rico claim in Georgia

2025See Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 168 (1) (reversing trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss RICO claims where plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries (loss of their jobs) that were the “indirect result of predicate acts directed at third parties”; lack of direct nexus between predicate acts and plaintiffs’ injuries demonstrated that plaintiffs could not satisfy proximate cause element of civil RICO claim); Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 430-431 (1) ( 571 SE2d 466 ) (2002) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss plaintiff’s RICO claim because defendants alleged predicate acts —

2025See Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 168 (1) (reversing trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss RICO claims where plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries (loss of their jobs) that were the “indirect result of predicate acts directed at third parties”; lack of direct nexus between predicate acts and plaintiffs’ injuries demonstrated that plaintiffs could not satisfy proximate cause element of civil RICO claim); Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 430-431 (1) ( 571 SE2d 466 ) (2002) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss plaintiff’s RICO claim because defendants alleged predicate acts —

2025See Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 168 (1) (reversing trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss RICO claims where plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries (loss of their jobs) that were the “indirect result of predicate acts directed at third parties”; lack of direct nexus between predicate acts and plaintiffs’ injuries demonstrated that plaintiffs could not satisfy proximate cause element of civil RICO claim); Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga. App. 429, 430-431 (1) ( 571 SE2d 466 ) (2002) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss plaintiff’s RICO claim because defendants alleged predicate acts —

2025The appellants’ injuries are, at best, an indirect result or “eventual consequence” of Oppenheimer’s alleged facilitation or coverup of Woods’s criminal Ponzi scheme.39 Simply put, as to their RICO claim, the complaint alleged predicate acts and omissions committed by Oppenheimer that are far too attenuated to be the proximate cause of the financial losses incurred by individuals induced to invest in Horizon solely 38 See id. at 168 (1). 39 The appellants argue Wylie is distinguishable because none of the predicate acts (i.e., forgery and theft directed at the bank’s customer) were directed at

2011Both the trial court in granting summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail and wire fraud and the *768 Court of Appeals in affirming the grant of summary judgment relied on Markowitz v. Wieland, 243 Ga. App. 151 (2) (b) ( 532 SE2d 705 ) (2000), and concluded that the Pollmans could not show mail and wire fraud because they could not prove their detrimental reliance on the misrepresentations purportedly made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.

2011Both the trial court in granting summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail and wire fraud and the *768 Court of Appeals in affirming the grant of summary judgment relied on Markowitz v. Wieland, 243 Ga. App. 151 (2) (b) ( 532 SE2d 705 ) (2000), and concluded that the Pollmans could not show mail and wire fraud because they could not prove their detrimental reliance on the misrepresentations purportedly made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.

2025See, e.g., McArthur v. Beech Haven Baptist Church of Athens, 368 Ga. App. 525 , 533 (3) n.42 ( 890 SE2d 427 ) (2023); Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 694 (4) n.32 ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Ctr., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (b) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019). 15 Hansford, 369 Ga. App. at 648 (1) (b) (punctuation omitted); accord Overlook Gardens Props., 366 Ga. App. at 834 (1) (c). 15 directly from at least one of the predicate acts.”16 Significantly, this burden is not met where “a plaintiff shows merely that his injury was an eventual consequence of

2025See, e.g., McArthur v. Beech Haven Baptist Church of Athens, 368 Ga. App. 525 , 533 (3) n.42 ( 890 SE2d 427 ) (2023); Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 694 (4) n.32 ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Ctr., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (b) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019). 15 Hansford, 369 Ga. App. at 648 (1) (b) (punctuation omitted); accord Overlook Gardens Props., 366 Ga. App. at 834 (1) (c). 15 directly from at least one of the predicate acts.”16 Significantly, this burden is not met where “a plaintiff shows merely that his injury was an eventual consequence of

2025See, e.g., McArthur v. Beech Haven Baptist Church of Athens, 368 Ga. App. 525 , 533 (3) n.42 ( 890 SE2d 427 ) (2023); Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 694 (4) n.32 ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Ctr., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (b) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019). 15 Hansford, 369 Ga. App. at 648 (1) (b) (punctuation omitted); accord Overlook Gardens Props., 366 Ga. App. at 834 (1) (c). 15 directly from at least one of the predicate acts.”16 Significantly, this burden is not met where “a plaintiff shows merely that his injury was an eventual consequence of

2025See, e.g., McArthur v. Beech Haven Baptist Church of Athens, 368 Ga. App. 525 , 533 (3) n.42 ( 890 SE2d 427 ) (2023); Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 694 (4) n.32 ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Ctr., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (b) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019). 15 Hansford, 369 Ga. App. at 648 (1) (b) (punctuation omitted); accord Overlook Gardens Props., 366 Ga. App. at 834 (1) (c). 15 directly from at least one of the predicate acts.”16 Significantly, this burden is not met where “a plaintiff shows merely that his injury was an eventual consequence of

2022To establish a valid civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must “show that the defendant violated or conspired to violate Georgia’s RICO Act and that the RICO violation proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.”10 Under OCGA § 16-14-4 (b), it is 9 Id. at 235-36 (punctuation omitted). 10 Five Star Athlete Mgmt., Inc. v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 774 , 778 (2) ( 845 SE2d 754 ) (2020); accord Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 693 (4) ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Vernon v. Assurance Forensic Acct., LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377, 392 ( 774 SE2d 197 ) (2015); see Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 165 (1) ( 7

2022To establish a valid civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must “show that the defendant violated or conspired to violate Georgia’s RICO Act and that the RICO violation proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.”10 Under OCGA § 16-14-4 (b), it is 9 Id. at 235-36 (punctuation omitted). 10 Five Star Athlete Mgmt., Inc. v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 774 , 778 (2) ( 845 SE2d 754 ) (2020); accord Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 693 (4) ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Vernon v. Assurance Forensic Acct., LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377, 392 ( 774 SE2d 197 ) (2015); see Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 165 (1) ( 7

2013DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F3d 1292, 1307 (2) (11th Cir. 2003) (in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfactorily alleged a RICO claim, a court should examine whether the alleged predicate acts were aimed at the plaintiff or whether they were aimed primarily at a third party); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, 140 F3d 898, 906 (IV) (A) (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a shareholder or a limited partner in a company that was the target of the alleged RICO violation does not have standing to sue for the losses he sustained as a result of the racketeering activity agai

2013DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F3d 1292, 1307 (2) (11th Cir. 2003) (in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfactorily alleged a RICO claim, a court should examine whether the alleged predicate acts were aimed at the plaintiff or whether they were aimed primarily at a third party); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, 140 F3d 898, 906 (IV) (A) (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a shareholder or a limited partner in a company that was the target of the alleged RICO violation does not have standing to sue for the losses he sustained as a result of the racketeering activity agai

2022To establish a valid civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must “show that the defendant violated or conspired to violate Georgia’s RICO Act and that the RICO violation proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.”10 Under OCGA § 16-14-4 (b), it is 9 Id. at 235-36 (punctuation omitted). 10 Five Star Athlete Mgmt., Inc. v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 774 , 778 (2) ( 845 SE2d 754 ) (2020); accord Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 693 (4) ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Vernon v. Assurance Forensic Acct., LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377, 392 ( 774 SE2d 197 ) (2015); see Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 165 (1) ( 7

2022To establish a valid civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must “show that the defendant violated or conspired to violate Georgia’s RICO Act and that the RICO violation proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.”10 Under OCGA § 16-14-4 (b), it is 9 Id. at 235-36 (punctuation omitted). 10 Five Star Athlete Mgmt., Inc. v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 774 , 778 (2) ( 845 SE2d 754 ) (2020); accord Najarian Cap., LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga. App. 685 , 693 (4) ( 849 SE2d 262 ) (2020); Vernon v. Assurance Forensic Acct., LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377, 392 ( 774 SE2d 197 ) (2015); see Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 165 (1) ( 7

2015Without reasonable reliance on a false representation, there can be no deception, and “[w]ithout deception, of course, there can be neither theft by deception nor a valid RICO claim based upon theft by deception.” First Data POS v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 795 (2) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001).

2015Without reasonable reliance on a false representation, there can be no deception, and “[w]ithout deception, of course, there can be neither theft by deception nor a valid RICO claim based upon theft by deception.” First Data POS v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 795 (2) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001).

2000This Court left open the possibility that Appellees could establish "a RICO claim through proof of an insurance fraud scheme if that scheme as a whole meets the definition of racketeering activity under OCGA § 16-14-3(9)." Security II, supra at 168(3), 509 S.E.2d 602 .

2000This Court left open the possibility that Appellees could establish "a RICO claim through proof of an insurance fraud scheme if that scheme as a whole meets the definition of racketeering activity under OCGA § 16-14-3(9)." Security II, supra at 168(3), 509 S.E.2d 602 .

2025As mentioned above, the Georgia civil RICO statute “prohibits a person from obtaining money or participating in an ‘enterprise’ through a ‘pattern of racketeering 40 See McArthur, 368 Ga. App. at 533 (3) (holding that sexual-abuse victims could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when the alleged predicate act was the defendants concealing the abuse of a third party); Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 168 (1) (holding that the plaintiffs could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when they sought “to recover for their injuries (the loss of their jobs) th

2025As mentioned above, the Georgia civil RICO statute “prohibits a person from obtaining money or participating in an ‘enterprise’ through a ‘pattern of racketeering 40 See McArthur, 368 Ga. App. at 533 (3) (holding that sexual-abuse victims could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when the alleged predicate act was the defendants concealing the abuse of a third party); Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 168 (1) (holding that the plaintiffs could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when they sought “to recover for their injuries (the loss of their jobs) th

2022See Mosley v. State, 253 Ga. App. 710, 711-712 (1) ( 560 SE2d 305 ) (2002) (“To prove a RICO violation, the state must show that the defendant committed two or more predicate criminal acts of the type included in the RICO statute as part of an enterprise engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity.”); OCGA § 16-14-4 (a), (b).

2022See Mosley v. State, 253 Ga. App. 710, 711-712 (1) ( 560 SE2d 305 ) (2002) (“To prove a RICO violation, the state must show that the defendant committed two or more predicate criminal acts of the type included in the RICO statute as part of an enterprise engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity.”); OCGA § 16-14-4 (a), (b).

2015See Richardson v. Simmons, 245 Ga. App. 749, 749-750 ( 538 SE2d 830 ) (2000) (suit asserting claims for spoliation of evidence, fraud, breach of legal and fiduciary duty, RICO violation, and abusive litigation, which were all based on allegations that the defendants conspired to alter or destroy evidence and used these tactics to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining judgments against defendants in the prior malpractice suits, constituted collateral attack on prior judgments).

2015See Richardson v. Simmons, 245 Ga. App. 749, 749-750 ( 538 SE2d 830 ) (2000) (suit asserting claims for spoliation of evidence, fraud, breach of legal and fiduciary duty, RICO violation, and abusive litigation, which were all based on allegations that the defendants conspired to alter or destroy evidence and used these tactics to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining judgments against defendants in the prior malpractice suits, constituted collateral attack on prior judgments).

2015See Division 1, supra. Accordingly, the jury’s verdict must be reversed in its entirety and the case remanded for a new trial.

2015See Division 1, supra. Accordingly, the jury’s verdict must be reversed in its entirety and the case remanded for a new trial.

2013DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F3d 1292, 1307 (2) (11th Cir. 2003) (in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfactorily alleged a RICO claim, a court should examine whether the alleged predicate acts were aimed at the plaintiff or whether they were aimed primarily at a third party); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, 140 F3d 898, 906 (IV) (A) (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a shareholder or a limited partner in a company that was the target of the alleged RICO violation does not have standing to sue for the losses he sustained as a result of the racketeering activity agai

2013DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F3d 1292, 1307 (2) (11th Cir. 2003) (in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfactorily alleged a RICO claim, a court should examine whether the alleged predicate acts were aimed at the plaintiff or whether they were aimed primarily at a third party); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, 140 F3d 898, 906 (IV) (A) (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a shareholder or a limited partner in a company that was the target of the alleged RICO violation does not have standing to sue for the losses he sustained as a result of the racketeering activity agai

2011“When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiffs injuries.” Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451, 461 (II) (126 SC 1991, 164 LE2d 720) (2006), cited in Bridge, supra, 553 U. S. at 654 (III) (B).

2008See id. (cab companies’ illegal insurance scheme may serve as the basis for a civil RICO claim only if it is proven to be a “fraud amounting to theft” from the plaintiff driver); see also Anza, supra at 457-458 (II) (where a state tax authority was the victim of RICO defendants’ acts of tax evasion resulting in defendants’ inordinately low prices, plaintiff competitors could not show that those acts were the proximate cause of their economic injuries).

2011In Division 3 of our prior opinion, we held in part that “ ‘(p)re-termitting whether the action meets the definition of mail fraud, the contract language precludes a showing of reliance; thus, no mail fraud can be shown,’ ” Pollman, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 374 (3), quoting Markowitz v. Wieland, 243 Ga. App. 151, 155 (2) (b) ( 532 SE2d 705 ) (2000).

2011In Division 3 of our prior opinion, we held in part that “ ‘(p)re-termitting whether the action meets the definition of mail fraud, the contract language precludes a showing of reliance; thus, no mail fraud can be shown,’ ” Pollman, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 374 (3), quoting Markowitz v. Wieland, 243 Ga. App. 151, 155 (2) (b) ( 532 SE2d 705 ) (2000).

1996A RICO violation, OCGA § 16-14-4, and any consequent recovery through OCGA § 16-14-6 (c), requires that Brown show an injury by a pattern of racketeering activity, State of Ga. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 188 Ga. App. 120, 121 (2) ( 372 SE2d 276 ) (1988).

1996A RICO violation, OCGA § 16-14-4, and any consequent recovery through OCGA § 16-14-6 (c), requires that Brown show an injury by a pattern of racketeering activity, State of Ga. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 188 Ga. App. 120, 121 (2) ( 372 SE2d 276 ) (1988).

2013Longino, supra. Rather, she must show that her injury was the direct result of a predicate act targeted towards her, such that she was the intended victim.

2013Longino, supra. Rather, she must show that her injury was the direct result of a predicate act targeted toward her, such that she was the intended victim.

2018Corp. v. Stone , 280 Ga. 631 , 632 (1), 632 S.E.2d 376 (2006) (holding that the Georgia RICO Act should be "liberally construed" to effectuate its remedial purpose of providing compensation to private persons injured or aggrieved by reason of any RICO violation), citing OCGA § 16-14-2 (b). 22 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Glover v. Colbert , 210 Ga. App. 666 , 668, 437 S.E.2d 363 (1993), citing Black's Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed., p. 1457 (1968). 23 OCGA § 50-27-70 (a). 24 Thompson , 73 Ga. App. at 597 , 37 S.E.2d 622 . 25 OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A) & (b) (2) (B) respectively provide

2018Corp. v. Stone , 280 Ga. 631 , 632 (1), 632 S.E.2d 376 (2006) (holding that the Georgia RICO Act should be "liberally construed" to effectuate its remedial purpose of providing compensation to private persons injured or aggrieved by reason of any RICO violation), citing OCGA § 16-14-2 (b). 22 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Glover v. Colbert , 210 Ga. App. 666 , 668, 437 S.E.2d 363 (1993), citing Black's Law Dictionary Revised 4th Ed., p. 1457 (1968). 23 OCGA § 50-27-70 (a). 24 Thompson , 73 Ga. App. at 597 , 37 S.E.2d 622 . 25 OCGA § 50-27-70 (b) (2) (A) & (b) (2) (B) respectively provide

2011OCGA § 16-14-3 (8); Raines v. State, 219 Ga. App. 893, 894 (1) ( 467 SE2d 217 ) (1996) (“sale of timber from a single parcel of real property, by means of a single deed, in one isolated transaction, cannot be broken down into two predicate acts”); Cobb v. Kennon Realty Svcs., 191 Ga. App. 740, 741-742 (2) ( 382 SE2d 697 ) (1989) (read estate transaction among four persons and a company, including several loans, while complex, constituted “only the one extended transaction between [appellant] and the appellees” and not “a pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of RICO).

2011OCGA § 16-14-3 (8); Raines v. State, 219 Ga. App. 893, 894 (1) ( 467 SE2d 217 ) (1996) (“sale of timber from a single parcel of real property, by means of a single deed, in one isolated transaction, cannot be broken down into two predicate acts”); Cobb v. Kennon Realty Svcs., 191 Ga. App. 740, 741-742 (2) ( 382 SE2d 697 ) (1989) (read estate transaction among four persons and a company, including several loans, while complex, constituted “only the one extended transaction between [appellant] and the appellees” and not “a pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of RICO).

1990Because of this difference, our legislature intended to and did, by virtue of OCGA §§ 16-14-4 (a) and 16-14-3 (2), [make] subject to the coverage of our RICO statute two crimes, included in the statute as designated predicate acts, which are part of the same scheme, without the added burden of showing that defendant would continue the conduct or had been guilty of like conduct before the incidents charged as a RICO violation. [Cit.]” (Indention omitted.) Dover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 429 (1) ( 385 SE2d 417 ) (1989).

1990Because of this difference, our legislature intended to and did, by virtue of OCGA §§ 16-14-4 (a) and 16-14-3 (2), [make] subject to the coverage of our RICO statute two crimes, included in the statute as designated predicate acts, which are part of the same scheme, without the added burden of showing that defendant would continue the conduct or had been guilty of like conduct before the incidents charged as a RICO violation. [Cit.]” (Indention omitted.) Dover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 429 (1) ( 385 SE2d 417 ) (1989).

2025As mentioned above, the Georgia civil RICO statute “prohibits a person from obtaining money or participating in an ‘enterprise’ through a ‘pattern of racketeering 40 See McArthur, 368 Ga. App. at 533 (3) (holding that sexual-abuse victims could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when the alleged predicate act was the defendants concealing the abuse of a third party); Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 168 (1) (holding that the plaintiffs could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when they sought “to recover for their injuries (the loss of their jobs) th

2025As mentioned above, the Georgia civil RICO statute “prohibits a person from obtaining money or participating in an ‘enterprise’ through a ‘pattern of racketeering 40 See McArthur, 368 Ga. App. at 533 (3) (holding that sexual-abuse victims could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when the alleged predicate act was the defendants concealing the abuse of a third party); Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 168 (1) (holding that the plaintiffs could not establish the proximate-cause element of their RICO claim when they sought “to recover for their injuries (the loss of their jobs) th

2025Compare O’Neal v. Garrison, 263 F3d 1317 , 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants in Georgia civil RICO suit when plaintiff-employee alleged obstruction of justice as predicate act, including termination of plaintiff and another employee to deter them from “freely giving truthful testimony . . . or to injure them because they did so testify” in criminal prosecution against the defendants),10 with O’Malley v. O’Neill, 887 F2d 1557, 1561 (II) (11th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court’s dismissal of federal civil RICO claim when only predicate a

2025A complaint need only give fair notice of the claim, and a motion to dismiss should be granted only when the complaint shows with certainty that the plaintiff would not be 2 entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of the claim.” Norman v. Xytex Corp., 310 Ga. 127, 138 (2) (e) ( 848 SE2d 835 ) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2025A complaint need only give fair notice of the claim, and a motion to dismiss should be granted only when the complaint shows with certainty that the plaintiff would not be 2 entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of the claim.” Norman v. Xytex Corp., 310 Ga. 127, 138 (2) (e) ( 848 SE2d 835 ) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2023A. Group, however, though fleetingly mentioning that the plaintiff alleged a civil RICO violation, never once mentions the words “conspire” or “conspiracy.” In fact, the decision specifically notes that it was not addressing whether damages may be apportioned under RICO, see id. at 464 (3), n. 6, and, in any in Division 1, the trial court clearly found that the complaint properly alleges, and therefore the defendants admitted through default, that Daniels and Veal were involved in a conspiracy.

2023See Hill v. Johnson, 210 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 437 SE2d 801 ) (1993) (concluding that complaint allegations that defendants’ actions warranted the award of punitive damages, coupled with default judgment on liability, satisfied the requirement in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) that a trier of fact first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made).

2023See Hill v. Johnson, 210 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 437 SE2d 801 ) (1993) (concluding that complaint allegations that defendants’ actions warranted the award of punitive damages, coupled with default judgment on liability, satisfied the requirement in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) that a trier of fact first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made).