Sullivan standard in Washington

2016And the error recognized in WR., 181 Wn.2d 757 is not structural. 5 This is because a holding on legislative intent always applies retroactively: "A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision giving rise to that construction." Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 , 114 S. Ct. 1510 , 128 L.

2016And the error recognized in W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757 , is not structural.

2005The Neder Court rejected the argument that Sullivan's analysis "applies with equal force where the constitutional error, as here, prevents the jury from rendering a `complete verdict' on every element of the offense." 527 U.S. at 11 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 .

2005The Neder Court rejected the argument that Sullivan’s analysis “applies with equal force where the constitutional error, as here, prevents the jury from rendering a ‘complete verdict’ on every element of the offense.” 527 U.S. at 11 .

2003Richardson, 100 Wash.2d at 675 , 675 P.2d 209 . [9] In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court found that the trial attorney's tactical decision to rest Sullivan's defense was a reasonable response to the weakness of the prosecutor's case rather than evidence of a conflict of interest. 446 U.S. at 347-48 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

2003Richardson, 100 Wn.2d at 675 . 9 In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court found that the trial attorney’s tactical decision to rest Sullivan’s defense was a reasonable response to the weakness of the prosecutor’s case rather than evidence of a conflict of interest. 446 U.S. at 347-48 .

2003An `actual conflict,' for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance." 535 U.S. at 172 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237 .

2003An ‘actual conflict,’ for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance.” 535 U.S. at 172 n.5.

2003Richardson, 100 Wash.2d at 675 , 675 P.2d 209 . [9] In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court found that the trial attorney's tactical decision to rest Sullivan's defense was a reasonable response to the weakness of the prosecutor's case rather than evidence of a conflict of interest. 446 U.S. at 347-48 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

2003Richardson, 100 Wn.2d at 675 . 9 In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court found that the trial attorney’s tactical decision to rest Sullivan’s defense was a reasonable response to the weakness of the prosecutor’s case rather than evidence of a conflict of interest. 446 U.S. at 347-48 .

1989To support its application of the convincing clarity standard rather than that of simple preponderance, the court cited two Washington cases — Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 37 , 515 P.2d 154 (1973) and Exner v. AMA, 12 Wn.

1989To support its application of the convincing clarity standard rather than that of simple preponderance, the court cited two Washington cases — Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 37 , 515 P.2d 154 (1973) and Exner v. AMA, 12 Wn.

1989Ed. 2d 296 , 91 S. Ct. 1811 (1971), this state nonetheless adopted the Sullivan standard for such comments because it felt constitutionally bound to follow the Rosenbloom plurality.

1989Ed. 2d 296 , 91 S. Ct. 1811 (1971), this state nonetheless adopted the Sullivan standard for such comments because it felt constitutionally bound to follow the Rosenbloom plurality.

1989Miller v. Argus Pub'g Co., 79 Wn.2d 816 , 490 P.2d 101 (1971).

1989Miller v. Argus Pub'g Co., 79 Wn.2d 816 , 490 P.2d 101 (1971).

1989To support its application of the convincing clarity standard rather than that of simple preponderance, the court cited two Washington cases — Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 37 , 515 P.2d 154 (1973) and Exner v. AMA, 12 Wn.

1989To support its application of the convincing clarity standard rather than that of simple preponderance, the court cited two Washington cases — Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 37 , 515 P.2d 154 (1973) and Exner v. AMA, 12 Wn.

2021Because an order of our Supreme Court suspended the time requirements for filing certain motions under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Order, No. 25700-B-611 In the Matter of the Suspension of RAP 18.8(b) and (c) in Response by Washington State Appellate Courts to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (Wash. Apr. 2, 2020), we grant Sullivan’s motion to file a late statement of additional grounds. 7 See, e.g., State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 187 , 225 P.3d 973 (2010). 19 No. 81254-8-I/20 speculation is not enough.” In re Pers.

2021Because an order of our Supreme Court suspended the time requirements for filing certain motions under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Order, No. 25700-B-611 In the Matter of the Suspension of RAP 18.8(b) and (c) in Response by Washington State Appellate Courts to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (Wash. Apr. 2, 2020), we grant Sullivan’s motion to file a late statement of additional grounds. 7 See, e.g., State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 187 , 225 P.3d 973 (2010). 19 No. 81254-8-I/20 speculation is not enough.” In re Pers.

2021Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201 .

2021Restraint of Haynes, 100 Wn.

2016And the error recognized in WR., 181 Wn.2d 757 is not structural. 5 This is because a holding on legislative intent always applies retroactively: "A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision giving rise to that construction." Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 , 114 S. Ct. 1510 , 128 L.

2016And the error recognized in WR., 181 Wn.2d 757 is not structural. 5 This is because a holding on legislative intent always applies retroactively: "A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision giving rise to that construction." Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 , 114 S. Ct. 1510 , 128 L.

1997Id.