eighth assignment error in Texas

1920McMurry v. Stanley, supra; Johnson et al. v. Kirby, supra; Young v. Campbell, supra; Feegles v. Slaughter, supra. It follows from what we have said that the eighth assignment of error must be overruled.

1920McMurry v. Stanley, supra; Johnson et al. v. Kirby, supra; Young v. Campbell, supra; Feegles v. Slaughter, supra. It follows from what we have said that the eighth assignment of error must be overruled.

1921Co. v. Mitchell, 89 Tex. 443 , 35 S. W. 4 ; Clark v. Pearce, 80 Tex. 146 , 15 S. W. 787 . [3, 4] The eighth assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing special charge No. 1, which in general .terms sought to have the jury instructed to return a verdict for appellant.

1921Co. v. Mitchell, 89 Tex. 443 , 35 S. W. 4 ; Clark v. Pearce, 80 Tex. 146 , 15 S. W. 787 . [3, 4] The eighth assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing special charge No. 1, which in general .terms sought to have the jury instructed to return a verdict for appellant.

1921Co. v. Mitchell, 89 Tex. 443 , 35 S. W. 4 ; Clark v. Pearce, 80 Tex. 146 , 15 S. W. 787 . [3, 4] The eighth assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing special charge No. 1, which in general .terms sought to have the jury instructed to return a verdict for appellant.

1920McMurry v. Stanley, supra; Johnson et al. v. Kirby, supra; Young v. Campbell, supra; Feegles v. Slaughter, supra. It follows from what we have said that the eighth assignment of error must be overruled.

1920McMurry v. Stanley, supra; Johnson et al. v. Kirby, supra; Young v. Campbell, supra; Feegles v. Slaughter, supra. It follows from what we have said that the eighth assignment of error must be overruled.

1920McMurry v. Stanley, supra; Johnson et al. v. Kirby, supra; Young v. Campbell, supra; Feegles v. Slaughter, supra. It follows from what we have said that the eighth assignment of error must be overruled.

1920McMurry v. Stanley, supra; Johnson et al. v. Kirby, supra; Young v. Campbell, supra; Feegles v. Slaughter, supra. It follows from what we have said that the eighth assignment of error must be overruled.

1919St. art. 3676; Gill v. Barik, 61 S. W. 146 ; Hugo v. Hirsch, 63 S. W. 163 ; Pottery Co. v. Black, 149 S. W. 735 . [3, 4] The eighth assignment of error assails the action of the, court in permitting Hoffman, appellant’s assistant superintendent, to testify that it was the duty of appellant’s porter to build a fire in the Pullman sleeper when standing on a transfer track, and striking out additional matters stated by the witness as to the effect that it was the duty of the railway company to see that the car was kept comfortable.

1917Railway Co. v. De Bord, 21 Tex. Civ.

1916Manufacturing Co. v. Femelat, 79 S.W. 872 ; Railway Co. v. McVey, 81 S.W. 999 , 1000; Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex. 387 ; Abney v. Bank, 152 S.W. 734 .

1915Hand v. Swann, 1 Tex. Civ.

1915We think these objections are sufficiently met and answered by the cases (Pecos & Northern Texas Railway Co. v. Grundy, 171 S. W. 318 , and Pecos & Northern Texas Ry.

1912App. 435 , 52 S. W. 983 ; Taylor v. Davidson, 120 S. W. 1018 ; Henyan v. Trevino, 137 S. W. 458 . [3] The statement under the eighth assignment of error, which is adopted under the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments, is so imperfect as to be unintelligible, and those assignments will not be considered.

1912App. 435 , 52 S. W. 983 ; Taylor v. Davidson, 120 S. W. 1018 ; Henyan v. Trevino, 137 S. W. 458 . [3] The statement under the eighth assignment of error, which is adopted under the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments, is so imperfect as to be unintelligible, and those assignments will not be considered.

1910As the judgment of the trial court is against this contention, and, as said by Justice Brown in Grand Fraternity v. Melton, 102 Texas, 399 , 117 S. W., 788 , “must stand unless the evidence establishes that the shooting was intentional to that degree of conclusiveness which precludes a reasonable doubt to the contrary; that there must be no room for fair and reasonable minds to reach different conclusions from the evidence.” This is the rule announced by our Supreme Court by which we must be governed, and it is our duty not to disturb the judgment -of the trial court on this point, if there is

1910As the judgment of the trial court is against this contention, and, as said by Justice Brown in Grand Fraternity v. Melton, 102 Texas, 399 , 117 S. W., 788 , “must stand unless the evidence establishes that the shooting was intentional to that degree of conclusiveness which precludes a reasonable doubt to the contrary; that there must be no room for fair and reasonable minds to reach different conclusions from the evidence.” This is the rule announced by our Supreme Court by which we must be governed, and it is our duty not to disturb the judgment -of the trial court on this point, if there is

1904The instruction requested was a copy of that given and approved by our Supreme Court in the case of Railway Company v. Fuller, 63 Texas, 473 ; and while we are not prepared to say, in view of the charge given by the court, that its refusal would be reversible error, yet, in view of another trial, we suggest that it would have been proper to have given it, and would perhaps have presented the case from plaintiff’s standpoint a little more clearly than the charge given by the court. *527 The cases of Railway Company v. Scarlock, 9 Texas Ct. Rep., 162, and Boyer v. Railway Company, 8 Texas Ct. Re