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16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hensler v. City of Glendalegreen2 sentences2002(See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, supra, 503 U.S. at pp. 527-532, 112 S.Ct. 1522 ; Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 9 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 .) Noting that the case before it involved a regulatory takings claim, our state's high court stated: "There is no basis for a conclusion that Code of Civil Procedure sections 318[or] 319 ... govern this action, therefore. 2002(See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, supra, 503 U.S. at pp. 527-532, 112 S.Ct. 1522 ; Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 9 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 .) Noting that the case before it involved a regulatory takings claim, our state's high court stated: "There is no basis for a conclusion that Code of Civil Procedure sections 318[or] 319 ... govern this action, therefore. | 2 | 4 |
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Countygreen2 sentences2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co 2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co | 1 | 3 |
Agins v. City of Tiburonred2 sentences2003In Lucas, Justice Antonin Scalia referred in a single paragraph to a regulatory takings claim as “where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land” and later, citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at page 261 , as when an enactment “ ‘denies an owner economically viable use of his land.’ ” (Lucas v. South *1438 Carolina Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 1015-1016. 4 ) Quite obviously, in Agins , Justice Powell did not state that the loss of “all” “economically viable use of [the] land” was a prerequisite to a regulatory takings claim. 1998(Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) 520 U.S. 725, 734 [ 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1665 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 ]; Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 186 [ 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 ].) As the trial court recognized, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication until the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision on the application of the land use regulations to the affected property. 4 (Williamson Planning Comm’n | 1 | 2 |
Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapmentgreen2 sentences2018Finally ..., States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property. [Citation.]" ( Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection (2010) 560 U.S. 702 , 713, 130 S.Ct. 2592 , 177 L.Ed.2d 184 .) Initially, in evaluating a challenge under the takings clause, the court resolves whether there is, in fact, a constitutionally protected property right implicated. ( Peterson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior (9th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 799 , 807 ; see, *156 e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (1986) 4 2018Finally ..., States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property. [Citation.]" ( Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection (2010) 560 U.S. 702 , 713, 130 S.Ct. 2592 , 177 L.Ed.2d 184 .) Initially, in evaluating a challenge under the takings clause, the court resolves whether there is, in fact, a constitutionally protected property right implicated. ( Peterson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior (9th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 799 , 807 ; see, *156 e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (1986) 4 | 1 | 1 |
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015(Arkansas Game, 133 S.Ct. at pp. 522-523, citing 11 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 342 ["duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim"]; Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 130-131 [the court "focuses . . . both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole"]; Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States (1922) 260 U.S. 327, 329-330 ["[W]hile a single act may not be | 1 | 1 |
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agencygreen1 sentence2015(Arkansas Game, 133 S.Ct. at pp. 522-523, citing 11 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 342 ["duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim"]; Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 130-131 [the court "focuses . . . both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole"]; Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States (1922) 260 U.S. 327, 329-330 ["[W]hile a single act may not be | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahongreen2 sentences2013Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S. 393, 415 [ 67 L.Ed. 322 , 43 S.Ct. 158 ].) To assist courts in discerning “how far is ‘too far,’ ” the United States Supreme Court has identified three distinct categories of regulatory takings and the tests for evaluating each. 2013Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S. 393, 415 [ 67 L.Ed. 322 , 43 S.Ct. 158 ].) To assist courts in discerning “how far is ‘too far,’ ” the United States Supreme Court has identified three distinct categories of regulatory takings and the tests for evaluating each. | 1 | 1 |
Ali v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2013(Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 773 ; see Ali v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 246, 251 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 458 ].) A regulatory takings analysis rests on the foundational principle that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” (Penna. 2013(Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 773 ; see Ali v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 246, 251 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 458 ].) A regulatory takings analysis rests on the foundational principle that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” (Penna. | 1 | 1 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York Citygreen2 sentences2013(Ibid.) A regulatory takings challenge that does not fall into one of these two narrow categories is evaluated under a set of standards first articulated by the Supreme Court in Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. 104 . 2013(Ibid.) A regulatory takings challenge that does not fall into one of these two narrow categories is evaluated under a set of standards first articulated by the Supreme Court in Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. 104 . | 1 | 1 |
Yee v. City of Escondidogreen1 sentence2002(See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, supra, 503 U.S. at pp. 527-532, 112 S.Ct. 1522 ; Hensler, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 9 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 .) Noting that the case before it involved a regulatory takings claim, our state's high court stated: "There is no basis for a conclusion that Code of Civil Procedure sections 318[or] 319 ... govern this action, therefore. | 1 | 1 |
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agencygreen2 sentences1998(Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) 520 U.S. 725, 734 [ 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1665 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 ]; Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 186 [ 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 ].) As the trial court recognized, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication until the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision on the application of the land use regulations to the affected property. 4 (Williamson Planning Comm’n 1998(Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) 520 U.S. 725, 734 [ 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1665 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 ]; Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 186 [ 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 ].) As the trial court recognized, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication until the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision on the application of the land use regulations to the affected property. 4 (Williamson Planning Comm’n | 1 | 1 |
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson Cityred2 sentences1998(Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) 520 U.S. 725, 734 [ 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1665 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 ]; Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 186 [ 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 ].) As the trial court recognized, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication until the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision on the application of the land use regulations to the affected property. 4 (Williamson Planning Comm’n 1998(Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1997) 520 U.S. 725, 734 [ 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1665 , 137 L.Ed.2d 980 ]; Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 186 [ 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 ]; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 ].) As the trial court recognized, a regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication until the governmental entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision on the application of the land use regulations to the affected property. 4 (Williamson Planning Comm’n | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co 2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co | 3 | 2013–2019 |
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
green
2 sentences2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co 2019Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528 , 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074 , 161 L.Ed.2d 876 .) "Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. [Citation.]" ( Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 , 617-618, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 .) *1194 The United States Supreme Court co | 3 | 2001–2019 |
cluster 783675
green
2 sentences2022Lexis 137155, *28‒*30.) 14 13 The “individualized scrutiny” required of a regulatory takings claim “does not foreclose resolution on a motion to dismiss . . . .” (Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3d 959 , 966.) 14 District courts outside the Ninth Circuit have reached similar conclusions involving their particular state’s COVID-19 business restrictions. 2022Lexis 137155, *28‒*30.)14 13 The “individualized scrutiny” required of a regulatory takings claim “does not foreclose resolution on a motion to dismiss . . . .” (Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3d 959 , 966.) 14 District courts outside the Ninth Circuit have reached similar conclusions involving their particular state’s COVID-19 business restrictions. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection
green
2 sentences2018Finally ..., States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property. [Citation.]" ( Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection (2010) 560 U.S. 702 , 713, 130 S.Ct. 2592 , 177 L.Ed.2d 184 .) Initially, in evaluating a challenge under the takings clause, the court resolves whether there is, in fact, a constitutionally protected property right implicated. ( Peterson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior (9th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 799 , 807 ; see, *156 e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (1986) 4 2018Finally ..., States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property. [Citation.]" ( Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection (2010) 560 U.S. 702 , 713, 130 S.Ct. 2592 , 177 L.Ed.2d 184 .) Initially, in evaluating a challenge under the takings clause, the court resolves whether there is, in fact, a constitutionally protected property right implicated. ( Peterson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior (9th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 799 , 807 ; see, *156 e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (1986) 4 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board
green
2 sentences2013(Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 773 ; see Ali v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 246, 251 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 458 ].) A regulatory takings analysis rests on the foundational principle that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” (Penna. 2001(Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 776 .) As the United States Supreme Court has recently confirmed, when evaluating a regulatory takings claim, these factors should be considered and applied in light of “the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ [Citation.]” (Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606 [ 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2457-2458 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 ].) In the present case, plaintiffs allege that Proposition G constitutes both a per s | 2 | 2001–2013 |
Jameson v. Desta
green
1 sentence2023Therefore, both parties’ arguments are forfeited.11 (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 [judgment is presumed correct, and party challenging ruling has burden to show that trial court erred].) A regulatory takings claim “ ‘ “is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue,” ’ i.e., when ‘there has been a “final, definitive position regarding” how the regulations will be applied to the land.’ ” (Felkay v. City of Santa Barbara, supra, 62 Cal.App.5 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dryden Oaks, LLC v. San Diego Cnty. Reg'l Airport Auth.
green
1 sentence2019A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes." ' " (Dryden Oaks, LLC v. San Diego County Regional Airport Authority (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 383, 396 .) 42 4. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
cluster 538897
green
1 sentence2018Finally ..., States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property. [Citation.]" ( Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection (2010) 560 U.S. 702 , 713, 130 S.Ct. 2592 , 177 L.Ed.2d 184 .) Initially, in evaluating a challenge under the takings clause, the court resolves whether there is, in fact, a constitutionally protected property right implicated. ( Peterson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior (9th Cir. 1990) 899 F.2d 799 , 807 ; see, *156 e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment (1986) 4 | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Travis v. County of Santa Cruz
green
1 sentence2014(Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 775 ; see Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22 [90- day period found in section 66499.37 establishes limitations period for takings claim arising from application of regulation to specific piece of property].) Again, Winfield is barred from pursuing this claim because it did not timely challenge the condition. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz
green
1 sentence2013(Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 124 ; Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 538 .) Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the “economic impact” of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with “distinct, investment-backed expectations,” and (3) the “character of the government action.” (Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 ; see Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 124 .) These Penn Central factors are “the principal guidelines” for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the two per se categories. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States
green
1 sentence2001What is necessary is a classic exercise of judicial balancing of competing values.” (Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. U.S., supra, 18 F.3d at p. 1570 .) “An individualized assessment of the impact of the regulation on a particular parcel of property and its relation to a legitimate state interest is necessary in determining whether a regulatory restriction on property use constitutes a compensable taking.” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 10 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 , 876 P.2d 1043 ].) It simply is not our role to engage, in the first instance, in the individualized assessment that | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Toigo v. Town of Ross
green
1 sentence2000Therefore, the inference that is sought to be raised from Toigo’s showing on summary judgment — that the Town has applied the land use criteria it administers to the particular land in question in such a draconian fashion that reapplication for a modified plan would be futile — derives from nothing more than ‘speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess *595 work,’ and is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. [Citation.] In this connection, the United States Supreme Court has observed that ‘[^ejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less ambit | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.