6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1916–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harrison v. Taylorgreen1 sentence1990In Harrison , p 592, the Idaho Supreme Court explained this incompatibility: Prior to the advent of comparative negligence, contributory negligence was an absolute bar to recovery. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Felgner v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2021He explained that “[t]rampolines are not designed to have persons jump on the edge of the trampoline bed near the frame,” and generally “are not designed for lateral movement, including the lateral movement required to jump from one bed, over the frame, and on to another bed.” Dr. Rabinoff opined that “there is a substantial 1 In Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23, 39-40 ; 133 NW2d 136 (1965), the Michigan Supreme Court eliminated the assumption of the risk defense in tort cases. 2021He explained that “[t]rampolines are not designed to have persons jump on the edge of the trampoline bed near the frame,” and generally “are not designed for lateral movement, including the lateral movement required to jump from one bed, over the frame, and on to another bed.” Dr. Rabinoff opined that “there is a substantial 1 In Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23, 39-40 ; 133 NW2d 136 (1965), the Michigan Supreme Court eliminated the assumption of the risk defense in tort cases. | 3 | 1995–2021 |
Barr v. Mt. Brighton Inc.
green
1 sentence2000However, this Court concluded it is clear from the plain and unambiguous wording of § 22(2) that the Legislature intended to place the burden of *740 certain risks or danger on skiers, rather than ski resort operators . . . [and that] it is logical to construe this section of the statute as an assumption of the risk clause that renders the reasonableness of the skiers’ or the ski operator’s behavior irrelevant. [Id. at 696.] In Barr, supra, a skier hit a tree within a cluster of trees that the defendant considered an out-of-bounds area but that was not fenced off or marked as closed as the pla | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. De Atley
green
1 sentence1916Co. v. De Atley, 241 U. S. 310 (36 Sup. Ct. 364), Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the court, says: “It is insisted that the true test is not whether the employee did, in fact, know the speed of the train and appreciate the danger, but whether he ought to have known and comprehended; whether, in effect, he ought to have anticipated and taken precautions to discover the danger. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.