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11 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. Stonegreen2 sentences2006Allen, 47 S.W.2d at 50, citing Huizar and Fields.10 In Graves, the court held that the jury instruction required by Huizar was limited to extraneous offense or bad act evidence actually admitted at the penalty stage of the trial, but then extended Huizar to hold that the required jury instruction was necessary for extraneous offense evidence from the guilt stage only if that evidence was in turn used at the penalty stage. 2006Allen , 47 S.W.2d at 50, citing Huizar and Fields . (10) In Graves , the court held that the jury instruction required by Huizar was limited to extraneous offense or bad act evidence actually admitted at the penalty stage of the trial, but then extended Huizar to hold that the required jury instruction was necessary for extraneous offense evidence from the guilt stage only if that evidence was in turn used at the penalty stage. | 2 | 2 |
Graves v. Stategreen2 sentences2021In Graves, the court held the Article 37.07 jury instruction required by Huizar was “limited to extraneous offense or bad act evidence actually admitted at the penalty stage of the trial, but then extended Huizar to hold that the required jury instruction was necessary for extraneous offense evidence from the guilt stage only if that evidence was in turn used at the penalty stage.” Wright v. State, 212 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex.App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d)(citing Graves v. State, 176 S.W.3d 422, 432 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) [Emphasis added]. 2006Graves, 176 S.W.3d at 432 . | 1 | 4 |
Wright v. Stategreen1 sentence2021In Graves, the court held the Article 37.07 jury instruction required by Huizar was “limited to extraneous offense or bad act evidence actually admitted at the penalty stage of the trial, but then extended Huizar to hold that the required jury instruction was necessary for extraneous offense evidence from the guilt stage only if that evidence was in turn used at the penalty stage.” Wright v. State, 212 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex.App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d)(citing Graves v. State, 176 S.W.3d 422, 432 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. struck) [Emphasis added]. | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen1 sentence2014For comparison, this court considered in Walker v. State whether counsel’s failure to request a required jury instruction in the punishment phase of a defendant’s trial supported an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 195 S.W.3d 250, 262 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Snow v. Stategreen1 sentence2008The voluntariness of a confession is not destroyed, and a confession induced by deception or trickery, is not inadmissible, unless the method used was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.”); Snow v. State, 721 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex. App.– Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet. ) (“voluntariness is not destroyed, and a confession induced by deception or trickery is not inadmissible, unless the method used was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.”); see also Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992) | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Holland v. Kenneth McGinnis Warden, and Michael P. Lane, Director, Illinois Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2008The voluntariness of a confession is not destroyed, and a confession induced by deception or trickery, is not inadmissible, unless the method used was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.”); Snow v. State, 721 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex. App.– Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet. ) (“voluntariness is not destroyed, and a confession induced by deception or trickery is not inadmissible, unless the method used was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.”); see also Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992) | 1 | 1 |
Geesa v. Statered1 sentence2003Here, the trial court simply instructed the jury that “in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty cannot be expected.” In Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the required jury instruction attempted to define reasonable doubt three times: (1)“A ‘reasonable doubt’ is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case”; (2) “It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs”; and (3) “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be pr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Paulson v. State
green
2 sentences2003Here, the trial court simply instructed the jury that “in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty cannot be expected.” In Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the required jury instruction attempted to define reasonable doubt three times: (1)“A ‘reasonable doubt’ is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case”; (2) “It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs”; and (3) “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be pr 2003App. 1991), the required jury instruction attempted to define reasonable doubt three times: (1)“A ‘reasonable doubt’ is a doubt based on reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case”; (2) “It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs”; and (3) “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.” However, Paulson specifica | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Zamora, Jaime Arturo
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 510 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Almanza v. State
green
1 sentence2015Harm resulting from the denial of a required jury instruction is analyzed under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d. 157 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Oursbourn v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 182 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Allen v. State
green
1 sentence2006Allen, 47 S.W.3d at 50 , citing Huizar and Fields. 10 In Graves , the court held that the jury instruction required by Huizar was limited to extraneous offense or bad act evidence actually admitted at the penalty stage of the trial, but then extended Huizar to hold that the required jury instruction was necessary for extraneous offense evidence from the guilt stage only if that evidence was in turn used at the penalty stage. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.