reviewed factors in California

2026Clark was convicted of first degree felony murder, and true findings were made on the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance allegations based on his aiding and abetting liability in the shooting. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 608–610.) To decide whether Clark was a major participant in the robbery, the court reviewed the factors discussed in Banks, but did not decide whether Clark was a major participant because it held the evidence was insufficient to show reckless indifference to human life. ( Clark, supra, at p. 614 .) In reaching this conclusion, the court expanded on

2026Clark was convicted of first degree felony murder, and true findings were made on the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance allegations based on his aiding and abetting liability in the shooting. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 608–610.) To decide whether Clark was a major participant in the robbery, the court reviewed the factors discussed in Banks, but did not decide whether Clark was a major participant because it held the evidence was insufficient to show reckless indifference to human life. ( Clark, supra, at p. 614 .) In reaching this conclusion, the court expanded on

2014In In re Vioxx Class Cases (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 116 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 83 ], the court reviewed the requirement of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ.

2014In In re Vioxx Class Cases (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 116 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 83 ], the court reviewed the requirement of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ.

2026In Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004 , the court reviewed a challenge to a trial court’s certification of a meal period subclass.

2026In Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004 , the court reviewed a challenge to a trial court’s certification of a meal period subclass.

2023(See People v. Parra, supra.) This court reviewed the factors under Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and concluded there was “no question that substantial evidence 7 The court remanded the matter for correction of several sentencing errors.

2018There, the court reviewed a challenge brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to a requirement, authorized by statute, that public employees pay a union fee as a condition of employment. ( Id ., at pp. 211-213, 97 S.Ct. 1782 .) The court in Abood concluded that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' objections to the fee, the assessment was permissible to the extent that it subsidized activities that " 'promote[d] the cause which justified bringing the group together' " ( id ., at p. 223, 97 S.Ct. 1782 , quoting Machinists v. Street (1961) 367 U.S. 740 , 7

2018There, the court reviewed a challenge brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to a requirement, authorized by statute, that public employees pay a union fee as a condition of employment. ( Id ., at pp. 211-213, 97 S.Ct. 1782 .) The court in Abood concluded that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' objections to the fee, the assessment was permissible to the extent that it subsidized activities that " 'promote[d] the cause which justified bringing the group together' " ( id ., at p. 223, 97 S.Ct. 1782 , quoting Machinists v. Street (1961) 367 U.S. 740 , 7

2018There, the court reviewed a challenge brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to a requirement, authorized by statute, that public employees pay a union fee as a condition of employment. ( Id ., at pp. 211-213, 97 S.Ct. 1782 .) The court in Abood concluded that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' objections to the fee, the assessment was permissible to the extent that it subsidized activities that " 'promote[d] the cause which justified bringing the group together' " ( id ., at p. 223, 97 S.Ct. 1782 , quoting Machinists v. Street (1961) 367 U.S. 740 , 7

2018There, the court reviewed a challenge brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to a requirement, authorized by statute, that public employees pay a union fee as a condition of employment. ( Id ., at pp. 211-213, 97 S.Ct. 1782 .) The court in Abood concluded that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' objections to the fee, the assessment was permissible to the extent that it subsidized activities that " 'promote[d] the cause which justified bringing the group together' " ( id ., at p. 223, 97 S.Ct. 1782 , quoting Machinists v. Street (1961) 367 U.S. 740 , 7

2017Douda is inapposite; there the court reviewed a challenge to the Coastal Commission's authority to designate ESHA. ( Id . at p. 1191, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 .) In passing, the court noted that a local government may become an "issuing agency," i.e., an agency empowered to issue a coastal development permit, before it certifies a local coastal program. ( Id . at pp. 1188, 1191, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 .) For that to happen, however, the local agency must "establish procedures for the filing, processing, review, modification, approval, or denial of a coastal development permit." (§ 30600, subd. (b)(1).) Th

2017Douda is inapposite; there the court reviewed a challenge to the Coastal Commission's authority to designate ESHA. ( Id . at p. 1191, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 .) In passing, the court noted that a local government may become an "issuing agency," i.e., an agency empowered to issue a coastal development permit, before it certifies a local coastal program. ( Id . at pp. 1188, 1191, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 .) For that to happen, however, the local agency must "establish procedures for the filing, processing, review, modification, approval, or denial of a coastal development permit." (§ 30600, subd. (b)(1).) Th

2013Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 .) However, since the trial court reviewed their claim on the merits, we will review their claim.

2009Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez, supra, [ 418 U.S. 24 ] suggests the contrary.” ( 471 U.S. at p. 233 .) The Supreme Court thus held the exemption did not apply because the motivation for the criminal disenfranchisement was racial discrimination.

2009The Supreme Court construed the phrase so that it not only removed a class of persons from being counted in determining whether a state was subject to the penalty of subdivision 2, but also removed the same class from the protections afforded by section 1.” (McPherson, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1478, fn. 6.) The United States Supreme Court has addressed section 2’s disenfranchisement of felons in one other case — Hunter v. Underwood, supra, 471 U.S. 222 , where the court reviewed a challenge to article VIII, former section 182 of the Alabama Constitution, which disenfranchised persons convi

2009Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez, supra, [ 418 U.S. 24 ] suggests the contrary.” ( 471 U.S. at p. 233 .) The Supreme Court thus held the exemption did not apply because the motivation for the criminal disenfranchisement was racial discrimination.

2007To secure reversal under that standard, Combs had to prove "`that: (1) there was "error"; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected "substantial rights." [Citations.] Reversal is proper `only if, viewed in the context of the entire trial, the impropriety seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, or where failing to reverse a conviction would result in a miscarriage of justice.' [Citations.]" ( Combs, supra , 379 F.3d at pp. 568-569 .) Noting the government's concession that it was improper for the prosecutor to repeatedly ask the defend

2007To secure reversal under that standard, Combs had to prove "`that: (1) there was "error"; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected "substantial rights." [Citations.] Reversal is proper `only if, viewed in the context of the entire trial, the impropriety seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, or where failing to reverse a conviction would result in a miscarriage of justice.' [Citations.]" ( Combs, supra , 379 F.3d at pp. 568-569 .) Noting the government's concession that it was improper for the prosecutor to repeatedly ask the defend

2007To secure reversal under that standard, Combs had to prove "`that: (1) there was "error"; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected "substantial rights." [Citations.] Reversal is proper `only if, viewed in the context of the entire trial, the impropriety seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, or where failing to reverse a conviction would result in a miscarriage of justice.' [Citations.]" ( Combs, supra , 379 F.3d at pp. 568-569 .) Noting the government's concession that it was improper for the prosecutor to repeatedly ask the defend

2003The court reviewed the factors that led to its conclusion and the balancing of interests approach that led to that conclusion. ( Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 221-222, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 955 P.2d 469 .) The court concluded that the subject matter of the broadcast as a whole was of legitimate public concern.

2003The court reviewed the factors that led to its conclusion and the balancing of interests approach that led to that conclusion. ( Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 221-222, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 955 P.2d 469 .) The court concluded that the subject matter of the broadcast as a whole was of legitimate public concern.

2001(In re Marriage of Dancy (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1142 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 775 ] (Dancy).) 3 The court reviewed the analysis of legislative intent in Plescia and determined its conclusions were equally appropriate in the context of child support.

2001(In re Marriage of Dancy (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1142 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 775 ] (Dancy).) 3 The court reviewed the analysis of legislative intent in Plescia and determined its conclusions were equally appropriate in the context of child support.

1994(People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1106 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 , 864 P.2d 40 ]; People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1038-1039 ; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th 792, 866; see People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 337 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 862 P.2d 710 ]; cf. People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 786 P.2d 892 ].) The record in the present case reveals that the trial court reviewed the factors in aggravation and mitigation and then denied the automatic motion for modification.

1993The doctrine is a departure from the general tort principle that liability is based on fault. [Citation.] It is ‘ “a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk.” ’ [Citations.] Respondeat superior is based on ‘ “a deeply rooted sentiment” ’ that it would be unjust for an enterprise to disclaim responsibility for injuries occurring in the course of its characteristic activities. [Citations.]” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 208 .) Having recognized the policy underpinnings of the doctrine, the court then articulated three policy reasons for imposing liability unde

1993The doctrine is a departure from the general tort principle that liability is based on fault. [Citation.] It is ‘ “a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk.” ’ [Citations.] Respondeat superior is based on ‘ “a deeply rooted sentiment” ’ that it would be unjust for an enterprise to disclaim responsibility for injuries occurring in the course of its characteristic activities. [Citations.]” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 208 .) Having recognized the policy underpinnings of the doctrine, the court then articulated three policy reasons for imposing liability unde

1992Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected unless this prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant’s course of action is also required.” (Fn. omitted.) (For ease of discussion we will refer to this formulation of the jury unanimity issue as the Gipson rule.) This acceptance of Gipson in the federal courts was noted by Justice Blackmun in his separate concurring opinion in McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 449, fn. 5 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 369, 385 , 110 S.Ct. 1227 ], wherein he stated: “In federal

1992Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected unless this prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant’s course of action is also required.” (Fn. omitted.) (For ease of discussion we will refer to this formulation of the jury unanimity issue as the Gipson rule.) This acceptance of Gipson in the federal courts was noted by Justice Blackmun in his separate concurring opinion in McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 449, fn. 5 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 369, 385 , 110 S.Ct. 1227 ], wherein he stated: “In federal

1992Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected unless this prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant’s course of action is also required.” (Fn. omitted.) (For ease of discussion we will refer to this formulation of the jury unanimity issue as the Gipson rule.) This acceptance of Gipson in the federal courts was noted by Justice Blackmun in his separate concurring opinion in McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 449, fn. 5 [ 108 L.Ed.2d 369, 385 , 110 S.Ct. 1227 ], wherein he stated: “In federal

1992In United States v. Gipson (5th Cir. 1977) 553 F.2d 453, 457-458 , the court reviewed the requirement of unanimous verdicts in criminal cases and came to this conclusion: “The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.

1988Section 1111 provides, in pertinent part, that “a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.” In People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756 at page 769 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ], this court reviewed the standard by which the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is to be measured: “To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, the prosecution must produce independent evidence which, without aid or assistance from the testimony of the accomplice, ten

1988Section 1111 provides, in pertinent part, that “a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.” In People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756 at page 769 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 499 P.2d 129 ], this court reviewed the standard by which the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is to be measured: “To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, the prosecution must produce independent evidence which, without aid or assistance from the testimony of the accomplice, ten