11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1987–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 550881green2 sentences2018See Home Orthopedics Corp. v. Rodriguez, 781 F.3d 521, 530 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Sil–Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1516 (10th Cir. 1990)) (“our common sense dictates that where, as here, a closed- ended series of predicate acts . . . constitute[s] a single scheme to accomplish one discrete goal, directed at one individual with no potential to extend to other persons or entities . . . 2018See Home Orthopedics Corp. v. Rodriguez , 781 F.3d 521 , 530 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting S IL -F LO , Inc. v. SFHC, Inc. , 917 F.2d 1507 , 1516 (10th Cir. 1990) ) ("our common sense dictates that where, as here, a closed-ended series of predicate acts ... constitute[s] a single scheme to accomplish one discrete goal, directed at one individual with no potential to extend to other persons or entities ... | 2 | 2 |
Home Orthopedics Corp. v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2018See Home Orthopedics Corp. v. Rodriguez, 781 F.3d 521, 530 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Sil–Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1516 (10th Cir. 1990)) (“our common sense dictates that where, as here, a closed- ended series of predicate acts . . . constitute[s] a single scheme to accomplish one discrete goal, directed at one individual with no potential to extend to other persons or entities . . . 2018See Home Orthopedics Corp. v. Rodriguez , 781 F.3d 521 , 530 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting S IL -F LO , Inc. v. SFHC, Inc. , 917 F.2d 1507 , 1516 (10th Cir. 1990) ) ("our common sense dictates that where, as here, a closed-ended series of predicate acts ... constitute[s] a single scheme to accomplish one discrete goal, directed at one individual with no potential to extend to other persons or entities ... | 2 | 2 |
cluster 502706green2 sentences2018Cir. 1995) (where there is “single scheme, single injury, and few victims,” it will be “virtually impossible” to state RICO claim); Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531, 538 (4th Cir. 1988) (fraudulent acts lasting seven years by single entity against single victim did not establish racketeering pattern). 2018Cir. 1995) (where there is "single scheme, single injury, and *1228 few victims," it will be "virtually impossible" to state RICO claim); Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone , 841 F.2d 531 , 538 (4th Cir. 1988) (fraudulent acts lasting seven years by single entity against single victim did not establish racketeering pattern). | 1 | 2 |
Rosen v. American Bank of Rollagreen1 sentence2018The common law cause of action for abuse of process “is defined as the use of legal process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for ____________________________________________ 5Because we conclude that Husband fails to state a valid RICO claim, we need not address his arguments that he filed this claim within the applicable statute of limitations. - 24 - J-S18014-18 which it is not designed.” Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Gibbs v. Ernstgreen2 sentences2018See Gibbs v. Ernst , 538 Pa. 193 , 647 A.2d 882 , 889 (1994) (common law fraud requires proof of plaintiff's justifiable reliance on defendant's misrepresentation). 5 Because we conclude that Husband fails to state a valid RICO claim, we need not address his arguments that he filed this claim within the applicable statute of limitations. 2018See Gibbs v. Ernst , 538 Pa. 193 , 647 A.2d 882 , 889 (1994) (common law fraud requires proof of plaintiff's justifiable reliance on defendant's misrepresentation). 5 Because we conclude that Husband fails to state a valid RICO claim, we need not address his arguments that he filed this claim within the applicable statute of limitations. | 1 | 1 |
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.green1 sentence2015See id. at 641-42 (“The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud must plead and prove that it relied on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations.”) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Actiongreen1 sentence2015Section 1964(c) confers standing upon ‘any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . . [.]’” In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 246 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c)) (other internal quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Humphreys v. Niagara Fire Insurancegreen2 sentences2002Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra.” Humphreys v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co., 404 Pa. Super. 347, 356 , 590 A.2d 1267, 1272 (1991). 2002Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra.” Humphreys v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co., 404 Pa. Super. 347, 356 , 590 A.2d 1267, 1272 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Maplewood Bank & Trust Co. v. Acorn, Inc.green1 sentence1987Compare Maplewood Bank & Trust v. Acorn Inc., 504 A.2d 819, 820 (N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wishnefsky v. Carroll
neutral
2 sentences2019In Wishnefsky v. Carroll, 44 F. App’x 581 (3d Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his civil RICO claim against Carroll and Riley. [Appellant] filed the instant action in 2001. 2017After the parties engaged in discovery, the _______________________ (Footnote Continued) Carroll, 44 Fed.Appx. 581 (3rd Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision) (affirming the dismissal of Appellant’s civil RICO claim for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); Wishnefsky v. Evans, 155 MDA 2015 (Pa.Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming the dismissal of Appellant’s civil RICO claim as “meritless nuisance litigation” and concluding that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant leave to file a seventh amended complaint). 2 Appellant also claimed that the copies of | 3 | 2015–2019 |
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co.
green
2 sentences2017To have standing under RICO, (1) a plaintiff's ‘business or property’ must have been ‘injured’ (2) ‘by reason of’ the defendant's RICO violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 , 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3284 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) (providing that “a RICO plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by [reason of] the conduct constituting the violation”). 2017To have standing under RICO, (1) a plaintiff's ‘business or property’ must have been ‘injured’ (2) ‘by reason of’ the defendant's RICO violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 , 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3284 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) (providing that “a RICO plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by [reason of] the conduct constituting the violation”). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation
green
1 sentence2016In re Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 F.3d 300 , 362–63 (3d Cir.2010). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sunlight Electrical Contracting Co. v. Turchi
green
2 sentences2015Sunlight Electrical Contracting Co. v. Turchi, 918 F.Supp.2d 392 (E.D.Pa.2013). 2015Sunlight Electrical Contracting Co. v. Turchi, 918 F.Supp.2d 392 (E.D.Pa.2013). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Werner v. Plater-Zyberk
green
2 sentences2006The Werner court explained the difference between allowing a Dragonetti Act claim to be heard in a case involving an abuse of process centered on a civil RICO claim in federal courts and denying that an abuse of process claim be heard when the underlying federal court claim is based on the Bankruptcy Code. "[The] Bankruptcy Code demonstrates Congress's intent to create a whole system under federal control therefore mandating that the adjustment of rights and duties within the bankruptcy process itself is uniquely and exclusively federal, thereby precluding state law remedies for abuse of its p 2006The Werner court explained the difference between allowing a Dragonetti Act claim to be heard in a case involving an abuse of process centered on a civil RICO claim in federal courts and denying that an abuse of process claim be heard when the underlying federal court claim is based on the Bankruptcy Code. “[The] Bankruptcy Code demonstrates Congress’s intent to create a whole system under federal control therefore mandating that the adjustment of rights and duties within the bankruptcy process itself is uniquely and exclusively federal, thereby precluding state law remedies for abuse of its p | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Shiner v. Moriarty
green
2 sentences2006The Werner court explained the difference between allowing a Dragonetti Act claim to be heard in a case involving an abuse of process centered on a civil RICO claim in federal courts and denying that an abuse of process claim be heard when the underlying federal court claim is based on the Bankruptcy Code. "[The] Bankruptcy Code demonstrates Congress's intent to create a whole system under federal control therefore mandating that the adjustment of rights and duties within the bankruptcy process itself is uniquely and exclusively federal, thereby precluding state law remedies for abuse of its p 2006The Werner court explained the difference between allowing a Dragonetti Act claim to be heard in a case involving an abuse of process centered on a civil RICO claim in federal courts and denying that an abuse of process claim be heard when the underlying federal court claim is based on the Bankruptcy Code. “[The] Bankruptcy Code demonstrates Congress’s intent to create a whole system under federal control therefore mandating that the adjustment of rights and duties within the bankruptcy process itself is uniquely and exclusively federal, thereby precluding state law remedies for abuse of its p | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Mouzon
green
2 sentences2003Mouzon, supra at 627 . ¶ 6 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement, the sentencing court reasoned: [u]pon resentencing on September 28, 1999, the RICO violation was vacated in accordance with the Supreme Court’s Order and the appellant received a term of four to eight years (No.l535(i)) [delivery], consecutive to two to four years (No.l535(j)) [conspiracy], consecutive to four to eight years (No.l535(k)) [delivery], The new sentences did not increase or decrease, but essentially reflected the original sentences, however, were imposed in view of the number of counts against the appellant on which resen 2003Mouzon, supra at 627 . ¶ 6 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement, the sentencing court reasoned: [u]pon resentencing on September 28, 1999, the RICO violation was vacated in accordance with the Supreme Court’s Order and the appellant received a term of four to eight years (No.l535(i)) [delivery], consecutive to two to four years (No.l535(j)) [conspiracy], consecutive to four to eight years (No.l535(k)) [delivery], The new sentences did not increase or decrease, but essentially reflected the original sentences, however, were imposed in view of the number of counts against the appellant on which resen | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.