impulse instruction (Texas) · Go Syfert
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impulse instruction in Texas

11 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Solomon v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2001 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2002–2021
2 sentences

2021However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Solomon v. State held that the defensive instruction of independent impulse is not required as the issue is not a 7 statutorily enumerated defense and merely serves to negate the conspiracy liability element of the State’s case. 49 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Mayfield v. State, 716 S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), overruled by Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).

24
Mayfield v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1986 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2002–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mayfield v. State, 716 S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Mayfield v. State, 716 S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), overruled by Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).

24
Patterson v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2019
2 sentences

2019For that reason, a defendant may not be convicted for a completed sexual assault by penetration and also for conduct—such as exposure or contact—that is “demonstrably and inextricably part of that single sexual assault.” Id. at 281 ; see Patterson v. State, 152 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim.

2018Thus, a defendant may not be convicted for a completed sexual assault by penetration and also for conduct—such as exposure or contact—that is “demonstrably and inextricably part of that single sexual assault.” Id. at 281 ; see Patterson v. State, 152 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim.

22
Aekins v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2014 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2019
2 sentences

2019For that reason, a defendant may not be convicted for a completed sexual assault by penetration and also for conduct—such as exposure or contact—that is “demonstrably and inextricably part of that single sexual assault.” Id. at 281 ; see Patterson v. State, 152 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim.

2019Aekins, 447 S.W.3d at 275 (discussing “the merger doctrine,” “the single impulse doctrine,” or, here in Texas, “the doctrine of subsumed acts”).

12
Fincher v. Stategreen
texapp · 1998 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2001–2012
2 sentences

2012The independent impulse defense “embraces the theory that the accused, although admittedly intent on some wrongful conduct, did not contemplate the extent of criminal conduct actually engaged in by his fellow conspirators, and thus cannot be held vicariously responsible for their conduct.” Fincher v. State, 980 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d).

2001Davis v. State, 651 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. Crim.App.1983); Fincher, 980 S.W.2d at 888 .

12
People v. Garciagreen
coloctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014This is variously called “the merger doctrine,” 17 “the single impulse doctrine,”18 or, here in Texas, “the doctrine of subsumed acts.” 19 If more 17 See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 296 P.3d 285, 293 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012) (“To determine whether a defendant’s conduct constituted factually distinct acts, and therefore factually distinct offenses, we examine various factors including whether the acts occurred at different times and were separated by intervening events.

11
Marquet Bryant and Robert B. Hagood v. United Statesgreen
dc · 2014 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Convictions not based on separate offenses merge with one another.”) (citation omitted). 18 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302-03 ; see Hagood v. United States, 93 A.3d 210, 226 (D.C. 2014) (applying the “fresh impulse” or “fork-in-the-road” test and holding that two counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence merged when, although burglary and assault were distinct offenses separated by a ten-minute interval, the convictions arose “out of a defendant’s uninterrupted possession of a single weapon during a single act of violence.”).

11
Davis v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1983 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Davis v. State, 651 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. Crim.App.1983); Fincher, 980 S.W.2d at 888 .

2001Davis v. State, 651 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Fincher, 980 S.W.2d at 888 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Mayfield v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1986 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2002–2015
2 sentences

2015See Mayfield v. State, 716 S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Mayfield v. State, 716 S.W.2d 509, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), overruled by Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).

14

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Giesberg v. State green
texcrimapp · 1998
2 sentences

2002Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 367-68 ; Giesberg, 984 S.W.2d at 249 ; Mayfield, 716 S.W.2d at 515 .

2002Solomon , 49 S.W.3d at 367-68 ; Giesberg , 984 S.W.2d at 249 ; Mayfield , 716 S.W.2d at 515 .

22002–2002
Blockburger v. United States green
scotus · 1931
1 sentence

2014Convictions not based on separate offenses merge with one another.”) (citation omitted). 18 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302-03 ; see Hagood v. United States, 93 A.3d 210, 226 (D.C. 2014) (applying the “fresh impulse” or “fork-in-the-road” test and holding that two counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence merged when, although burglary and assault were distinct offenses separated by a ten-minute interval, the convictions arose “out of a defendant’s uninterrupted possession of a single weapon during a single act of violence.”).

12014–2014
Simmons v. State green
texcrimapp · 1980
2 sentences

1986Where some evidence is presented that might support such a reasonable doubt on the issue, a jury charge on the defensive matter should be given." 594 S.W.2d at 763 .

1986Where some evidence is presented that might support such a reasonable doubt on the issue, a jury charge on the defensive matter should be given." 594 S.W.2d at 763 .

11986–1986

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Penal Code § 7.02 (4) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 12.31 (3) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 22.021 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 11 (1986–2021) KS 2 (1992–1993)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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