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11 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictisgreen2 sentences2019It was thus difficult to determine whether and to what extent substantive due process principles were relevant to the regulatory takings analysis. 13 Yim et al v. City ofSeattle, No. 95813-1 As a result of such confusion, courts were left to determine when a regulation crosses the line into a regulatory taking based on '"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted) {(yyolmg Kaiser Aetna V. 1987We can uphold the trial court's summary judgment in Orion's favor only if we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the three components of a regulatory takings claim: (1) whether the regulatory regime as applied to Orion's property scheme was insulated from a takings challenge as part of the State's authority to enact health and safety regulations, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ___ U.S. ___, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 491-93 , 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 733 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); (2) whether | 1 | 2 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York Citygreen2 sentences2000Justice Joseph Story wrote: "All the property and vested rights of individuals are subject to such regulations of police as the legislature may establish with a view to protect the community and its several members against such use or employment thereof as would be injurious to society or unjust toward other individuals. " 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1954, at 700-01 (5th ed. 1891) (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger with approval). [15] "Under the `character-of-the-regulation' prong of the regulatory takings analysis, `[a] "taking" may mo 2000“Under the ‘character-of-the-regulation’ prong of the regulatory takings analysis, ‘[a] “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can he characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the social good.’ ” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 , 709 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124), withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999). | 1 | 2 |
Anthony Simmonds, A/K/A Anthony Simmons v. Immigration and Naturalization Servicegreen2 sentences2018We exercise our discretion to decide this case on the merits, and we affirm summary judgment dismissal of Thun’s regulatory takings claim because there is no genuine issue of material fact and because Thun fails to meet the threshold requirement of a regulatory takings claim. 1 As we discuss in more detail below, prudential ripeness is “a tool that courts may use to enhance the accuracy of their decisions and to avoid becoming embroiled in adjudications that may later turn out to be unnecessary or may require premature examination.” Simmonds v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 326 F.3d 351, 2018We exercise our discretion to decide this case on the merits, and we affirm summary judgment dismissal of Thun’s regulatory takings claim because there is no genuine issue of material fact and because Thun fails to meet the threshold requirement of a regulatory takings claim. 1 As we discuss in more detail below, prudential ripeness is “a tool that courts may use to enhance the accuracy of their decisions and to avoid becoming embroiled in adjudications that may later turn out to be unnecessary or may require premature examination.” Simmonds v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 326 F.3d 351, | 1 | 1 |
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfelgreen1 sentence1998Regarding the propriety of substantive due process as a overall concept, see Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2153 (section IV-D of plurality opinion); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 S. Ct. 539 , 49 L. | 1 | 1 |
Christianson v. Snohomish Health Districtgreen1 sentence1998See generally id. at 667 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 646 , 747 P.2d 1062 (noting, without approval, that “commentators have also pointed out that the regulatory takings doctrine and the longstanding substantive due process test seem analytically identical”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston Countygreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston Cy., 92 Wn.2d 656 , 601 P.2d 494 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). 1987See, e.g., Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston Cy., 92 Wn.2d 656 , 601 P.2d 494 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Hecker v. Township of Dovergreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston Cy., 92 Wn.2d 656 , 601 P.2d 494 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). 1987See, e.g., Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston Cy., 92 Wn.2d 656 , 601 P.2d 494 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Countygreen2 sentences1987We can uphold the trial court's summary judgment in Orion's favor only if we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the three components of a regulatory takings claim: (1) whether the regulatory regime as applied to Orion's property scheme was insulated from a takings challenge as part of the State's authority to enact health and safety regulations, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ___ U.S. ___, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 491-93 , 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 733 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); (2) whether 1987We can uphold the trial court's summary judgment in Orion's favor only if we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the three components of a regulatory takings claim: (1) whether the regulatory regime as applied to Orion's property scheme was insulated from a takings challenge as part of the State's authority to enact health and safety regulations, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ___ U.S. ___, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 491-93 , 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 733 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); (2) whether | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dolan v. City of Tigard
green
2 sentences2002Although Benchmark initially proposed to dedicate an additional five feet of right-of-way in order to make the half-width improvements, the city council expressly determined that Benchmark was not required to dedicate any land beyond the preexisting right-of-way to make such improvements. [3] The court analyzed the regulatory takings claim under the "essential nexus" standard announced in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) and the "rough proportionality" standard set forth in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d 2002Although Benchmark initially proposed to dedicate an additional five feet of right-of-way in order to make the half-width improvements, the city council expressly determined that Benchmark was not required to dedicate any land beyond the preexisting right-of-way to make such improvements. [3] The court analyzed the regulatory takings claim under the "essential nexus" standard announced in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S.Ct. 3141 , 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987) and the "rough proportionality" standard set forth in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 , 114 S.Ct. 2309 , 129 L.Ed.2d | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
green
2 sentences2002The court analyzed the regulatory takings claim under the “essential nexus” standard announced in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S. Ct. 3141 , 97 L. 2002The court analyzed the regulatory takings claim under the “essential nexus” standard announced in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 , 107 S. Ct. 3141 , 97 L. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
cluster 760864
green
2 sentences2000Justice Joseph Story wrote: "All the property and vested rights of individuals are subject to such regulations of police as the legislature may establish with a view to protect the community and its several members against such use or employment thereof as would be injurious to society or unjust toward other individuals. " 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1954, at 700-01 (5th ed. 1891) (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger with approval). [15] "Under the `character-of-the-regulation' prong of the regulatory takings analysis, `[a] "taking" may mo 2000“Under the ‘character-of-the-regulation’ prong of the regulatory takings analysis, ‘[a] “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can he characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the social good.’ ” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 , 709 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124), withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Kaiser Aetna v. United States
green
2 sentences2019United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 , 100 S. Ct. 383 , 62 L. 2019United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 , 100 S. Ct. 383 , 62 L. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kinderace Llc v. City Of Sammamish
neutral
2 sentences2018“In a regulatory takings claim, one threshold issue is whether a city’s decision denies a landowner a fundamental attribute of property ownership, such as the right to possess, exclude others, dispose of, or make some economically viable use of the property.” Kinderace LLC v. City of Sammamish, 194 Wn. 2018App. 835, 843 , 379 P.3d 135 (2016). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kahuna Land Co. v. Spokane County
green
1 sentence2016Kahuna Land Co. v. Spokane County, 94 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
cluster 766327
green
1 sentence2000“Under the ‘character-of-the-regulation’ prong of the regulatory takings analysis, ‘[a] “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can he characterized as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the social good.’ ” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 , 709 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124), withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lochner v. New York
red
2 sentences1998Regarding the propriety of substantive due process as a overall concept, see Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2153 (section IV-D of plurality opinion); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 S. Ct. 539 , 49 L. 1998Regarding the propriety of substantive due process as a overall concept, see Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2153 (section IV-D of plurality opinion); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 S. Ct. 539 , 49 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Orion Corporation v. State
green
2 sentences1998See generally id. at 667 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 646 , 747 P.2d 1062 (noting, without approval, that “commentators have also pointed out that the regulatory takings doctrine and the longstanding substantive due process test seem analytically identical”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). 1998See generally id. at 667 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 646 , 747 P.2d 1062 (noting, without approval, that “commentators have also pointed out that the regulatory takings doctrine and the longstanding substantive due process test seem analytically identical”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Massachusetts v. Oakes
green
1 sentence1998See generally id. at 667 (Talmadge, J., concurring); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 646 , 747 P.2d 1062 (noting, without approval, that “commentators have also pointed out that the regulatory takings doctrine and the longstanding substantive due process test seem analytically identical”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Margaret Kinzli Evelyn Goossen Philip Kinzli Ernest Kinzli, Plaintiffs v. City of Santa Cruz
green
1 sentence1989The court in Herrington relied on Kinzli v. Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1987), a case involving a regulatory takings challenge. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Agins v. City of Tiburon
red
2 sentences1989Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 , 65 L. 1989Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 , 65 L. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
green
2 sentences1987Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 , 67 L.Ed. 322 , 43 S.Ct. 158 (1922); Hamilton Bank , at 186. 1987Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 , 67 L.Ed. 322 , 43 S.Ct. 158 (1922); Hamilton Bank , at 186. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology
green
2 sentences1987We can uphold the trial court's summary judgment in Orion's favor only if we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the three components of a regulatory takings claim: (1) whether the regulatory regime as applied to Orion's property scheme was insulated from a takings challenge as part of the State's authority to enact health and safety regulations, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ___ U.S. ___, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 491-93 , 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 733 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); (2) whether 1987We can uphold the trial court's summary judgment in Orion's favor only if we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the three components of a regulatory takings claim: (1) whether the regulatory regime as applied to Orion's property scheme was insulated from a takings challenge as part of the State's authority to enact health and safety regulations, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, ___ U.S. ___, 94 L.Ed.2d 472, 491-93 , 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of Ecology, 88 Wn.2d 726, 733 , 565 P.2d 1162 (1977); (2) whether | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Wilson v. Steinbach
green
2 sentences1987Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434 , 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). 1. 1987Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434 , 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). 1. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.