Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Pers. Restraint of Schorrgreen2 sentences2019Restraint of Schorr , 191 Wash.2d 315 , 320, 422 P.3d 451 (2018) ("[Resolving the time bar] is a threshold inquiry; we do not have to decide whether the entire claim is completely meritorious in order to decide whether it fits within an exception to the time bar."). ¶ 19 Meippen argues that RCW 10.73.100(6) exempts him from the time bar. 2019Restraint of Schorr, 191 Wn.2d 315 , 320, 422 P.3d 451 (2018)("[Resolving the time bar] is a threshold inquiry; we do not have to decide whether the entire claim is completely meritorious in order to decide whether it fits within an exception to the time bar."). | 2 | 3 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Greeninggreen2 sentences2004Greening, 141 Wn.2d at 697-98, 700-01 . 2004Greening, 141 Wash.2d at 697-98, 700-01 , 9 P.3d 206 . | 2 | 2 |
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschkegreen2 sentences2023Instead, he argues that his PRP falls under the exception to the time bar listed in RCW 10.73.100(2), which states that the one-year limit does not apply in cases where “[t]he statute that the defendant was convicted of violating was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant’s conduct.” A. MONSCHKE FRACTURED DECISION Pender relies on our supreme court’s decision in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 306 , 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion), for his contention that the FASE statute encompasses both a substantive criminal violation provision and a sentenc 2023Instead, he argues that his PRP falls under the exception to the time bar listed in RCW 10.73.100(2), which states that the one-year limit does not apply in cases where “[t]he statute that the defendant was convicted of violating was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant’s conduct.” A. MONSCHKE FRACTURED DECISION Pender relies on our supreme court’s decision in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 306 , 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion), for his contention that the FASE statute encompasses both a substantive criminal violation provision and a sentenc | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Personal Restraint of Scott
green
2 sentences2025Restraint of Scott, 173 Wn.2d 911, 917 , 271 P.3d 218 (2012). 2025Restraint of Scott, 173 Wn.2d 911, 917 , 271 P.3d 218 (2012). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Knapstad
green
2 sentences2025In any case, to qualify for an exception to the time bar based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must show that they 4 State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346 , 729 P.2d 48 (1986). 14 No. 87085-8-I/15 “acted with reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence and filing the petition or motion.” RCW 10.73.100(1). 2025In any case, to qualify for an exception to the time bar based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must show that they 4 State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346 , 729 P.2d 48 (1986). 14 No. 87085-8-I/15 “acted with reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence and filing the petition or motion.” RCW 10.73.100(1). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Colbert
green
2 sentences2022Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wn.2d 614, 619 , 380 P.3d 504 (2016). 2022Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wn.2d 614, 619 , 380 P.3d 504 (2016). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
McCoy v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2020Specifically, Somerville argues that McCoy v. Louisiana, constitutes a significant change in the law that is material to his case and applies retroactively. 138 S. Ct. at 1500 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth
green
1 sentence2019In In re Personal Restraint of Light-Roth, our Supreme Court held that O’Dell did not constitute a significant change in the law and therefore did not provide an exception to the time bar. 191 Wn.2d 328 , 336-38, 422 P.3d 444 (2018). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Houston-Sconiers
green
1 sentence2019As noted above, our Supreme Court in Meippen declined to address this issue. 193 Wn.2d at 315.4 Significantly, here we are not addressing the actual holding of Houston-Sconiers – that “sentencing courts must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they want below otherwise applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancements when sentencing juveniles in adult court.” 188 Wn.2d at 9 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Greening
green
1 sentence2004Greening, 141 Wash.2d at 697-98, 700-01 , 9 P.3d 206 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.