inventory exception in Washington

2013Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 153 .

1998Houser, 95 Wn.2d at 154 .

2019The GMA has a number of planning goals, including to “[ejncourage the availability of affordable housing to all economic segments of the population of this state.”26 To achieve this goal, the GMA requires a city to include a housing element in its comprehensive plan.27 The GMA mandates that the element “(a) [i]ncludes an inventory and analysis of existing and projected housing needs that identifies the number of housing units necessary to manage projected growth [and] (d) makes adequate provisions for existing and projected needs of all economic segments of the community.”28 The GMHB has adopt

2003Hearings Bd., 136 Wash.2d 38, 46 , 959 P.2d 1091 (1998). [29] RCW 36.70A.070(6)(a)(iii). [30] RCW 36.70A.070(6)(a)(iii)(D). [31] RCW 36.70A.070(6)(a)(iv)(C). [32] This portion of the mandatory comprehensive plan elements requires: (2) A housing element ensuring the vitality and character of established residential neighborhoods that: (a) Includes an inventory and analysis of existing and projected housing needs that identifies the number of housing units necessary to manage projected growth; (b) includes a statement of goals, policies, objectives, and mandatory provisions for the preservation,

2013Consent is recognized as an independent basis for a warrantless search, see, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 72 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996), and thus, if accepted, Tyler's argument would to a significant extent nullify the inventory exception to the warrant requirement where searches of impounded vehicles are concerned.

2013We agree. ¶38 Consent is recognized as an independent basis for a warrantless search, see, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 72 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996), and thus, if accepted, Tyler’s argument would to a significant extent nullify the inventory exception to the warrant requirement where searches of impounded vehicles are concerned. ¶39 As explained, inventory searches are limited searches for limited purposes.

2013Consent is recognized as an independent basis for a warrantless search, see, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 72 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996), and thus, if accepted, Tyler's argument would to a significant extent nullify the inventory exception to the warrant requirement where searches of impounded vehicles are concerned.

2013We agree. ¶38 Consent is recognized as an independent basis for a warrantless search, see, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 72 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996), and thus, if accepted, Tyler’s argument would to a significant extent nullify the inventory exception to the warrant requirement where searches of impounded vehicles are concerned. ¶39 As explained, inventory searches are limited searches for limited purposes.

1973Miller v. State, 137 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962).

1968Miller v. State, 137 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1962).

2018Brock, 184 Wn.2d at 154-55 ; Byrd, 178 Wn.2d at 619-20 .

2018Brock, 184 Wn.2d at 154-55 ; Byrd, 178 Wn.2d at 619-20 .

2018Id. at 155 . 3 No. 35452-1-III State v. Mitchell (Concurrence) Our Supreme Court’s time of arrest rule is rooted in an inventory analysis.

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin

2013App. 694, 703-04 , 128 P.3d 1271 (2006) (presence of chemical fumes indicated likelihood that highly combustible materials were being transported in the vehicle’s trunk and presented manifest necessity for search). ¶42 Because of the privacy interests at stake, pretextual searches are prohibited, even if the search would otherwise be permissible under the inventory exception.

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin

2013Generally, a presumption shifting the burden of persuasion should outweigh one that only shifts the burden of production because the same factors that justify giving one presumption greater impact also justify giving it greater weight than a presumption having less procedural impact.36 Here, giving precedence to the inventory presumption does not further any policy decision articulated by our Supreme Court, while giving precedence to the joint property presumption furthers those policies articulated by the court in In re Marriage of Lindsev.37 Connell v. Francisco.38 and Olver v. Fowler.39 Fin