expression standard in Indiana

2019However, if the expression is ambiguous when viewed in context, we instead “evaluate the constitutionality of any state-imposed restriction of the expression under standard rationality review.” Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370 .

2006Id. "'If the expression, viewed in context, is ambiguous, a reviewing court should find that the claimant has not established that it was political and should evaluate the constitutionality of any state-imposed restriction of the expression under standard rationality review."" Id. (quoting Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370 ).

2015“Expressive activity is political if its aim is to comment on government action, including criticism of an official acting under color of law.” Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 585 .

2015Id. [14] Cundari contends that her statements to the officers were protected political speech because she was commenting on the government action of the arrest.

2015If the speech is determined to be ambiguous, “then the expression is not political, and we review the State’s restriction of the expression under standard rational review.” Anderson, 881 N.E.2d at 90 .

2014“If the expression is ambiguous, then the expression is not political, and we review the State’s restriction of the expression under standard rational review.” Id. at 90 .

2014The Washington court concluded its overall analysis by stating that “Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction 10.03A provides no less of an expression of that rule, and thus the instruction given in the present case by the trial court was a correct statement of the 10 law.” Id. at 350 ; see also Davis v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1285, 1289-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (observing that the language of pattern instructions covering defense of self, another and attack on dwelling and the use of deadly force was adequate because the jury was apprised through the statutory language that “reasonable belief” was from the

2007U.M., 827 N.E.2d at 1192-93 .

2007U.M., 827 N.E.2d at 1192-93 .

2006Id.

1982I would follow McDonnell v. Flaharty, (7th Cir.1980) 636 F.2d 184 as a correct expression of the rule of law in Indiana.

1982I would follow McDonnell v. Flaharty, (7th Cir. 1980) 636 F.2d 184 as a correct expression of the rule of law in Indiana.

1979And the view which we think supported by the better reason and the greater weight of authority is that depreciation may not be deducted from such cost because that would make the sum insufficient to complete the repairs and would leave the building unfinished; and this would fall short of the indemnity contracted for in the policy." (Citations omitted). 178 S.W.2d 915, at 925 . [4] An expression of the rule is that the trier of facts may consider any evidence logically tending to the formation of a correct estimate of the value of the insured property at the time of the loss.

1975In support of his argument that the concurrent motions for judgment on the evidence resulted in a waiver of trial by jury, Osha relies on the expression of that principle found in Estes v. Hancock County Bank (1972), 259 Ind. 542 , 289 N.E.2d 728 .

1975In support of his argument that the concurrent motions for judgment on the evidence resulted in a waiver of trial by jury, Osha relies on the expression of that principle found in Estes v. Hancock County Bank (1972), 259 Ind. 542 , 289 N.E.2d 728 .

1926But in the present case the expression is, ‘death by poison.’ We know of no case which goes to the *567 extent of holding that such an expression in the exception contained in the policy does not avoid it.” In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hudgins (1903), 97 Texas 124 , 76 S. W. 745 , 104 Am.

1926But in the present case the expression is, ‘death by poison.’ We know of no case which goes to the *567 extent of holding that such an expression in the exception contained in the policy does not avoid it.” In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hudgins (1903), 97 Texas 124 , 76 S. W. 745 , 104 Am.

1923In Lasswell v. Henderson (1910), 144 Mo. App. 396 , 128 S. W. 789 , it was held that where a mortgagee of personal property permits a mortgagor to remain in possession thereof and dispose of the mortgaged property in the ordinary course of business for his own use and benefit, such conduct upon his part renders the mortgage fraudulent as to creditors or subsequent purchasers.

1923In Lasswell v. Henderson (1910), 144 Mo. App. 396 , 128 S. W. 789 , it was held that where a mortgagee of personal property permits a mortgagor to remain in possession thereof and dispose of the mortgaged property in the ordinary course of business for his own use and benefit, such conduct upon his part renders the mortgage fraudulent as to creditors or subsequent purchasers.

1904Co. v. Juday, supra, concluded as follows: “‘Perhaps a better expression of this rule is, that although the plaintiff has negligently exposed himself or property to an injury, yet if the defendant, after discovering the exposed situation, inflicts the injury upon him through a failure to exercise ordinary care, the plaintiff may recover damages.’ ” In Elwood, etc., St.

1898See, also, Beach on Contributory Negligence, section 54; Barker v. Savage, 45 N. Y. 191, 194 ; 6 Am.

1893In the case last cited is this expression of the rule: ‘ ‘The material charge against the appellant, and without which the complaint would be bad, is that the appellant, with notice of the negligence and carelessness of Pool, the engineer, carelessly and negligently retained him in its service.” In Jenney Electric Light, etc., Co. v. Murphy, 115 Ind. 566 , it is said, on page 568: ‘ ‘If an employee, reposing confidence, as he has a right to, in the prudence and caution of the employer, relies upon the adequacy of the implements put into his hands to work with, and upon the safety of the place

1868It must be confined, in the language of Story, J., in that case, “to facts and circumstances connected with the matters stated in the direct examination.” This expression of the rule was approved by this court in Wright v. Gaff, 6 Ind. 416 .

1868In Patton v. Hamilton, 12 Ind. 256 , the cross-examination was restricted “tothejsubject matter of the original examination.” In Dearmond v. Dearmond, 12 Ind. 455 , it was said that “on cross-examination the defendants would have the undoubted right to draw out all that was said at the time in relation to the subject about which the statements sworn to were made.” The"‘same rule must apply as to all that was done at the time-in relation to the subject concerning which the witness has "Testified.

1868In Patton v. Hamilton, 12 Ind. 256 , the cross-examination was restricted “tothejsubject matter of the original examination.” In Dearmond v. Dearmond, 12 Ind. 455 , it was said that “on cross-examination the defendants would have the undoubted right to draw out all that was said at the time in relation to the subject about which the statements sworn to were made.” The"‘same rule must apply as to all that was done at the time-in relation to the subject concerning which the witness has "Testified.