expression rule in Missouri

1907Cotton-press, 6 Pickle 353 , it is said: “The proximate cause of an injury may, in general, be stated to be that act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act or omission occurring or concurring with another, which had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted, notwithstanding the latter.” In Haley v. Transit Co., 179 Mo. 1 . c. 35, 77 S. W. 731 , the Supreme Court said: “In the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in Railroad v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469,1 . c. 475, may be found, perhaps, as brief and yet as comprehensive an expression of the rule as can

1903If we could deduce from them the best possible expression of the rule, it would remain after all to decide each case largely upon the special facts belonging to it, and often upon the very nicest, discriminations.” In the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in Railroad v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 , l. c. 475, may be found, perhaps, as brief and yet as comprehensive an expression of the rule as can well be given.

1979If he should absent himself and remain away the court would simply have to suspend all proceedings, and eventually discharge the jury and declare a mistrial.” See also State v. Whites, 538 S.W.2d 70 (Mo.App.1976), and State v. Colbert, 344 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Mo.1961).

1907Cotton-press, 6 Pickle 353 , it is said: “The proximate cause of an injury may, in general, be stated to be that act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act or omission occurring or concurring with another, which had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted, notwithstanding the latter.” In Haley v. Transit Co., 179 Mo. 1 . c. 35, 77 S. W. 731 , the Supreme Court said: “In the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in Railroad v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469,1 . c. 475, may be found, perhaps, as brief and yet as comprehensive an expression of the rule as can

1907Cotton-press, 6 Pickle 353 , it is said: “The proximate cause of an injury may, in general, be stated to be that act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act or omission occurring or concurring with another, which had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted, notwithstanding the latter.” In Haley v. Transit Co., 179 Mo. 1 . c. 35, 77 S. W. 731 , the Supreme Court said: “In the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in Railroad v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469,1 . c. 475, may be found, perhaps, as brief and yet as comprehensive an expression of the rule as can

1904Perhaps the best expression of the rule is that to be found in Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514 , which is to the effect: “Mere delay or acquiescence can not defeat the remedy by injunction in support of the legal right, unless it has been continued so long, and under such circumstances, as to defeat the right itself. . . .

1904And a like ruling was made by us in the latter case of Goodman v. Railway, 71 Mo. App. 460 .

1889In the later case of Steinkamper v. McManus, 26 Mo. App. 51, 56 . this court, following Berry v. Wilson, supra, held that the unexplained use of this expression in an instruction will not warrant a reversal of the judgment, though it is better not to use the expression without explanation.

1889In the later case of Steinkamper v. McManus, 26 Mo. App. 51, 56 . this court, following Berry v. Wilson, supra, held that the unexplained use of this expression in an instruction will not warrant a reversal of the judgment, though it is better not to use the expression without explanation.

1889In the later case of Steinkamper v. McManus, 26 Mo. App. 51, 56 . this court, following Berry v. Wilson, supra, held that the unexplained use of this expression in an instruction will not warrant a reversal of the judgment, though it is better not to use the expression without explanation.

1889In the later case of Steinkamper v. McManus, 26 Mo. App. 51, 56 . this court, following Berry v. Wilson, supra, held that the unexplained use of this expression in an instruction will not warrant a reversal of the judgment, though it is better not to use the expression without explanation.

1889Cases might, however, arise in which the use of this expression in an instruction would be ground of reversal; and such was ~the opinion of Philips, P. J., in Carson v. Porter, 22 Mo. App. 179, under the peculiar circumstances of that case, though it is not clear that in that case the reversal of the judgment was predicated upon that ground alone.

1887In such cases the officer holds during the pleasure of the person or body that appoints him, and the power of removal is purely discretionary.” In support of this expression of doctrine the learned judge cited, Ex Parte Hennen ( 13 Pet. 230, 256 ), and Billon Mun.

1887The court pro ceeded upon the doctrine laid down in Sharpe v. Conkling ( 16 Vt. 355), “that the rule is perfectly established, that, where the interest in the subject matter secured by a covenant is several, although the terms will naturally bear a joint interpretation, yet, if they do not exclude the inference of being’ intended to be several, they shall be so taken ; they shall have a several construction put upon them.” The court also proceeded upon the following expression of doctrine by the late Professor Parsons, in his work on Contracts: “The nature, and especially the entireness, of th

1886This expression of doctrine was quoted with approval .by our supreme court in Freeman v. Thompson ( 53 Mo. 183 ), and also in Gray v. Bowles, supra. The following statement of the same doctrine is from an approved text writer: “Before this power can be affirmed to exist, it must be made to appear that the law has given the tribunal capacity to entertain the complaint against the person or thing sought to be charged or ^affected; that such complaint has been preferred, and that such person or thing has been properly brought before the court or tribunal to answer the charge therein contained.

1886This expression of doctrine was quoted with approval .by our supreme court in Freeman v. Thompson ( 53 Mo. 183 ), and also in Gray v. Bowles, supra. The following statement of the same doctrine is from an approved text writer: “Before this power can be affirmed to exist, it must be made to appear that the law has given the tribunal capacity to entertain the complaint against the person or thing sought to be charged or ^affected; that such complaint has been preferred, and that such person or thing has been properly brought before the court or tribunal to answer the charge therein contained.

1882There is another branch of this doctrine upon which alone, if there were no other grounds, we should be required to decide this case for the plaintiff; and this is found in the expression of the rule by Norton, J., in Ranken v. Patton ( 65 Mo. 378, 410 ), quoted with approval in Bradshaw v. Yates ( 67 Mo. 228 ), namely : “ Where a confidential relation exists, and the subordinate conveys to the superior, courts of equity * * * require the act to be done with a reasonable knowledge of all the facts necessary to an understanding of what the grantor is doing.” And they not only require the act to

1880It may be admitted that the proper expression of the doctrine is, as stated, for instance, in McCall v. Reybold, 1 Harr. 150 , that, “ since the Statute of Frauds, a partition, to be valid, must be in wilting.” It is entirely consistent with this, and not inconsistent with the settled interpretation which in parallel cases has been put upon the Statute of Frauds, to hold that tenants in common may by their own acts sever their possession, and when such severance has been executed, that they may be debarred from denying it.