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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1905–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gilesgreen2 sentences2007See also People v. Giles, 40 Cal.4th at 842-44 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 152 P.3d 433 (Federal Rule 804(b)(6) is simply an expression of the rule applied in the glut of witness tampering cases that began to appear in the 1960s and 1970s when the federal government began placing greater emphasis on the prosecution of organized crime and drug activity). 2007See also People v. Giles, 40 Cal.4th at 842-44 , 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 152 P.3d 433 (Federal Rule 804(b)(6) is simply an expression of the rule applied in the glut of witness tampering cases that began to appear in the 1960s and 1970s when the federal government began placing greater emphasis on the prosecution of organized crime and drug activity). | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss.green2 sentences1971Beyond doubt, the fourteenth amendment does not impose on the States an inflexible and technical rule of equal taxation, and the extent to which the States may go in devising a legislative classification for taxation is illustrated by the statement of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276, 284, 285 , 76 L. 1971Beyond doubt, the fourteenth amendment does not impose on the States an inflexible and technical rule of equal taxation, and the extent to which the States may go in devising a legislative classification for taxation is illustrated by the statement of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276, 284, 285 , 76 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Continental Casualty Company v. Michael S. Robertson
green
1 sentence1977Nonetheless, the Robertson and Buckner courts admonished defendant insurer for not employing less restrictive terminology and strictly construed language suggested to the insurer by other courts. 245 F.2d 604, 607-08 , 117 Ga. App. 633, 637-38 , 161 S.E.2d 319, 322 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Bracey
green
2 sentences1977As observed in Bracey, “Once the condemned use of perjured testimony has been established, Chapman dictated that the burden then be placed on the State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the perjured testimony did not contribute to the conviction.” (People v. Bracey, 51 Ill. 2d 514, 520 , 283 N.E.2d 685, 690 .) Although the opinion in Bracey discusses the application of the Chapman standard, the court affirmed the trial court’s action dismissing the petition because the trial judge had found the defendant had failed to prove there was any perjured testimony and in any event, the judge 1977As observed in Bracey, “Once the condemned use of perjured testimony has been established, Chapman dictated that the burden then be placed on the State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the perjured testimony did not contribute to the conviction.” (People v. Bracey, 51 Ill. 2d 514, 520 , 283 N.E.2d 685, 690 .) Although the opinion in Bracey discusses the application of the Chapman standard, the court affirmed the trial court’s action dismissing the petition because the trial judge had found the defendant had failed to prove there was any perjured testimony and in any event, the judge | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Fahy v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence1977Ed. 2d 171 , 84 S. Ct. 229 , at least required a different expression of the standard and a different emphasis, even though the court was not convinced that an entirely new or different standard was being applied. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Buckner v. American National Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1977Nonetheless, the Robertson and Buckner courts admonished defendant insurer for not employing less restrictive terminology and strictly construed language suggested to the insurer by other courts. 245 F.2d 604, 607-08 , 117 Ga. App. 633, 637-38 , 161 S.E.2d 319, 322 . 1977Nonetheless, the Robertson and Buckner courts admonished defendant insurer for not employing less restrictive terminology and strictly construed language suggested to the insurer by other courts. 245 F.2d 604, 607-08 , 117 Ga. App. 633, 637-38 , 161 S.E.2d 319, 322 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization
green
2 sentences1973The best expression of this rule occurs in Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization (1966), 34 Ill.2d 257 , 215 N.E.2d 443 . 1973The best expression of this rule occurs in Centennial Laundry Co. v. West Side Organization (1966), 34 Ill.2d 257 , 215 N.E.2d 443 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Thorpe v. Mahin
green
1 sentence1971Beyond doubt, the fourteenth amendment does not impose on the States an inflexible and technical rule of equal taxation, and the extent to which the States may go in devising a legislative classification for taxation is illustrated by the statement of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276, 284, 285 , 76 L.Ed. 1102, 1108 , 52 S.Ct. 556 , 559: "The equal protection clause does not require the state to maintain a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in ta | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Cook v. Big Muddy-Carterville Mining Co.
green
1 sentence1911We held substantially to this effect in Cook v. Big Muddy Mining Co. 249 Ill. 41 , where we s.aid, on page 47: “The requirement of the statute for a conspicuous mark and a report relates only to working places and their physical condition and does not include other things.” The defects alleged in the engine were the broken balance wheels and the worn friction blocks, and it is not claimed that these made the working place at the engine dangerous or affected' any particular place in the mine. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Yoe v. McCord
neutral
1 sentence1906In the case of Yoe v. McCord, 74 Ill. 33 , the court commended the following definition from 1 Redfield on Wills, 123, as to the legal meaning of sound mind and memory: “The result of the best considered cases upon the subject seems to put the quantum of understanding requisite to the valid execution of a will upon the basis of knowing and comprehending the transaction, or, in popular phrase, that the testator should, at the time of executing the will, know and understand what he was about.” It was said that such an expression of the doctrine is intelligible to a jury and embodies about the wh | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Commonwealth v. Richards
green
1 sentence1905The case of Commonwealth v. Richards, 131 Pa. 209 , is much in point. | 1 | 1905–1905 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.