Superior Court began analysis in Pennsylvania

2026Relying on Commonwealth v. Golden Gate National Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 2018) (Golden Gate), CLI argued that veil piercing is available only to impose liability already established by judgment against the entity whose veil is sought to be pierced.

2026Relying on Commonwealth v. Golden Gate National Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 2018) (Golden Gate), CLI argued that veil piercing is available only to impose liability already established by judgment against the entity whose veil is sought to be pierced.

2019Moore, 928 A.2d at 1097 .

2014The court noted that in several medical malpractice cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, this Court had used the phrase “error in judgment” in an “effort to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence.” Id. at 165-66 , citing and quoting Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 (1891); English v. Free, 205 Pa. 624 , 55 A. 777 (1903); and Ward v. Garvin, 328 Pa. 395 , 195 A. 885 (1938).

2014The court noted that in several medical malpractice cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, this Court had used the phrase “error in judgment” in an “effort to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence.” Id. at 165-66 , citing and quoting Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 (1891); English v. Free, 205 Pa. 624 , 55 A. 777 (1903); and Ward v. Garvin, 328 Pa. 395 , 195 A. 885 (1938).

2014The court noted that in several medical malpractice cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, this Court had used the phrase “error in judgment” in an “effort to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence.” Id. at 165-66 , citing and quoting Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 (1891); English v. Free, 205 Pa. 624 , 55 A. 777 (1903); and Ward v. Garvin, 328 Pa. 395 , 195 A. 885 (1938).

2014The court noted that in several medical malpractice cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, this Court had used the phrase “error in judgment” in an “effort to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence.” Id. at 165-66 , citing and quoting Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 (1891); English v. Free, 205 Pa. 624 , 55 A. 777 (1903); and Ward v. Garvin, 328 Pa. 395 , 195 A. 885 (1938).

2014The court noted that in several medical malpractice cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, this Court had used the phrase “error in judgment” in an “effort to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence.” Id. at 165-66 , citing and quoting Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 (1891); English v. Free, 205 Pa. 624 , 55 A. 777 (1903); and Ward v. Garvin, 328 Pa. 395 , 195 A. 885 (1938).

2014The court noted that in several medical malpractice cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, this Court had used the phrase “error in judgment” in an “effort to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence.” Id. at 165-66 , citing and quoting Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 (1891); English v. Free, 205 Pa. 624 , 55 A. 777 (1903); and Ward v. Garvin, 328 Pa. 395 , 195 A. 885 (1938).

2014The court noted that in several medical malpractice cases decided in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, this Court had used the phrase “error in judgment” in an “effort to explain the interrelated notions that a doctor does not promise a cure and that mistakes by doctors are not necessarily the result of negligence.” Id. at 165-66 , citing and quoting Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 21 A. 525 (1891); English v. Free, 205 Pa. 624 , 55 A. 777 (1903); and Ward v. Garvin, 328 Pa. 395 , 195 A. 885 (1938).

2010Before addressing the merits of the constitutional challenges, the majority, in an opinion authored by former-judge Lally-Green, addressed “the threshold question of whether [Plaintiffs] lack standing to raise a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.” Id. at 577 . 6 The Superior Court began its analysis by stating that, generally, “a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not aggrieved thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge,” id. (quoting Soc’y Hill Civic Ass’n v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 593 Pa. 1 , 928 A.2d 175,

2010Before addressing the merits of the constitutional challenges, the majority, in an opinion authored by former-judge Lally-Green, addressed “the threshold question of whether [Plaintiffs] lack standing to raise a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.” Id. at 577 . 6 The Superior Court began its analysis by stating that, generally, “a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not aggrieved thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge,” id. (quoting Soc’y Hill Civic Ass’n v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 593 Pa. 1 , 928 A.2d 175,

2006Fausey, 851 A.2d at 196 .

2006Fausey, 851 A.2d at 196 .

2006On appeal, the Superior Court began its analysis by reaffirming its earlier decision in In re Dillon interpreting “ ‘all of [the *124 coroner’s] official-records’ in [Section 1251] as including autopsy reports.” Id. at 149 (quoting In re Dillon, 674 A.2d at 739 ).

2006Id. [9] The Superior Court began its analysis by comparing Pennsylvania's statute to the Washington State statute which the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional as applied in Troxel .

2006Id. 9 The Superior Court began its analysis by comparing Pennsylvania’s statute to the Washington State statute which the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional as applied in Troxel.

2001In the case of Feingold v. Pucello, 439 Pa. Super. 509 , 654 A.2d 1093 (1995), the Superior Court began its analysis of that case by noting that the plaintiff, a personal injury attorney, came to the court “with hands smudged by the ink which should have been used to sign his fee agreement.” In Feingold , the attorney sued his client in quantum meruit for a contingency fee for work on the client’s case.

2001In the case of Feingold v. Pucello, 439 Pa. Super. 509 , 654 A.2d 1093 (1995), the Superior Court began its analysis of that case by noting that the plaintiff, a personal injury attorney, came to the court “with hands smudged by the ink which should have been used to sign his fee agreement.” In Feingold , the attorney sued his client in quantum meruit for a contingency fee for work on the client’s case.