expression rule in Washington

1980Prior to the American Law Institute's adoption of section 203, this court long ago adopted the rule that "the parties to a contract may make the same with reference to the laws of any state or country and have their contractual rights governed thereby, provided only that such laws have a real and not a mere fictitious connection with the subject-matter of the transaction." Crawford v. Seattle, Renton & S. Ry., 86 Wash. 628, 635 , 150 P. 1155 (1915).

1980Prior to the American Law Institute's adoption of section 203, this court long ago adopted the rule that "the parties to a contract may make the same with reference to the laws of any state or country and have their contractual rights governed thereby, provided only that such laws have a real and not a mere fictitious connection with the subject-matter of the transaction." Crawford v. Seattle, Renton & S. Ry., 86 Wash. 628, 635 , 150 P. 1155 (1915).

1991Pursuant to the expression of that rule in Owens v. Seattle, 49 Wn.2d 187, 194 , 299 P.2d 560 , 61 A.L.R.2d 417 (1956), Knight argues that this exhibit should not have been admitted because no one testified that it was based on accurate measurements.

1991Pursuant to the expression of that rule in Owens v. Seattle, 49 Wn.2d 187, 194 , 299 P.2d 560 , 61 A.L.R.2d 417 (1956), Knight argues that this exhibit should not have been admitted because no one testified that it was based on accurate measurements.

1978Jaffe is an expression of the defense of "legal impossibility," and its rationale has been followed in attempt cases in several jurisdictions, e.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hair, 356 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1973); State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325 , 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939); Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla.

1978Jaffe is an expression of the defense of "legal impossibility," and its rationale has been followed in attempt cases in several jurisdictions, e.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hair, 356 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1973); State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325 , 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939); Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla.

1978Jaffe is an expression of the defense of "legal impossibility," and its rationale has been followed in attempt cases in several jurisdictions, e.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hair, 356 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1973); State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325 , 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939); Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla.

1978Jaffe is an expression of the defense of "legal impossibility," and its rationale has been followed in attempt cases in several jurisdictions, e.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hair, 356 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1973); State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325 , 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939); Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla.

1978Jaffe is an expression of the defense of "legal impossibility," and its rationale has been followed in attempt cases in several jurisdictions, e.g., United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hair, 356 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1973); State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325 , 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939); Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla.

1968A classic expression of this principle was set forth in 1926 by Justice Cardozo in the case of Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439 , 154 N.E. 303 (1926), where, in dealing with a similar situation, he wrote, at 443: Finally we are told that the brokers acted in good faith, that the terms procured were the best obtainable at the moment, and that the wrong, if any, was unaccompanied by damage.

1968A classic expression of this principle was set forth in 1926 by Justice Cardozo in the case of Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439 , 154 N.E. 303 (1926), where, in dealing with a similar situation, he wrote, at 443: Finally we are told that the brokers acted in good faith, that the terms procured were the best obtainable at the moment, and that the wrong, if any, was unaccompanied by damage.

1966An expression of this principle in a civil cause, equally applicable here, is found in Groff v. Department of Labor & Indus., 65 Wn.2d 35, 40 , 395 P.2d 633 (1964), where we said: It was pointed out in the first volume of the Washington reports[ 2 ] that general findings such as “the matters and things set forth in the complaint are true,” are “entirely insufficient” for an appellate review.

1966An expression of this principle in a civil cause, equally applicable here, is found in Groff v. Department of Labor & Indus., 65 Wn.2d 35, 40 , 395 P.2d 633 (1964), where we said: It was pointed out in the first volume of the Washington reports[ 2 ] that general findings such as “the matters and things set forth in the complaint are true,” are “entirely insufficient” for an appellate review.

1955The instruction further said: “The owner of a dog is liable for injuries inflicted upon a child by his dog if the previous conduct of the dog of which the owner had knowledge was such that an ordinarily prudent person would anticipate that the dog might injure children, even though the dog had not previously bitten or injured anyone.” This instruction is substantially in the language of Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434 , 28 Pac. 752 , and, in our opinion, is a correct expression of the rule at common law.

1955The instruction further said: “The owner of a dog is liable for injuries inflicted upon a child by his dog if the previous conduct of the dog of which the owner had knowledge was such that an ordinarily prudent person would anticipate that the dog might injure children, even though the dog had not previously bitten or injured anyone.” This instruction is substantially in the language of Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434 , 28 Pac. 752 , and, in our opinion, is a correct expression of the rule at common law.

1954It is the rule in this state, expressed both in legislative enactments (RCW 46.60.230; Seattle ordinance No. 80998, § 33, known as the traffic code) and in many of our decisions, of which the following are typical: Ballard v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Wn. (2d) 67, 74, 145 P. (2d) 1019 (1944); Fedland v. Teshera, 40 Wn. (2d) 256, 262, 242 P. *343 (2d) 751 (1952); Orme v. Watkins, 44 Wn. (2d) 325, 329, 267 P. (2d) 681 (1954), and case cited. • One of plaintiff’s requested instructions, designated plaintiff’s additional requested instruction No. 2, is a proper expression of this rule of law and should h

1954It is the rule in this state, expressed both in legislative enactments (RCW 46.60.230; Seattle ordinance No. 80998, § 33, known as the traffic code) and in many of our decisions, of which the following are typical: Ballard v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Wn. (2d) 67, 74, 145 P. (2d) 1019 (1944); Fedland v. Teshera, 40 Wn. (2d) 256, 262, 242 P. *343 (2d) 751 (1952); Orme v. Watkins, 44 Wn. (2d) 325, 329, 267 P. (2d) 681 (1954), and case cited. • One of plaintiff’s requested instructions, designated plaintiff’s additional requested instruction No. 2, is a proper expression of this rule of law and should h