assumption of the risk doctrine in Rhode Island

2004The doctrine of assumption of the risk, if proven, “absolve[s] a defendant of liability for having created an unreasonable risk.” Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd., 772 A.2d 1056, 1064 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (quoting Walker v. Jackson, 723 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) and Rickey v. Boden, 421 A.2d 539, 543 (R.I.1980)). “[A]n individual does not assume the risk of harm arising from another’s conduct unless he knows of the existence of the risk *1067 and appreciates its unreasonable character.” Rickey, 421 A.2d at 543 .

2004The doctrine of assumption of the risk, if proven, “absolve[s] a defendant of liability for having created an unreasonable risk.” Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd., 772 A.2d 1056, 1064 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (quoting Walker v. Jackson, 723 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) and Rickey v. Boden, 421 A.2d 539, 543 (R.I.1980)). “[A]n individual does not assume the risk of harm arising from another’s conduct unless he knows of the existence of the risk *1067 and appreciates its unreasonable character.” Rickey, 421 A.2d at 543 .

2011Werne v. Executive Women's Golf Assoc. , 969 A.2d 346 , 348 (N.H. 2009) (holding that defendant had no duty to protect plaintiff from severe injury caused when he hit a golf ball and it struck her head such that plaintiff's claim of negligence was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk); Allen v. Dover , 807 A.2d 1274 , 1282 (N.H. 2002) (doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars plaintiff from recovering damages for injuries received from being hit in the head by an errant softball as that was an inherent risk of the game from which the defendant had no duty to protect

2011Werne v. Executive Women's Golf Assoc. , 969 A.2d 346 , 348 (N.H. 2009) (holding that defendant had no duty to protect plaintiff from severe injury caused when he hit a golf ball and it struck her head such that plaintiff's claim of negligence was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk); Allen v. Dover , 807 A.2d 1274 , 1282 (N.H. 2002) (doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars plaintiff from recovering damages for injuries received from being hit in the head by an errant softball as that was an inherent risk of the game from which the defendant had no duty to protect

2011See Cheong v. Antablin , 946 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1997).

2006We also noted in Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District, 755 A.2d 153, 156 (R.I.2000), that the doctrine of assumption of the risk may be implicated, and remanded the case to the trial court for trial on that issue. 8 .

2004The doctrine of assumption of the risk, if proven, “absolve[s] a defendant of liability for having created an unreasonable risk.” Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd., 772 A.2d 1056, 1064 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (quoting Walker v. Jackson, 723 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) and Rickey v. Boden, 421 A.2d 539, 543 (R.I.1980)). “[A]n individual does not assume the risk of harm arising from another’s conduct unless he knows of the existence of the risk *1067 and appreciates its unreasonable character.” Rickey, 421 A.2d at 543 .

2004The doctrine of assumption of the risk, if proven, “absolve[s] a defendant of liability for having created an unreasonable risk.” Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd., 772 A.2d 1056, 1064 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (quoting Walker v. Jackson, 723 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) and Rickey v. Boden, 421 A.2d 539, 543 (R.I.1980)). “[A]n individual does not assume the risk of harm arising from another’s conduct unless he knows of the existence of the risk *1067 and appreciates its unreasonable character.” Rickey, 421 A.2d at 543 .

2004Day v. Caslowitz, 713 A.2d 758, 760 (R.I.1998).

1999See Hennessey, 694 A.2d at 699-700 ; see also Morrocco v. Piccardi, 713 A.2d 250 (R.I.1998) (rejecting an assumption-of-the-risk defense as a matter of law based upon the homeowner’s decision to walk over her driveway in icy conditions).

1999See Hennessey, 694 A.2d at 699-700 ; see also Morrocco v. Piccardi, 713 A.2d 250 (R.I.1998) (rejecting an assumption-of-the-risk defense as a matter of law based upon the homeowner’s decision to walk over her driveway in icy conditions).

1997In the absence of an express agreement, “a defendant must prove that a plaintiff ‘knew of the existence of a danger, appreciated its unreasonable character, and then voluntarily exposed himself [or herself] to it.’ ” Id.; see also Loffredo v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 669 A.2d 1162, 1164 (R.I.1996).

1997The doctrine of assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense that “may be invoked * * * by a tort-feasor to escape or to diminish liability” for having created “an unreasonable risk of injury.” Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 678 A.2d 867, 872 (R.I.1996).

1996Cf. Filosa, 590 A.2d at 103-04 (decedent and owner of dilapidated building, who was repeatedly warned not to go into the building because of the danger of a wall collapsing, assumed the risk of injury by working behind it); Drew, 495 A.2d at 232 (decedent who was aware of danger posed by running internal-combustion engine in enclosed space assumed the risk of asphyxiation by restarting engine after becoming dizzy and after reentering pit); Rickey, 421 A.2d at 544 (woman assumed risk of injury when in response to several options, she chose to ascend narrow stairway with no handrail).

1996Cf. Filosa, 590 A.2d at 103-04 (decedent and owner of dilapidated building, who was repeatedly warned not to go into the building because of the danger of a wall collapsing, assumed the risk of injury by working behind it); Drew, 495 A.2d at 232 (decedent who was aware of danger posed by running internal-combustion engine in enclosed space assumed the risk of asphyxiation by restarting engine after becoming dizzy and after reentering pit); Rickey, 421 A.2d at 544 (woman assumed risk of injury when in response to several options, she chose to ascend narrow stairway with no handrail).

1985Dawes v. McKenna, 100 R.I. 317, 322 , 215 A.2d 235, 238 (1965).

1985Dawes v. McKenna, 100 R.I. 317, 322 , 215 A.2d 235, 238 (1965).

1979One of our recent opinions contains the following instructive discussion: “ ‘in deciding whether a plaintiff knew of and understood the extent of the risk he incurred, the standard is subjective and is keyed to “what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates.’ ” [citation omitted.] This subjective standard is to be applied to asumption of the risk cases and is to be distinguished from an objective standard ‘which is concerned with how in the particular case the hypothetical reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have acted.’ ” Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Clu

1979One of our recent opinions contains the following instructive discussion: “ ‘in deciding whether a plaintiff knew of and understood the extent of the risk he incurred, the standard is subjective and is keyed to “what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates.’ ” [citation omitted.] This subjective standard is to be applied to asumption of the risk cases and is to be distinguished from an objective standard ‘which is concerned with how in the particular case the hypothetical reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have acted.’ ” Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Clu

1979One of our recent opinions contains the following instructive discussion: “ ‘in deciding whether a plaintiff knew of and understood the extent of the risk he incurred, the standard is subjective and is keyed to “what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates.’ ” [citation omitted.] This subjective standard is to be applied to asumption of the risk cases and is to be distinguished from an objective standard ‘which is concerned with how in the particular case the hypothetical reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have acted.’ ” Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Clu

1979One of our recent opinions contains the following instructive discussion: “ ‘in deciding whether a plaintiff knew of and understood the extent of the risk he incurred, the standard is subjective and is keyed to “what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates.’ ” [citation omitted.] This subjective standard is to be applied to asumption of the risk cases and is to be distinguished from an objective standard ‘which is concerned with how in the particular case the hypothetical reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have acted.’ ” Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Clu

1958See Dalton v. Rhode Island Co., swpra, Corley v. Hubbard, supra, and Eiban v. Widsteen, 31 Wash.2d 655 .

1958See Dalton v. Rhode Island Co., swpra, Corley v. Hubbard, supra, and Eiban v. Widsteen, 31 Wash.2d 655 .