rico violation in Utah

2004See Dempsey v. Sanders, 132 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2001) ("`[Because the RICO statute] is an unusually potent weapon — the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device ... courts must always be on the lookout for the putative RICO case that is really nothing more than an ordinary fraud case clothed in the Emperor's trendy garb.'") (quoting Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F.Supp.2d 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y.1998)); State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Minn.1994) ("Clearly, our statute is not limited to drug `kingpins' or major crime syndicates, but neither *371 do we think our Act is intended to make

2004See Dempsey v. Sanders, 132 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2001) ("`[Because the RICO statute] is an unusually potent weapon — the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device ... courts must always be on the lookout for the putative RICO case that is really nothing more than an ordinary fraud case clothed in the Emperor's trendy garb.'") (quoting Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F.Supp.2d 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y.1998)); State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Minn.1994) ("Clearly, our statute is not limited to drug `kingpins' or major crime syndicates, but neither *371 do we think our Act is intended to make

2004See Dempsey v. Sanders, 182 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (" [Because the RICO statute] is an unusually potent weapon-the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device ... courts must always be on the lookout for the putative RICO case that is really nothing more than an ordinary fraud case clothed in the Emperor's trendy garb." ") (quoting Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F.Supp.2d 340 , $46 (S.D.N.Y.1998)); State v. Huynh, 519 NW.2d 191, 195 (Minn.1994) ("Clearly, our statute is not limited to drug 'kingpins' or major crime syndicates, but nei- ther do we think our Act is intended to make a r

2004July 6, 1990) (holding that "section 1962(a) is not violated ... where the RICO defendant merely profits from a pattern of racketeering activity but does not otherwise invest this money in a RICO enterprise"). ¶ 32 Like its RICO cousin, UPUAA is a fairly intricate criminal statute, and the stipulation in this case, focused as it was on facts pertinent to other crimes, i.e., to "a garden-variety fraud and deceit case," Condict v. Condict, 826 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.1987), is wholly insufficient to demonstrate probable cause to support a bindover on the racketeering charge.

2004See Dempsey v. Sanders, 132 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2001) ("`[Because the RICO statute] is an unusually potent weapon — the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device ... courts must always be on the lookout for the putative RICO case that is really nothing more than an ordinary fraud case clothed in the Emperor's trendy garb.'") (quoting Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F.Supp.2d 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y.1998)); State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Minn.1994) ("Clearly, our statute is not limited to drug `kingpins' or major crime syndicates, but neither *371 do we think our Act is intended to make

2004See Dempsey v. Sanders, 182 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (" [Because the RICO statute] is an unusually potent weapon-the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device ... courts must always be on the lookout for the putative RICO case that is really nothing more than an ordinary fraud case clothed in the Emperor's trendy garb." ") (quoting Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F.Supp.2d 340 , $46 (S.D.N.Y.1998)); State v. Huynh, 519 NW.2d 191, 195 (Minn.1994) ("Clearly, our statute is not limited to drug 'kingpins' or major crime syndicates, but nei- ther do we think our Act is intended to make a r

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1997See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1991) (“Although the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise are separate elements of a RICO violation, the government need not necessarily adduce different proof for each element.”); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1115 (6th Cir.1985) (“Although ‘enterprise’ and ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence.”); United States v. Mazzei 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2nd Cir.1983) (holding “proof of [pattern of unlawful activity and enterprise need not] be distinct and independent,

1988The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but differentiated the case from one where “the RICO claim is based on one scheme involving one victim, but the plan contemplates open-ended fraudulent activity and does not have a single goal that, when achieved, will bring the activity to an end.” Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir.1987).

1988The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but differentiated the case from one where “the RICO claim is based on one scheme involving one victim, but the plan contemplates open-ended fraudulent activity and does not have a single goal that, when achieved, will bring the activity to an end.” Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929 (10th Cir.1987).