assumption of the risk doctrine in Georgia

2026Cook’s perception of the location of that edge before he turned away from it and began to walk backwards, and the existence of conditions that impaired that perception, are also material to the issue of whether Cook voluntarily assumed a position of imminent danger. 7 “[T]he standard to be applied in assessing an assumption of the risk defense is a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence[.]” Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999) (quotation marks omitted).

2026Cook’s perception of the location of that edge before he turned away from it and began to walk backwards, and the existence of conditions that impaired that perception, are also material to the issue of whether Cook voluntarily assumed a position of imminent danger. 7 “[T]he standard to be applied in assessing an assumption of the risk defense is a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of a reasonable person of ordinary prudence[.]” Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999) (quotation marks omitted).

2015See Myers v. Boleman, 151 Ga. App. 506, 509 (3) ( 260 SE2d 359 ) (1979) (“[t]he doctrine of the assumption of the risk of danger applies only where the plaintiff, with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction from his freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately chooses an obviously perilous course of conduct so that it can be said as a matter of law he has assumed all risk of injury”) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied). 2 What we know about the underlying case is that it was closing time, the employees were preparing to close (which i

2015See Myers v. Boleman, 151 Ga. App. 506, 509 (3) ( 260 SE2d 359 ) (1979) (“[t]he doctrine of the assumption of the risk of danger applies only where the plaintiff, with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction from his freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately chooses an obviously perilous course of conduct so that it can be said as a matter of law he has assumed all risk of injury”) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied). 2 What we know about the underlying case is that it was closing time, the employees were preparing to close (which i

2020“The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk bars a plaintiff from recovering on a negligence claim if it is established that he[,] without coercion of circumstances, chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its danger and while exercising a free choice as to whether to engage in the act or not.” Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471 SE2d 866 ) (1996) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[A] defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated w

2020“The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk bars a plaintiff from recovering on a negligence claim if it is established that he[,] without coercion of circumstances, chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its danger and while exercising a free choice as to whether to engage in the act or not.” Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471 SE2d 866 ) (1996) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[A] defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated w

2015See Myers v. Boleman, 151 Ga.App. 506, 509 (3) ( 260 SE2d 359 ) (1979) (“[t]he doctrine of the assumption of the risk of danger applies only where the plaintiff, with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction from his freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately chooses an obviously perilous course of conduct so that it can be said as a matter of law he has assumed all risk of injury”) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied).2 2 Compare Moore v. Service Merchandise Co., 200 Ga. App. 463 ( 468 SE2d 480 ) (1991) (Summary judgment affirmed to t

2009See also Moore v. Service Merchandise Co., 200 Ga. App. 463, 464 ( 408 SE2d 480 ) (1991) (“[t]he doctrine of the assumption of the risk of danger applies only where the plaintiff, with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction from his freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately chooses an obviously perilous course of conduct so that it can be said as a matter of law he has assumed all risk of injury”) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Shell Oil Co., 205 Ga. App. at 369 (2). 9 (Punctuation

2013The charge properly instructed the jury that a defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense had the burden of establishing that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the danger, understood and appreciated the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself to the risk, but that “assumption of risk does not extend to assuming the negligent act of another.” See Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995).

2013The charge properly instructed the jury that a defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense had the burden of establishing that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the danger, understood and appreciated the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself to the risk, but that “assumption of risk does not extend to assuming the negligent act of another.” See Little Rapids Corp. v. McCamy, 218 Ga. App. 111, 113 (1) ( 460 SE2d 800 ) (1995).

2016“A defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks.” Findley v. Griffin, 292 Ga. App. 807, 809 (2) ( 666 SE2d 79 ) (2008) (citations omitted).”Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk, and means both actual and subjective knowledge on the plaintiff’s part.” Kroger Co. v. Williams, 257 Ga. App. 833, 835 ( 572 SE2d 316 ) (2002).

2016“A defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks.” Findley v. Griffin, 292 Ga. App. 807, 809 (2) ( 666 SE2d 79 ) (2008) (citations omitted).”Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk, and means both actual and subjective knowledge on the plaintiff’s part.” Kroger Co. v. Williams, 257 Ga. App. 833, 835 ( 572 SE2d 316 ) (2002).

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2018Co. , 142 Ga. App. 269 , 270, 235 S.E.2d 601 (1977) ("[t]o hold otherwise ... would make the appellant a captive in her own apartment during cold weather, forcing her to abandon her very means of livelihood until such time as the appellee found it convenient to remedy the dangerous situation"). 1 However, in Smith v. NT Nails, LLC, we held that there was not coercion of circumstances sufficient to defeat an assumption of the risk defense when an invitee chose to knowingly walk on a freshly mopped floor when the salon was closing and an employee told her to walk to the front of the store to pay

2018Co. , 142 Ga. App. 269 , 270, 235 S.E.2d 601 (1977) ("[t]o hold otherwise ... would make the appellant a captive in her own apartment during cold weather, forcing her to abandon her very means of livelihood until such time as the appellee found it convenient to remedy the dangerous situation"). 1 However, in Smith v. NT Nails, LLC, we held that there was not coercion of circumstances sufficient to defeat an assumption of the risk defense when an invitee chose to knowingly walk on a freshly mopped floor when the salon was closing and an employee told her to walk to the front of the store to pay

2016“A defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks.” Findley v. Griffin, 292 Ga. App. 807, 809 (2) ( 666 SE2d 79 ) (2008) (citations omitted).

2016“A defendant asserting an assumption of the risk defense must establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks.” Findley v. Griffin, 292 Ga. App. 807, 809 (2) ( 666 SE2d 79 ) (2008) (citations omitted).

2013See Barger v. Garden Way, 231 Ga. App. 723, 728-729 (7) ( 499 SE2d 737 ) (1998) (finding no error in charge when substance of requests was thoroughly and accurately stated in product liability case). 2.

2013See Barger v. Garden Way, 231 Ga. App. 723, 728-729 (7) ( 499 SE2d 737 ) (1998) (finding no error in charge when substance of requests was thoroughly and accurately stated in product liability case). 2.

1991"In order for a defendant to invoke the doctrine of assumption of the risk it must be established that the plaintiff deliberately chose an obviously perilous course of conduct and fully appreciated the danger involved. [Cit.]" Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bryson, 138 Ga. App. 78, 79 ( 225 SE2d 475 ) (1976).

1991"In order for a defendant to invoke the doctrine of assumption of the risk it must be established that the plaintiff deliberately chose an obviously perilous course of conduct and fully appreciated the danger involved. [Cit.]" Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bryson, 138 Ga. App. 78, 79 ( 225 SE2d 475 ) (1976).

2010Kitchens, 161 Ga.App. at 703 (1), 289 S.E.2d 807 .

2010Kitchens, 161 Ga.App. at 703 (1), 289 S.E.2d 807 .

1995Whitehead v. Seymour, 120 Ga.App. 25 (4) ( 169 SE2d 369 ).

1995Whitehead v. Seymour, 120 Ga.App. 25 (4) ( 169 SE2d 369 ).

2026“Except in plain, palpable and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached, the jury must determine whether a claimant exercised ordinary care for his safety or assumed the risk of injury.” King v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 347 Ga. App. 606, 608 (2) ( 820 SE2d 445 ) (2018) (quotation marks omitted).

2026“Except in plain, palpable and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached, the jury must determine whether a claimant exercised ordinary care for his safety or assumed the risk of injury.” King v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 347 Ga. App. 606, 608 (2) ( 820 SE2d 445 ) (2018) (quotation marks omitted).

2025See Norman v. Xytex Corp., 310 Ga. 127, 136 (2) (d) n. 10 ( 848 SE2d 835 ) (2020) (noting that any “difficulty [the plaintiffs may have] in ultimately proving their case is not a basis to dismiss their claims at the pleading stage; at this stage, at least, there exists some possibility that the [plaintiffs] could introduce some evidence to warrant some of the relief they seek”).

2025See Norman v. Xytex Corp., 310 Ga. 127, 136 (2) (d) n. 10 ( 848 SE2d 835 ) (2020) (noting that any “difficulty [the plaintiffs may have] in ultimately proving their case is not a basis to dismiss their claims at the pleading stage; at this stage, at least, there exists some possibility that the [plaintiffs] could introduce some evidence to warrant some of the relief they seek”).

2025See, e.g., Fun Spot of America of Atlanta, Inc. v. Johnson, 371 Ga. App. 123 , 125-126 ( 899 SE2d 766 ) (2024) (reversing denial of defendant theme park’s motion for summary judgment in park visitor’s personal injury action wherein he alleged that he suffered injury after another visitor crashed into the back of his go-kart; record evidence, including that visitor had previously ridden on course and was aware go-karts were driver-operated and occasionally made contact with one another during ride, and theme park had posted “RIDE AT YOUR OWN RISK” sign, held sufficient as a matter of law to dem

2025See, e.g., Fun Spot of America of Atlanta, Inc. v. Johnson, 371 Ga. App. 123 , 125-126 ( 899 SE2d 766 ) (2024) (reversing denial of defendant theme park’s motion for summary judgment in park visitor’s personal injury action wherein he alleged that he suffered injury after another visitor crashed into the back of his go-kart; record evidence, including that visitor had previously ridden on course and was aware go-karts were driver-operated and occasionally made contact with one another during ride, and theme park had posted “RIDE AT YOUR OWN RISK” sign, held sufficient as a matter of law to dem

2024It was there.” First, as noted above, “it is well settled that an adult of ordinary intelligence assumes the risk of possible injury when [she] deliberately and voluntarily joins in a fight, or enters into a fight for the purpose of breaking it up.” Carter v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 404, 408 (2) ( 750 SE2d 679 ) (2013) (reversing denial of summary judgment and finding that security guard, injured when he intervened in a fight between an Alzheimer patient and a nurse, had assumed the risk of injury); see generally Cornelius v. Morris Brown College, 299 Ga. App. 83, 86 (3) ( 681 SE2d 730 ) (2009) (p

2024It was there.” First, as noted above, “it is well settled that an adult of ordinary intelligence assumes the risk of possible injury when [she] deliberately and voluntarily joins in a fight, or enters into a fight for the purpose of breaking it up.” Carter v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 404, 408 (2) ( 750 SE2d 679 ) (2013) (reversing denial of summary judgment and finding that security guard, injured when he intervened in a fight between an Alzheimer patient and a nurse, had assumed the risk of injury); see generally Cornelius v. Morris Brown College, 299 Ga. App. 83, 86 (3) ( 681 SE2d 730 ) (2009) (p

2024It was there.” First, as noted above, “it is well settled that an adult of ordinary intelligence assumes the risk of possible injury when [she] deliberately and voluntarily joins in a fight, or enters into a fight for the purpose of breaking it up.” Carter v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 404, 408 (2) ( 750 SE2d 679 ) (2013) (reversing denial of summary judgment and finding that security guard, injured when he intervened in a fight between an Alzheimer patient and a nurse, had assumed the risk of injury); see generally Cornelius v. Morris Brown College, 299 Ga. App. 83, 86 (3) ( 681 SE2d 730 ) (2009) (p

2024It was there.” First, as noted above, “it is well settled that an adult of ordinary intelligence assumes the risk of possible injury when [she] deliberately and voluntarily joins in a fight, or enters into a fight for the purpose of breaking it up.” Carter v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 404, 408 (2) ( 750 SE2d 679 ) (2013) (reversing denial of summary judgment and finding that security guard, injured when he intervened in a fight between an Alzheimer patient and a nurse, had assumed the risk of injury); see generally Cornelius v. Morris Brown College, 299 Ga. App. 83, 86 (3) ( 681 SE2d 730 ) (2009) (p

2024It was there.” First, as noted above, “it is well settled that an adult of ordinary intelligence assumes the risk of possible injury when [she] deliberately and voluntarily joins in a fight, or enters into a fight for the purpose of breaking it up.” Carter v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 404, 408 (2) ( 750 SE2d 679 ) (2013) (reversing denial of summary judgment and finding that security guard, injured when he intervened in a fight between an Alzheimer patient and a nurse, had assumed the risk of injury); see generally Cornelius v. Morris Brown College, 299 Ga. App. 83, 86 (3) ( 681 SE2d 730 ) (2009) (p

2024It was there.” First, as noted above, “it is well settled that an adult of ordinary intelligence assumes the risk of possible injury when [she] deliberately and voluntarily joins in a fight, or enters into a fight for the purpose of breaking it up.” Carter v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 404, 408 (2) ( 750 SE2d 679 ) (2013) (reversing denial of summary judgment and finding that security guard, injured when he intervened in a fight between an Alzheimer patient and a nurse, had assumed the risk of injury); see generally Cornelius v. Morris Brown College, 299 Ga. App. 83, 86 (3) ( 681 SE2d 730 ) (2009) (p

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2022Knowledge of the risk means that the plaintiff has both actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm associated with the activity or condition that proximately causes injury.4 “It is well established under Georgia law that the danger of drowning in water is a palpable and manifest peril, the knowledge of which is chargeable to persons in the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daly v. Berryhill, 308 Ga. 831, 834 ( 843 SE2d 870 ) (2020), quoting Muldovan v. McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (2) ( 523 SE2d 566 ) (1999); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (1) ( 471

2020As in Tennison, our determination of whether appellants have proven an assumption-of-the-risk defense is based on Gonzalez-Nunez’s subjective knowledge and his particular situation.23 Indeed, Gonzalez-Nunez admitted in his deposition that he was familiar with and had experience removing the metal bars in the appellants’ trucks, realized the bar was stuck, understood a tool he did not have was necessary to free the bar from the track, knew the bar could slip off Thompson’s broomstick, and knew his finger could be pinched if it was inside the track when the bar moved. 22 Id. at 344 (emphasis sup

2019(Citation omitted.) Teems v. Bates, 300 Ga. App. 70, 72-73 (1) ( 684 SE2d 662 ) (2009).

2019(Citation omitted.) Teems v. Bates, 300 Ga. App. 70, 72-73 (1) ( 684 SE2d 662 ) (2009).

2017Bills v. Lowery, 286 Ga. App. 301, 304 (3) ( 648 SE2d 779 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017Bills v. Lowery, 286 Ga. App. 301, 304 (3) ( 648 SE2d 779 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014Indeed, “[t]he strength of the assumption of risk doctrine to persons employed in security is shown in Atlanta Braves v. Leslie, 190 Ga. App. 49 ( 378 SE2d 133 ) (1989).” Martin v. Gaither, 219 Ga. App. 646, 649 ( 466 SE2d 621 ) (1995).

2014Indeed, “[t]he strength of the assumption of risk doctrine to persons employed in security is shown in Atlanta Braves v. Leslie, 190 Ga. App. 49 ( 378 SE2d 133 ) (1989).” Martin v. Gaither, 219 Ga. App. 646, 649 ( 466 SE2d 621 ) (1995).

2014Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 749, 754 (b) ( 694 SE2d 673 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 749, 754 (b) ( 694 SE2d 673 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).