportunities to object or seek additional pertinent information,” defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention concerning the voluntariness of the plea (Williams, 27 NY3d at 223 ; see Murray, 15 NY3d at 727 ), and we decline defendant’s request to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Erdman v. Ingraham
green
2 sentences1981Although the hearing’examiner has a right to receive and consider third-person statements which are hearsay evidence, where, however, as here, the charges against the petitioners authorized the imposition of penal sanctions, the accused party is entitled to a hearing conducted with proper adherence to due process requirements of which a reasonable opportunity to test and controvert adverse evidence is an essential element (Matter of Erdman v Ingraham, 28 AD2d 5 ). 1976(Matter of Erdman v Ingraham, 28 AD2d 5 .) Admission into evidence of rank hearsay on the business records exception (CPLR 4518, subd [a]) does not satisfy minimum standards of fairness. | 2 | 1976–1981 |
People v. Fiammegta
green
1 sentence2024As required, defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity at the hearing to assert his argument ( see People v Fiammegta , 14 NY3d 90 [2010]). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Lowe
green
1 sentence2020When offered a chance to speak before the court imposed the mandatory period of postrelease supervision, defense counsel did not object and instead agreed that postrelease supervision was "mandatory." Defendant therefore "had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the same ground now advanced on appeal, or to move to withdraw the plea or otherwise to object to the imposition of postrelease supervision, and he failed to do so" ( People v King , 151 AD3d 1759, 1759 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 981 [2017]; see People v Williams , 27 NY3d 212, 219-225 [2016] | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Granto v. City of Niagara Falls
green
1 sentence2017Likewise, inasmuch as the court advised defendant during the plea colloquy that it would impose a fine and defendant acknowledged in the Contract that a fine would be a component of his sentence if he was terminated from the diversion program, we conclude that defendant had a reasonable opportunity to challenge the plea on the ground that the court failed to advise him of the amount of the fine, and thus preservation was also required for that challenge (see Neal, 148 AD3d at 1700 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Eisenstaedt v. Schweitzer
neutral
1 sentence1975Since plaintiff has not had an examination of the compressor, he should be given a reasonable opportunity to test the compressor before completing his answer to this demand (see Eisenstaedt v Schweitzer, 3 AD2d 716 ). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Bender v. Board of Regents
green
1 sentence1967(See Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435 ; Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, supra; Matter of Shields v. Hults, 21 A D 2d 745, 746, supra; Matter of Bender v. Board of Regents, 262 App. Div. 627 .) A reasonable opportunity to test and controvert adverse evidence is an essential element of a fair hearing before an administrative tribunal or officer. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Wignall v. Fletcher
green
1 sentence1967(See Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435 ; Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, supra; Matter of Shields v. Hults, 21 A D 2d 745, 746, supra; Matter of Bender v. Board of Regents, 262 App. Div. 627 .) A reasonable opportunity to test and controvert adverse evidence is an essential element of a fair hearing before an administrative tribunal or officer. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Hecht v. Monaghan
green
1 sentence1967(See Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435 ; Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, supra; Matter of Shields v. Hults, 21 A D 2d 745, 746, supra; Matter of Bender v. Board of Regents, 262 App. Div. 627 .) A reasonable opportunity to test and controvert adverse evidence is an essential element of a fair hearing before an administrative tribunal or officer. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.