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11 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
INWOOD NORTH HOMEOWNERS'ASS'N v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2024XVI, § 50; and then citing Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. 1987))). 2024XVI, § 50; and then citing Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. 1987))). | 2 | 2 |
John W. Hankins v. Sarah T. Harrisgreen2 sentences2024See Hankins v. Harris, 500 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“Generally, a lien may not attach to property that is held as the debtor’s homestead[] because the Texas Constitution provides that homestead 10 Although Ha mentioned in her brief that Bran-Dan incorrectly used the innocent-purchaser doctrine to fortify its position, Bran-Dan responds that it “never argued this [doctrine] in the summary[-]judgment briefing and expressly noted that it did not apply.” 17 property is exempt from forced sale to pay debts, except for certain specified categories of debts.” 2024See Hankins v. Harris, 500 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“Generally, a lien may not attach to property that is held as the debtor’s homestead[] because the Texas Constitution provides that homestead 10 Although Ha mentioned in her brief that Bran-Dan incorrectly used the innocent-purchaser doctrine to fortify its position, Bran-Dan responds that it “never argued this [doctrine] in the summary[-]judgment briefing and expressly noted that it did not apply.” 17 property is exempt from forced sale to pay debts, except for certain specified categories of debts.” | 2 | 2 |
Texas Indemnity Insurance v. Middlebrookgreen1 sentence1978Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Tex. 332 , 114 S.W.2d 226, 234 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.
green
1 sentence2015Section 13.001 defines the elements of 33 Id. at 776–78. innocent-purchaser status for all cases, and courts may not As to the first requirement, we have applied estoppel to disregard or rewrite the statute when they believe straight-up prevent manifest injustice if, “officials acted deliberately application would be inequitable. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fleming v. Ashcroft
green
2 sentences1978The court of civil appeals quotes Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401 (1943), and construes it to hold that the innocent purchaser doctrine protects a purchaser by cutting off an equitable title, but that the doctrine does not cut off a legal title. 1978The court of civil appeals quotes Fleming v. Ashcroft, 142 Tex. 41 , 175 S.W.2d 401 (1943), and construes it to hold that the innocent purchaser doctrine protects a purchaser by cutting off an equitable title, but that the doctrine does not cut off a legal title. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.
green
1 sentence1978Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Tex. 332 , 114 S.W.2d 226, 234 (1938). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Strong v. Strong
green
1 sentence1956In 43B Texjur., page 4, Sec. 701, a bona fide purchaser is defined as one 'who acquires the apparent legal title to property in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice of a claim or interest of a third person under the common source of title.’ Aside from the requirement that the apparent legal title pass, the three elements essential to a bona fide purchase are: (1) good faith, (2) a valuable consideration, and (3) absence of notice.”’ The foregoing statement of the rule is m accord with the pronouncements, of our Supreme Court in Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Strong v. Strong
green
1 sentence1956In 43B Texjur., page 4, Sec. 701, a bona fide purchaser is defined as one 'who acquires the apparent legal title to property in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice of a claim or interest of a third person under the common source of title.’ Aside from the requirement that the apparent legal title pass, the three elements essential to a bona fide purchase are: (1) good faith, (2) a valuable consideration, and (3) absence of notice.”’ The foregoing statement of the rule is m accord with the pronouncements, of our Supreme Court in Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden
green
2 sentences1956In 43B Texjur., page 4, Sec. 701, a bona fide purchaser is defined as one 'who acquires the apparent legal title to property in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice of a claim or interest of a third person under the common source of title.’ Aside from the requirement that the apparent legal title pass, the three elements essential to a bona fide purchase are: (1) good faith, (2) a valuable consideration, and (3) absence of notice.”’ The foregoing statement of the rule is m accord with the pronouncements, of our Supreme Court in Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. 1956In 43B Texjur., page 4, Sec. 701, a bona fide purchaser is defined as one 'who acquires the apparent legal title to property in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice of a claim or interest of a third person under the common source of title.’ Aside from the requirement that the apparent legal title pass, the three elements essential to a bona fide purchase are: (1) good faith, (2) a valuable consideration, and (3) absence of notice.”’ The foregoing statement of the rule is m accord with the pronouncements, of our Supreme Court in Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hayden, 104 Tex. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Mast v. Tibbles
neutral
1 sentence1940Mast v. Tibbles, 60 Tex. 301 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Roach v. Karr
neutral
1 sentence1927Some of those authorities are Gavagan v. Bryant, 83 Ill. 376 ; Medlin v. Buford, 115 N. C. 260 , 20 S. E. 463 ; Roach v. Karr, 18 Kan. 529 , 26 Am. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Medlin v. . Buford
green
2 sentences1927Some of those authorities are Gavagan v. Bryant, 83 Ill. 376 ; Medlin v. Buford, 115 N. C. 260 , 20 S. E. 463 ; Roach v. Karr, 18 Kan. 529 , 26 Am. 1927Some of those authorities are Gavagan v. Bryant, 83 Ill. 376 ; Medlin v. Buford, 115 N. C. 260 , 20 S. E. 463 ; Roach v. Karr, 18 Kan. 529 , 26 Am. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Gavagan v. Bryant
neutral
1 sentence1927Some of those authorities are Gavagan v. Bryant, 83 Ill. 376 ; Medlin v. Buford, 115 N. C. 260 , 20 S. E. 463 ; Roach v. Karr, 18 Kan. 529 , 26 Am. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Taylor v. Harrison
green
2 sentences1927Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 ; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 , 26 Am. 1927Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 ; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 , 26 Am.Rep. 304 ; Love v. Berry, 22 Tex. 372 ; Jackson v. Berliner (Tex.Civ.App.) 127 S.W. 1160 ; White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66 , 40 S.W. 962 ; Lumpkin v. Adams, 74 Tex. 964 , 11 S.W. 1070 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Bradley v. Love
green
2 sentences1927Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 ; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 , 26 Am. 1927Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 ; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 , 26 Am.Rep. 304 ; Love v. Berry, 22 Tex. 372 ; Jackson v. Berliner (Tex.Civ.App.) 127 S.W. 1160 ; White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66 , 40 S.W. 962 ; Lumpkin v. Adams, 74 Tex. 964 , 11 S.W. 1070 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Lumpkin v. Adams & Wicks
green
1 sentence1927Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 ; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 , 26 Am.Rep. 304 ; Love v. Berry, 22 Tex. 372 ; Jackson v. Berliner (Tex.Civ.App.) 127 S.W. 1160 ; White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66 , 40 S.W. 962 ; Lumpkin v. Adams, 74 Tex. 964 , 11 S.W. 1070 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
White and Newman v. Frank
green
2 sentences1927Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 ; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 , 26 Am.Rep. 304 ; Love v. Berry, 22 Tex. 372 ; Jackson v. Berliner (Tex.Civ.App.) 127 S.W. 1160 ; White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66 , 40 S.W. 962 ; Lumpkin v. Adams, 74 Tex. 964 , 11 S.W. 1070 . 1927Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 ; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454 , 26 Am.Rep. 304 ; Love v. Berry, 22 Tex. 372 ; Jackson v. Berliner (Tex.Civ.App.) 127 S.W. 1160 ; White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66 , 40 S.W. 962 ; Lumpkin v. Adams, 74 Tex. 964 , 11 S.W. 1070 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Boothe v. Fiest
neutral
1 sentence1914It is true that it was held in Boothe v. Fiest, 80 Tex. 145 , 15 S. W. 799 , and affirmed in Mixon v. Miles, 92 Tex. 318 , 47 S. W. 967 , that, where a trustee sold the land to an innocent purchaser in violation of his trust, the cestui que trust could recover the value of the land at the time of the trial, less the indebtedness. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Mixon v. Cora Miles
neutral
1 sentence1914It is true that it was held in Boothe v. Fiest, 80 Tex. 145 , 15 S. W. 799 , and affirmed in Mixon v. Miles, 92 Tex. 318 , 47 S. W. 967 , that, where a trustee sold the land to an innocent purchaser in violation of his trust, the cestui que trust could recover the value of the land at the time of the trial, less the indebtedness. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Crary v. Port Arthur Channel & Dock Co.
green
1 sentence1914It is true that it was held in Boothe v. Fiest, 80 Tex. 145 , 15 S. W. 799 , and affirmed in Mixon v. Miles, 92 Tex. 318 , 47 S. W. 967 , that, where a trustee sold the land to an innocent purchaser in violation of his trust, the cestui que trust could recover the value of the land at the time of the trial, less the indebtedness. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
F. J. Harrison & Co. v. Boring
green
2 sentences1912Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 ; Woody v. Strong, 45 Tex. Civ. 1912Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 ; Woody v. Strong, 45 Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Woody v. Strong
neutral
2 sentences1912Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 ; Woody v. Strong, 45 Tex. Civ. 1912Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 ; Woody v. Strong, 45 Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Bird v. Jones
green
1 sentence1911Abee v. Bargas, 65 S. W. 489 ; Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark. 195 ; Camp v. Carpenter, 52 Mich. 375 , 18 N. W. 113 ; McGinn v. Tobey, 62 Mich. 252 , 28 N. W. 818 , 4 Am. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Camp v. Carpenter
green
2 sentences1911Abee v. Bargas, 65 S. W. 489 ; Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark. 195 ; Camp v. Carpenter, 52 Mich. 375 , 18 N. W. 113 ; McGinn v. Tobey, 62 Mich. 252 , 28 N. W. 818 , 4 Am. 1911Abee v. Bargas, 65 S. W. 489 ; Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark. 195 ; Camp v. Carpenter, 52 Mich. 375 , 18 N. W. 113 ; McGinn v. Tobey, 62 Mich. 252 , 28 N. W. 818 , 4 Am. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
McGinn v. Tobey
green
2 sentences1911Abee v. Bargas, 65 S. W. 489 ; Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark. 195 ; Camp v. Carpenter, 52 Mich. 375 , 18 N. W. 113 ; McGinn v. Tobey, 62 Mich. 252 , 28 N. W. 818 , 4 Am. 1911Abee v. Bargas, 65 S. W. 489 ; Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark. 195 ; Camp v. Carpenter, 52 Mich. 375 , 18 N. W. 113 ; McGinn v. Tobey, 62 Mich. 252 , 28 N. W. 818 , 4 Am. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.