Sullivan standard in Texas

2015Rather, it is fundamental that the First Amendment limits the sovereign power of government to criminally punish the speech of its officials and agents, including that uttered in their official roles.230 Also belying the State’s notion that public servants can be freely punished criminally for their speech in their official capacities, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the First Amendment’s application does not turn solely on the identity of the speaker or source of the expression at issue.231 229 See also Tex. Penal Code § 9.21 (public-duty defense). 230 See, e.g., Garrison, 379 U.S. at 6

2015Rather, it is fundamental that the First Amendment limits the sovereign power of government to criminally punish the speech of its officials and agents, including that uttered in their official roles.230 Also belying the State’s notion that public servants can be freely punished criminally for their speech in their official capacities, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the First Amendment’s application does not turn solely on the identity of the speaker or source of the expression at issue.231 229 See also Tex. Penal Code § 9.21 (public-duty defense). 230 See, e.g., Garrison, 379 U.S. at 6

2015Accord Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 557-58 ; Asgeirsson, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 694 . 231 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784-85 (1978) (political speech by corporation). 70 In short, contrary to the State’s arguments, “[s]tatements made by public officials to other public officials” on public issues are generally protected by the First Amendment—and neither the “governmental speech” doctrine nor Garcetti holds otherwise.

2015Accord Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 557-58 ; Asgeirsson, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 694 . 231 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784-85 (1978) (political speech by corporation). 70 In short, contrary to the State’s arguments, “[s]tatements made by public officials to other public officials” on public issues are generally protected by the First Amendment—and neither the “governmental speech” doctrine nor Garcetti holds otherwise.

2015Accord Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 557-58 ; Asgeirsson, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 694 . 231 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784-85 (1978) (political speech by corporation). 70 In short, contrary to the State’s arguments, “[s]tatements made by public officials to other public officials” on public issues are generally protected by the First Amendment—and neither the “governmental speech” doctrine nor Garcetti holds otherwise.

2015Accord Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 557-58 ; Asgeirsson, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 694 . 231 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784-85 (1978) (political speech by corporation). 70 In short, contrary to the State’s arguments, “[s]tatements made by public officials to other public officials” on public issues are generally protected by the First Amendment—and neither the “governmental speech” doctrine nor Garcetti holds otherwise.

2015Rather, it is fundamental that the First Amendment limits the sovereign power of government to criminally punish the speech of its officials and agents, including that uttered in their official roles.230 Also belying the State’s notion that public servants can be freely punished criminally for their speech in their official capacities, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the First Amendment’s application does not turn solely on the identity of the speaker or source of the expression at issue.231 229 See also Tex. Penal Code § 9.21 (public-duty defense). 230 See, e.g., Garrison, 379 U.S. at 6

2015Rather, it is fundamental that the First Amendment limits the sovereign power of government to criminally punish the speech of its officials and agents, including that uttered in their official roles.230 Also belying the State’s notion that public servants can be freely punished criminally for their speech in their official capacities, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the First Amendment’s application does not turn solely on the identity of the speaker or source of the expression at issue.231 229 See also Tex. Penal Code § 9.21 (public-duty defense). 230 See, e.g., Garrison, 379 U.S. at 6

2026The State argued that Appellee did not possess a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when she was questioned in 2018 because that right terminated after her charges were no- billed in 2008 and remained dormant for ten years. 1 In Frye, we observed that the United States Supreme Court has held that when a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred, the trial court must “identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.” State v. Frye, 897 S.W.2d 324, 330 (Tex. Crim.

2021Standard of Review “The denial of a motion to disregard a jury finding is reviewed as a no-evidence or legal sufficiency issue.” Bell v. Castro, No. 04-11-00927-CV, 2012 WL 5874322 , at *3 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Nov. 21, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005)).

2021See Sullivan, 551 S.W.3d at 857 (“On this record and in accordance with our discussion above, in which we conclude that Sullivan’s motion might be argued to technically fit the act’s broad definition of a ‘legal action,’ we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Sullivan’s TCPA motion was 23 frivolous.”); see also Navidea, 2020 WL 5087826 , at *6 (“In addressing Navidea’s argument that CRG’s declaratory-judgment action was based on the right to petition, we concluded that some of the communications at issue arguably constituted protected activity under the TCPA.

2017The trial court’s error in overruling Sullivan’s objection and refusing his request for additional, specific findings resulted in a broad-form damage finding accompanied by six damage elements; five of which are legally insufficient.13 (CR2:444). 12 See Zaidi, 502 S.W.3d at 440 (“The Turnaround parties requested additional findings of fact, asking the trial court to identify the damages awarded to each of the Borrowers for each cause of action, but the trial court did not do so.

2015Cf. Frazier v. Yu, 987 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (holding order granting summary judgment implicitly sustained movant’s objections to nonmovant’s affidavits).

2013See in re BroaksJiire Grocery (. 25() S.W.3d 66, 73 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (stating “fundamental nature of a new trial motion ...seeks not to reborm, but to lcwule the court’s judgment): Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston 114th Dist.} 1970, no writ) (stating motion for new trial must “seek to have an existing judgment set aside and request a relitigat ion of the issues”), Sullivan’s motion to disregard the jury’s findings or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict did not ask the trial court to vacate the judgment and order a new trial.

2012Id. (citing Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004)); Levinthal v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, P.A., 902 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). 5 We conclude that the record does not support Sullivan’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Sullivan’s motion for continuance.

2012Id. (citing Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004)); Levinthal v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, P.A., 902 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). 5 We conclude that the record does not support Sullivan’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Sullivan’s motion for continuance.

1995The State also relies on White, Penry, and Parra v. State, 743 S.W.2d 281, 285-86 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, pet. refd), in support of the proposition that Officer Sullivan’s warnings substantially complied with article 38.22, section 2(a).

1995See White, 779 S.W.2d at 827 ; Penny 691 S.W.2d at 643 .

1987Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 , 101 S.Ct. 398 , 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 , 734 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 234 (1986) (discussing the Sullivan standard of actual malice applied to nonmedia defendants); Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249 , 616 P.2d 277, 283-84 (1980) (discussing Sullivan standard in suit between candidates for public office).

1987Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 , 101 S.Ct. 398 , 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 , 734 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 234 (1986) (discussing the Sullivan standard of actual malice applied to nonmedia defendants); Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249 , 616 P.2d 277, 283-84 (1980) (discussing Sullivan standard in suit between candidates for public office).

1987Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 , 101 S.Ct. 398 , 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 , 734 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 234 (1986) (discussing the Sullivan standard of actual malice applied to nonmedia defendants); Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249 , 616 P.2d 277, 283-84 (1980) (discussing Sullivan standard in suit between candidates for public office).

1987Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 , 101 S.Ct. 398 , 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 , 734 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 234 (1986) (discussing the Sullivan standard of actual malice applied to nonmedia defendants); Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249 , 616 P.2d 277, 283-84 (1980) (discussing Sullivan standard in suit between candidates for public office).

1987Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 , 101 S.Ct. 398 , 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 , 734 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 234 (1986) (discussing the Sullivan standard of actual malice applied to nonmedia defendants); Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249 , 616 P.2d 277, 283-84 (1980) (discussing Sullivan standard in suit between candidates for public office).

1987Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 , 101 S.Ct. 398 , 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 , 734 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 234 (1986) (discussing the Sullivan standard of actual malice applied to nonmedia defendants); Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249 , 616 P.2d 277, 283-84 (1980) (discussing Sullivan standard in suit between candidates for public office).

1987See Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565 n. 4; but see Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 , 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) (Supreme Court applied Sullivan standard in suit by non-media plaintiff against candidate for public office); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 , 85 S.Ct. 209 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (criminal district attorney’s conviction for criminal defamation for comments about judges was reversed; actual malice standard applied).

1987Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 , 101 S.Ct. 398 , 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 , 734 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Hepps, 106 S.Ct. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125 , 516 A.2d 220, 234 (1986) (discussing the Sullivan standard of actual malice applied to nonmedia defendants); Hein v. Lacy, 228 Kan. 249 , 616 P.2d 277, 283-84 (1980) (discussing Sullivan standard in suit between candidates for public office).