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22 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
ADM Partnership v. Martingreen2 sentences2011Petitioner notes prior Maryland cases where falling through an unguarded hole was recognized as a risk that “anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate” citing ADM v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 91-92 , 702 A.2d 730, 734 (1997) and other cases discussed infra. Finally, Petitioner contends that “how” Nocar fell is immaterial to an assumption of the risk claim. 2011Petitioner notes prior Maryland cases where falling through an unguarded hole was recognized as a risk that “anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate” citing ADM v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 91-92 , 702 A.2d 730, 734 (1997) and other cases discussed infra. Finally, Petitioner contends that “how” Nocar fell is immaterial to an assumption of the risk claim. | 3 | 5 |
Schroyer v. McNealgreen2 sentences2007The very nature of an assumption of the risk defense is that “by virtue of the plaintiffs voluntary actions, any duty the defendant owed the plaintiff to act reasonably for the plaintiffs safety is superseded by the plaintiffs willingness to take a chance.” Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 282 , 592 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1991). 2007The very nature of an assumption of the risk defense is that “by virtue of the plaintiffs voluntary actions, any duty the defendant owed the plaintiff to act reasonably for the plaintiffs safety is superseded by the plaintiffs willingness to take a chance.” Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 282 , 592 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1991). | 2 | 4 |
Crews v. Hollenbachgreen2 sentences2011Cotillo, 401 Md. at 668 , 934 A.2d at 34 (citing Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 644 , 751 A.2d 481, 490 (2000)); see also Morgan State, 397 Md. at 514 , 919 A.2d at 24 (stating “the question of voluntariness, in the context of an assumption of the risk analysis, is measured by an objective standard.”). 2011Cotillo, 401 Md. at 668 , 934 A.2d at 34 (citing Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 644 , 751 A.2d 481, 490 (2000)); see also Morgan State, 397 Md. at 514 , 919 A.2d at 24 (stating “the question of voluntariness, in the context of an assumption of the risk analysis, is measured by an objective standard.”). | 2 | 3 |
Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.green2 sentences2007See Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 358 Md. 194, 214 , 747 A.2d 662, 673 (2000) (finding that the relevant issue is whether the petitioner assumed the risk that was the immediate cause of his death). 2007See Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 358 Md. 194, 214 , 747 A.2d 662, 673 (2000) (finding that the relevant issue is whether the petitioner assumed the risk that was the immediate cause of his death). | 2 | 2 |
Morgan State University v. Walkergreen2 sentences2011We have often “stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, ‘where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was “no genuine issue of material fact” that the plaintiff had “assumed the usual a 2011We have often “stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, ‘where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was “no genuine issue of material fact” that the plaintiff had “assumed the usual a | 1 | 4 |
Gibson v. BEAVER AND SOUTHERN STATES HOWARD COUNTY PETROLEUM COOP., INC.green2 sentences2007“As we have stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, “where the facts are not in dispute and the *521 plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 103 , 702 A.2d at 740 (quoting Burke, 244 Md. at 158 , 223 A.2d at 189 ; citing Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89 , 592 A.2d at 1126 ; Gibson, 245 Md. at 422 , 226 A.2d at 276 ; Evans, 224 Md. at 239 , 167 A.2d at 594 ; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail and Constr. 2007“As we have stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, “where the facts are not in dispute and the *521 plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 103 , 702 A.2d at 740 (quoting Burke, 244 Md. at 158 , 223 A.2d at 189 ; citing Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89 , 592 A.2d at 1126 ; Gibson, 245 Md. at 422 , 226 A.2d at 276 ; Evans, 224 Md. at 239 , 167 A.2d at 594 ; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail and Constr. | 1 | 2 |
McQuiggan v. Boy Scouts of Americagreen2 sentences2011Assumption of the risk “negates the issue of a defendant’s negligence by virtue of a plaintiffs previous abandonment of his or her right to maintain an action if an accident occurs.” Cotillo, 401 Md. at 668 , 934 A.2d at 33 (quoting McQuiggan v. Boy Scouts of Am., 73 Md.App. 705, 710 , 536 A.2d 137, 139 (1998)). 2011Assumption of the risk “negates the issue of a defendant’s negligence by virtue of a plaintiffs previous abandonment of his or her right to maintain an action if an accident occurs.” Cotillo, 401 Md. at 668 , 934 A.2d at 33 (quoting McQuiggan v. Boy Scouts of Am., 73 Md.App. 705, 710 , 536 A.2d 137, 139 (1998)). | 1 | 1 |
Gurley v. Gurleygreen2 sentences2011We have often “stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, ‘where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was “no genuine issue of material fact” that the plaintiff had “assumed the usual a 2011We have often "stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, `where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.'" Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" that the plaintiff had "assumed the usual an | 1 | 1 |
Chalmers v. Willisgreen2 sentences2011Hooper v. Mougin, 263 Md. 630, 635 , 284 A.2d 236, 239 (1971); accord Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 379, 385 , 231 A.2d 70, 73 (1967). 2011Hooper v. Mougin, 263 Md. 630, 635 , 284 A.2d 236, 239 (1971); accord Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 379, 385 , 231 A.2d 70, 73 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Hooper v. Mougingreen2 sentences2011Hooper v. Mougin, 263 Md. 630, 635 , 284 A.2d 236, 239 (1971); accord Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 379, 385 , 231 A.2d 70, 73 (1967). 2011Hooper v. Mougin, 263 Md. 630, 635 , 284 A.2d 236, 239 (1971); accord Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 379, 385 , 231 A.2d 70, 73 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
DiLeo v. Nugentgreen2 sentences2011We have often “stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, ‘where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was “no genuine issue of material fact” that the plaintiff had “assumed the usual a 2011We have often "stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, `where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.'" Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" that the plaintiff had "assumed the usual an | 1 | 1 |
American Powerlifting Ass'n v. Cotillogreen2 sentences2011We have often “stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, ‘where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was “no genuine issue of material fact” that the plaintiff had “assumed the usual a 2011We have often “stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, ‘where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” Morgan State v. Walker, 397 Md. 509, 520-21 , 919 A.2d 21, 28 (2007) (quoting ADM, 348 Md. at 102 , 702 A.2d at 740 ); American Powerlifting v. Cotillo, 401 Md. 658, 663 , 934 A.2d 27, 30 (2007) (holding that there was “no genuine issue of material fact” that the plaintiff had “assumed the usual a | 1 | 1 |
Thomas D. Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Company, a Pennsylvania Corporationgreen2 sentences2010See Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 683 (10th Cir.1981) (holding that, under the Jones Act applying principles of FELA, an assumption of the risk instruction was necessary because the evidence focused on the employee’s acceptance of the dangerous condition and not the employee’s negligent act or omission); see also Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 257-58 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that a jury finding of contributory negligence based on the employee’s “strength of knowledge that a dangerous condition in his line of duty ... his working in that line of duty” was “assumptio 2010See Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 683 (10th Cir.1981) (holding that, under the Jones Act applying principles of FELA, an assumption of the risk instruction was necessary because the evidence focused on the employee's acceptance of the dangerous condition and not the employee's negligent act or omission); see also Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that a jury finding of contributory negligence based on the employee's "strength of knowledge that a dangerous condition in his line of duty ... his working in that line of duty" was "assumpti | 1 | 1 |
Alexander F. Koshorek v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Companygreen2 sentences2010Co., 318 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir.1963) (holding that an instruction was required because the employee testified to awareness of harmful dust particles at his jobsite and the circumstances of the case called for a "careful distinction” between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence); Hamrock v. Consol. 2010Co., 318 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir.1963) (holding that an instruction was required because the employee testified to awareness of harmful dust particles at his jobsite and the circumstances of the case called for a "careful distinction" between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence); Hamrock v. Consol. | 1 | 1 |
Arthur Clark v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Companygreen2 sentences2010Co., 328 F.2d 591, 595 (2d Cir.1964) (holding it was not error to refuse an assumption of the risk instruction because it would have "water[ed] down or even eliminate[d]” the issue of contributory negligence); Koshorek v. Pa. R.R. 2010Co., 328 F.2d 591, 595 (2d Cir.1964) (holding that an assumption of the risk instruction “might well cause such confusion as to water down or even eliminate the issue of contributory negligence”). | 1 | 1 |
Raymond H. Jenkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporationgreen2 sentences2010See Jenkins, 22 F.3d 206, 211-12 (9th Cir.1994) (noting the assumption of the risk instruction is warranted if the evidence can prove either contributory negligence or assumption of the risk). 2010See Jenkins, 22 F.3d 206, 211-12 (9th Cir.1994) (noting the assumption of the risk instruction is warranted if the evidence can prove either contributory negligence or assumption of the risk). | 1 | 1 |
William Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 683 (10th Cir.1981) (holding that, under the Jones Act applying principles of FELA, an assumption of the risk instruction was necessary because the evidence focused on the employee’s acceptance of the dangerous condition and not the employee’s negligent act or omission); see also Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 257-58 (2d Cir.1973) (stating that a jury finding of contributory negligence based on the employee’s “strength of knowledge that a dangerous condition in his line of duty ... his working in that line of duty” was “assumptio 2010See Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 683 (10th Cir.1981) (holding that, under the Jones Act applying principles of FELA, an assumption of the risk instruction was necessary because the evidence focused on the employee's acceptance of the dangerous condition and not the employee's negligent act or omission); see also Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that a jury finding of contributory negligence based on the employee's "strength of knowledge that a dangerous condition in his line of duty ... his working in that line of duty" was "assumpti | 1 | 1 |
Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail & Construction Co.green2 sentences2007Co., 224 Md. 439, 441 , 168 A.2d 393, 394 (1961)). 2007Co., 224 Md. 439, 441 , 168 A.2d 393, 394 (1961)). | 1 | 1 |
Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences2000See Flowers, 308 Md. at 445 , 520 A.2d at 367 . 2000See Flowers, 308 Md. at 445 , 520 A.2d at 367 . | 1 | 1 |
| Anita Pritchard, Administratrix of the Estate of Otto E. Pritchard, Deceased v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, a Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anita Pritchard, Administratrix of the Estate of Otto E. Pritchard, Deceased v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, a Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Pritchardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Griffith v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kasten Construction Co. v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hedding v. Pearsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rountree v. Lerner Development Co.
green
2 sentences2010Thomas relies on Rountree v. Lerner Development Co., et al., 52 Md.App. 281 , 447 A.2d 902 (1982), to support her argument that the “voluntary” component of the assumption of the risk defense was not shown. 2010Thomas relies on Rountree v. Lerner Development Co., et al., 52 Md.App. 281 , 447 A.2d 902 (1982), to support her argument that the “voluntary” component of the assumption of the risk defense was not shown. | 3 | 1990–2011 |
Thomas Fashauer, Jr. v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc
green
2 sentences2009Id. 2009Id. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Newell v. Richards
green
2 sentences2012Johnson argued that “[i]nformed consent is not a defense to negligence.” Johnson asserted that, although Maryland “has not spoken to this issue,” his research indicated that of all the “other states that have addressed this have held that informed consent information cannot be presented in a negligence case.” He further contended that he was “unable to find any appellate opinion where the assumption of the risk defense was upheld in a medical malpractice case.” According to Johnson, if the court were to allow an assumption of the risk defense to be asserted in the instant case, it would be “co 2012Johnson argued that “[i]nformed consent is not a defense to negligence.” Johnson asserted that, although Maryland “has not spoken to this issue,” his research indicated that of all the “other states that have addressed this have held that informed consent information cannot be presented in a negligence case.” He further contended that he was “unable to find any appellate opinion where the assumption of the risk defense was upheld in a medical malpractice case.” According to Johnson, if the court were to allow an assumption of the risk defense to be asserted in the instant case, it would be “co | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Thomas v. Panco Management of Maryland, LLC
green
2 sentences2011It stated: “We agree with [the trial judge] that the uncontradicted first-level facts developed in this case objectively showed that [Mary] Thomas, like David Allen, had at the time of her fall, knowledge of the risk that she might be stepping down upon ice and that a reasonable person in her position would have appreciated the danger of that action.” Thomas, 195 Md.App. at 256 , 6 A.3d at 311 . *398 It was error for the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that Petitioner had knowledge of the risk for the same reasons we explained in Poole, namely that the Allen case expanded the knowledg 2011It stated: “We agree with [the trial judge] that the uncontradicted first-level facts developed in this case objectively showed that [Mary] Thomas, like David Allen, had at the time of her fall, knowledge of the risk that she might be stepping down upon ice and that a reasonable person in her position would have appreciated the danger of that action.” Thomas, 195 Md.App. at 256 , 6 A.3d at 311 . *398 It was error for the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that Petitioner had knowledge of the risk for the same reasons we explained in Poole, namely that the Allen case expanded the knowledg | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Collins v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
green
2 sentences2010Collins, 187 Md.App. at 314-16 , 978 A.2d at 833-34 . 2010Collins, 187 Md.App. at 314-16 , 978 A.2d at 833-34 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Bickerstaff
green
2 sentences2010The Court of Special Appeals’s consideration of the Right of Refusal Policy and that court’s conclusion that it could not have raised an impermissible inference of assumption of the risk is also inconsistent with its holding in a similar case, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Richard Bickerstaff, et al., 187 Md.App. 187 , 978 A.2d 760 (2009), in which a cautionary instruction was given and upheld on appeal. 20 In Bickerstaff, the Court of Special Appeals identified evidence presented at trial by the appellant employer that supported the trial judge’s decision to give a cautionary instruction, namely “maki 2010The Court of Special Appeals’s consideration of the Right of Refusal Policy and that court’s conclusion that it could not have raised an impermissible inference of assumption of the risk is also inconsistent with its holding in a similar case, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Richard Bickerstaff, et al., 187 Md.App. 187 , 978 A.2d 760 (2009), in which a cautionary instruction was given and upheld on appeal. 20 In Bickerstaff, the Court of Special Appeals identified evidence presented at trial by the appellant employer that supported the trial judge’s decision to give a cautionary instruction, namely “maki | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Kelly v. McCarrick
green
2 sentences2007Kelly, 155 Md.App. at 115 , 841 A.2d at 888 . 2007Kelly, 155 Md.App. at 115 , 841 A.2d at 888 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Evans v. Johns Hopkins University
green
2 sentences2007“As we have stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, “where the facts are not in dispute and the *521 plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 103 , 702 A.2d at 740 (quoting Burke, 244 Md. at 158 , 223 A.2d at 189 ; citing Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89 , 592 A.2d at 1126 ; Gibson, 245 Md. at 422 , 226 A.2d at 276 ; Evans, 224 Md. at 239 , 167 A.2d at 594 ; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail and Constr. 2007“As we have stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, “where the facts are not in dispute and the *521 plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 103 , 702 A.2d at 740 (quoting Burke, 244 Md. at 158 , 223 A.2d at 189 ; citing Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89 , 592 A.2d at 1126 ; Gibson, 245 Md. at 422 , 226 A.2d at 276 ; Evans, 224 Md. at 239 , 167 A.2d at 594 ; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail and Constr. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Burke v. Williams
green
2 sentences2007“As we have stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, “where the facts are not in dispute and the *521 plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 103 , 702 A.2d at 740 (quoting Burke, 244 Md. at 158 , 223 A.2d at 189 ; citing Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89 , 592 A.2d at 1126 ; Gibson, 245 Md. at 422 , 226 A.2d at 276 ; Evans, 224 Md. at 239 , 167 A.2d at 594 ; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail and Constr. 2007“As we have stated in earlier cases involving the assumption of the risk defense, “where the facts are not in dispute and the *521 plaintiff intentionally and voluntarily exposed [himself or] herself to a known danger, we will sustain the granting of a summary judgment or the direction of a verdict.’ ” ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 103 , 702 A.2d at 740 (quoting Burke, 244 Md. at 158 , 223 A.2d at 189 ; citing Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288-89 , 592 A.2d at 1126 ; Gibson, 245 Md. at 422 , 226 A.2d at 276 ; Evans, 224 Md. at 239 , 167 A.2d at 594 ; Finkelstein v. Vulcan Rail and Constr. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.
green
2 sentences2002To prevail on the defense of assumption of the risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff: “(1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger.” Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630 , 495 A.2d 838 (1985). 2002To prevail on the defense of assumption of the risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff: “(1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger.” Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630 , 495 A.2d 838 (1985). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Warner v. Markoe
green
2 sentences2002The rationale underlying the doctrine of assumption of the risk “is that the plaintiffs actions serve as ‘a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.’ ” ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260 (1937)). 2002The rationale underlying the doctrine of assumption of the risk “is that the plaintiffs actions serve as ‘a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs.’ ” ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260 (1937)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Kirby v. Hylton green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| McAllister v. Cummings green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.