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64 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2026 23 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Wattsgreen2 sentences2025See Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011) (rejecting newly-discovered-fact claim based on judicial ruling and stating that “an in-court ruling or published judicial opinion is law, for it is simply the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual events. 2019See -5- Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Brandongreen2 sentences2023The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). 2023The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamalgreen2 sentences2018As to Appellant’s assertion that he was denied access to public records, it is well settled that to meet the governmental interference exception, a petitioner must plead and prove that (1) “the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials,” and (2) “the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). 2016Because a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate the exception to the time bar under section 9545(b)(1)(ii), see Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1269 (Pa. 2008), Washington’s petition is untimely. | 3 | 3 |
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Ralichgreen2 sentences2024Id. at 80 . 2024Id. at 80 . | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2019Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2008). 2019Id. ____________________________________________ 9 Oliver claims, without evidence, that he was adopted by the Oliver family, and he is actually the natural child of Robert Shriver and Queen Noor of Jordan. | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2019See Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 .4 ____________________________________________ 4 Assuming arguendo Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition was timely or that Appellant successfully pleaded and proved an exception to the time bar, thereby giving the PCRA court and this Court jurisdiction to reach the merits of Appellant’s claims, see Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 , Appellant’s challenges to the application of the “castle doctrine” and to Detective Williams’s credibility could have been raised as part of his direct appeal following his sentencing on May 14, 2002, but he failed to do so and thus waived these 2019See Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 .4 ____________________________________________ 4 Assuming arguendo Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition was timely or that Appellant successfully pleaded and proved an exception to the time bar, thereby giving the PCRA court and this Court jurisdiction to reach the merits of Appellant’s claims, see Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 , Appellant’s challenges to the application of the “castle doctrine” and to Detective Williams’s credibility could have been raised as part of his direct appeal following his sentencing on May 14, 2002, but he failed to do so and thus waived these | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Larkyellow2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000). 2016See Lark, supra. We find that the Green and Blye affidavits satisfy the exception to the time bar under section 9545. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Burtongreen2 sentences2015See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); Commonwealth v. Williamson, 21 A.3d 236 , 242 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011). 2015See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007) (noting, “the PCRA mandates that any petition invoking an exception to the time bar requirement be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented”). | 2 | 2 |
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019His first issue does not establish an exception to the time bar.5 In his second claim, Appellant argues that a charge of murder under section 2502 is unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).6 Appellant’s reliance is misplaced. 2018Floyd, therefore, attempts to rely on an exception to the time requirement, claiming his sentence was illegal pursuant to the “new constitutional right” introduced in Alleyne, supra, which he avers should apply retroactively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). | 1 | 4 |
Cowher, K. v. Kodali, S.green2 sentences2025See Commonwealth v. Balestier-Marrero, 314 A.3d at 556 ; Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130 , 1336 (Pa. Super. 2023). 2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130 , 1131 (Pa. Super. 2023) (concluding that “[n]othing in Bradley creates a right to file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel”); Commonwealth v. Edmondson, No. 884 WDA 2023, unpublished memorandum at *6-7 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 27, 2024) (same); Commonwealth v. Dixon, No. 1145 EDA 2022, unpublished memorandum at *6 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 28, 2022) (same).7 This argument would not have provided Appellant with an exception to the time bar. | 1 | 2 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2019See Order, 6/1/2017, at n.1. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) relying upon Williams14 To the extent that Appellant now attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception predicated upon Williams instead, despite his ____________________________________________ 14 Appellant’s 2012 PCRA petition had alleged that the claims therein qualified for an exception to the time bar “based upon a retroactively applicable constitutional right that was recognized by the United States Supreme Court” in Miller, 567 U.S. 460 . 2019See Order, 6/1/2017, at n.1. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) relying upon Williams14 To the extent that Appellant now attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception predicated upon Williams instead, despite his ____________________________________________ 14 Appellant’s 2012 PCRA petition had alleged that the claims therein qualified for an exception to the time bar “based upon a retroactively applicable constitutional right that was recognized by the United States Supreme Court” in Miller, 567 U.S. 460 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Cintoragreen2 sentences2019See -5- Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013). 2017However, Appellant avers that his Petition falls within the exception to the time bar provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) because “he filed the instant Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition within 60 days [of August 24, 2016, the date he] found out about A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2016) and Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa. -4- J-S55008-17 2016).”5 In his Reply Brief, Appellant quite clearly insists that he filed the instant Petition asserting the “Newly Discovered Facts” exception provided in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), not subsection (b)(1)(iii), because “that’s | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen1 sentence2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and -7- cannot grant relief”). | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Fantauzzi, R.green1 sentence2026“The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and -7- cannot grant relief”). | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Balestier-Marrero, C.green1 sentence2025See Commonwealth v. Balestier-Marrero, 314 A.3d at 556 ; Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130 , 1336 (Pa. Super. 2023). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2025See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“We have repeatedly held that the PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining collateral review, and that any petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.”). -3- plead and prove an exception to the time bar. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Stokesgreen1 sentence2023Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
| Com. of Pa. v. Montgomerygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Rykardred | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Derricksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Rossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Fennellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Marshallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Neimangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Flanagangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Beasleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Peterkin
green
2 sentences2021Under Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998), we may not grant relief under the PCRA unless Appellant has established an exception to the time bar. 2021Under Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998), we may not grant relief under the PCRA unless Appellant has established an exception to the time bar. | 3 | 2021–2021 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Hopkins, K.
green
2 sentences2021Id. 2017He argues that his sentence based on mandatory minimum sentencing provisions was illegal, and that he is entitled to relief based on the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013), holding that "any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime must be treated as an element of the offense, submitted to a jury, rather than a judge, and found beyond a reasonable doubt." Our High Court subsequently held in Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015), that a two-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of controlled substances within a drug | 2 | 2017–2021 |
McQuiggin v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2020March 24, 2014) (not reported) (motion for relief under F.R.C.P. 60(b) asserting retroactive application of McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), denied). 6 Appellant also asserted before the PCRA court that his conviction resulted from government interference of his Sixth Amendment right to effective -3- that he provided two bases for establishing this exception to the time bar: witness Mark Linden’s recantation and an affidavit from a potential new witness, Jerome Grady. 2014In support of this assertion, Appellant cites to Schlup v. Delo, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995), and House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (2006), as well as McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013). | 2 | 2014–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Ragan
green
2 sentences2019See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b); Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267 ; Ragan, 923 A.2d at 1170 . 2017See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b); Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267 ; Ragan, 923 A.2d at 1170 . | 2 | 2017–2019 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2018Citing Miller2 and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), which held that Miller applies retroactively to cases on state collateral review, Appellant argues that he is entitled to relief because, based upon neurologic studies regarding brain development and his own mental infirmities, he is in the same position as a juvenile homicide defendant. 2016In his petition, Appellant relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 , 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment when imposed upon defendants convicted of murder who were “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes.” Similarly, in his brief to this Court, Appellant invokes Section 9545(b)(l)(iii), based on his contention that he is entitled to relief under Miller and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Lo | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Wolfe, M.
green
2 sentences2018In his remaining issue appellant contends that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence in violation of Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016) which applied Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), on a direct appeal. 2017While Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. ____________________________________________ 1 Mengel argues that because his petition was filed within 60 days of Commonwealth v. Neumann, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (decided August 20, 2014), he meets the “newly discovered facts” exception to the PCRA. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Towles, J., Aplt.
green
1 sentence2026See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (requiring that an exception to the time bar be raised within a year “of the date the claim could have been presented”); Towles, 300 A.3d at 413 n.14, 417 n.18 (existing precedent from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court requires due diligence for the governmental interference exception). - 11 - probable cause determination.2 As with his first claim, Appellant did not explain how that alleged interference prevented him from raising the claim in the 30-year interim. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Singletary
green
1 sentence2026“It is well settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground without regard to the ground relied upon by the lower court itself.” Commonwealth v. Singletary, 803 A.2d 769 , 772-73 (Pa. Super. 2002). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Baroni
green
1 sentence2026First, [the] Commonwealth argued that the [Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] has explicitly said that [] Bradley does not constitute an exception to the time bar. [The] Commonwealth argued that in [Commonwealth v. Baroni, 827 A.2d 419 (Pa. 2003)], “the preset that structural errors can never be deemed harmless does not serve to create a state court -3- jurisdiction that is otherwise absent.” Additionally, [the] Commonwealth argued that in [Baroni], the [Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] held that an allegation of a structural error does not surmount the jurisdictional time bar of Section 9545(b). [T | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2025The court next succinctly summarized the applicable law applicable to Saunders’ substantive Brady claim: Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), exculpatory evidence not disclosed to the defense will give rise to a due process violation and will require a new trial if the exculpatory evidence is “material” either to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87 ; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a) (specifying, as mandatory discovery, “[a]ny evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or punishment, and is within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth”) 2025The court next succinctly summarized the applicable law applicable to Saunders’ substantive Brady claim: Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), exculpatory evidence not disclosed to the defense will give rise to a due process violation and will require a new trial if the exculpatory evidence is “material” either to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87 ; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a) (specifying, as mandatory discovery, “[a]ny evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or punishment, and is within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth”) | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Duboise, R., Aplt. v. Smith, K.
green
1 sentence2024In concluding that Appellant failed to establish a timeliness exception, the PCRA court explained: [Appellant] bases the exception to the time bar in Claim #1 of his 1925(b) statement on his assertion that the Alexander case was a “newly discovered fact.” Case law is not a newly discovered “fact.” Compare Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124 , 1146 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted) (“[J]udicial determinations do not satisfy the newly discovered fact exception because an in-court ruling or published judicial opinion is law, for it is simply the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual eve | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2024Taylor, 65 A.3d at 468 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Grazier
green
1 sentence2024As discussed, infra, Appellant did not assert an exception to the time bar and none of the allegations made would qualify as an exception under the circumstances of this case as all of the claims were ascertainable no later than the litigation of the first PCRA petition. -4- an on-the-record inquiry pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.3d 81 (Pa. 1998), to determine whether Appellant wished to proceed with appointed counsel or pro se. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Commonwealth v. Thompson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, T., Aplt. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Newman green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Bennett green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Story green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Johnson v. United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Williamson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Erm of Ny Ltd. v. Rainier Group of Atlantic USA green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| House v. Bell green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Schlup v. Delo red | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Williams v. Taylor green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.