reviewed challenge in Washington

2020In Green I, the court reviewed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to support a conviction for aggravated murder in the first degree. 91 Wn.2d at 442-43 .

2016This is best evidenced by our Supreme Court’s alteration of its evidentiary sufficiency analysis in State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I), as reconsidered in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Green II). ¶17 In Green I, the court reviewed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the element of kidnapping *393 necessary to support a conviction for aggravated murder in the first degree. 91 Wn.2d at 442-43 .

2007Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 811-12 , 100 P.3d 291 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 260-61 , 906 P.2d 325 .

2007Orange, 152 Wn.2d at 811-12 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 260-61 .

2007Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 811-12 , 100 P.3d 291 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 260-61 , 906 P.2d 325 .

2007Orange, 152 Wn.2d at 811-12 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 260-61 .

2001Restraint of Hews, 99 Wn.2d 80 , 660 P.2d 263 (1983), this court reviewed a challenge to the voluntariness of a plea agreement which was raised for the first time by way of a personal restraint petition.

2001Restraint of Hews, 99 Wn.2d 80 , 660 P.2d 263 (1983), this court reviewed a challenge to the voluntariness of a plea agreement which was raised for the first time by way of a personal restraint petition.

2024App. 708 , 986 P.2d 144 (1999). 7 For separate property, the agreement states: “Except as provided below, neither shall make any claim, and neither is entitled to, nor will receive, any of the separate property of the other.” The trial court considered the agreement and concluded “all the parties’ property characterized as separate property above, will remain separate property, and be distributed to the parties accordingly.” -10- No. 85511-5-I/11 The trial court reviewed the factors of RCW 26.09.080 and the parties’ agreement, including “the clause requiring that all their community property b

2019The court reviewed whether an exception to merger applied when the predicate and charged crimes are not "intertwined." Id. at 821-22 (citing Johnson, 92 Wn.2d at 681 ).

2019The court reviewed whether an exception to merger applied when the predicate and charged crimes are not "intertwined." Id. at 821-22 (citing Johnson, 92 Wn.2d at 681 ).

2016This is best evidenced by our Supreme Court’s alteration of its evidentiary sufficiency analysis in State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I), as reconsidered in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Green II). ¶17 In Green I, the court reviewed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the element of kidnapping *393 necessary to support a conviction for aggravated murder in the first degree. 91 Wn.2d at 442-43 .

2016This is best evidenced by our Supreme Court’s alteration of its evidentiary sufficiency analysis in State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I), as reconsidered in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Green II). ¶17 In Green I, the court reviewed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the element of kidnapping *393 necessary to support a conviction for aggravated murder in the first degree. 91 Wn.2d at 442-43 .

2015Id. at 587-88 .

2007Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 811-12 , 100 P.3d 291 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 260-61 , 906 P.2d 325 .

2007Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 811-12 , 100 P.3d 291 ; Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 260-61 , 906 P.2d 325 .

1996In State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607 , 674 P.2d 145 (1983), this court reviewed an instruction substantively identical to the challenged instruction in this case. 7 The Johnson court expressed concern that the "unless” clause "might well lead a reasonable juror to interpret the instruction as creating a mandatory production-shifting presumption.” 100 Wn.2d at 619 .

1996In State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607 , 674 P.2d 145 (1983), this court reviewed an instruction substantively identical to the challenged instruction in this case. 7 The Johnson court expressed concern that the "unless” clause "might well lead a reasonable juror to interpret the instruction as creating a mandatory production-shifting presumption.” 100 Wn.2d at 619 .

1911Co., 15 Wash. 522 , 46 Pac. 1054 , is not in harmony with this view, since there the court reviewed an instruction when it was claimed that all of the instructions had not been brought up in the record.

1911Co., 15 Wash. 522 , 46 Pac. 1054 , is not in harmony with this view, since there the court reviewed an instruction when it was claimed that all of the instructions had not been brought up in the record.