Sullivan analysis in Wisconsin

2026See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772, 783-87 (describing the first two parts of the Sullivan test).

2026See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772, 783-87 (describing the first two parts of the Sullivan test).

2026A. Permissible purpose ¶28 “As long as the proponent identifies one acceptable purpose for admission of the evidence that is not related to the forbidden character inference, the first step [of the Sullivan analysis] is satisfied.” State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶63 , 320 Wis. 2d 348 , 768 N.W.2d 832 (footnote omitted).

2026A. Permissible purpose ¶28 “As long as the proponent identifies one acceptable purpose for admission of the evidence that is not related to the forbidden character inference, the first step [of the Sullivan analysis] is satisfied.” State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶63 , 320 Wis. 2d 348 , 768 N.W.2d 832 (footnote omitted).

2023Counsel said the allegations were so vague that his “concern is really kind of through the roof on how these observations were ever even made; the inability to cross- examine beliefs, feelings, as opposed to something [the witness] can see and hear and testify to.” 3 No. 2022AP516-CR ¶6 The circuit court ruled that all three alleged incidents were admissible under the three prongs of the Sullivan analysis, particularly in light of “the greater latitude rule.” See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73 , 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶¶16, 20, 28, 34 , 331 Wis. 2d 568

2023Counsel said the allegations were so vague that his “concern is really kind of through the roof on how these observations were ever even made; the inability to cross- examine beliefs, feelings, as opposed to something [the witness] can see and hear and testify to.” 3 No. 2022AP516-CR ¶6 The circuit court ruled that all three alleged incidents were admissible under the three prongs of the Sullivan analysis, particularly in light of “the greater latitude rule.” See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73 , 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶¶16, 20, 28, 34 , 331 Wis. 2d 568

2026The greater latitude rule applies to each part of the Sullivan test, and “[t]he effect of the rule is to permit the more liberal admission of other crimes evidence in sex crime cases in which the victim is a child.” Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶¶51-52 . ¶24 We review a circuit court’s decision to admit or exclude other-acts evidence for an erroneous exercise of discretion.

2026The greater latitude rule applies to each part of the Sullivan test, and “[t]he effect of the rule is to permit the more liberal admission of other crimes evidence in sex crime cases in which the victim is a child.” Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶¶51-52 . ¶24 We review a circuit court’s decision to admit or exclude other-acts evidence for an erroneous exercise of discretion.

2026We will uphold a court’s evidentiary ruling if it “examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Id. ¶35 Given our determination above regarding the Denny evidence, we conclude that Steinhoff is unable to satisfy the second prong of the Sullivan analysis with regard to evidence of Welch’s past crimes.

2026We will uphold a court’s evidentiary ruling if it “examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Id. ¶35 Given our determination above regarding the Denny evidence, we conclude that Steinhoff is unable to satisfy the second prong of the Sullivan analysis with regard to evidence of Welch’s past crimes.

2023Instead, when considering whether other-acts evidence is admissible under the third step of the Sullivan analysis, a court must “consider the proponent’s need to present this evidence given the context of the entire trial.” State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶87 , 361 Wis. 2d 529 , 861 N.W.2d 174 (emphasis added).

2023Instead, when considering whether other-acts evidence is admissible under the third step of the Sullivan analysis, a court must “consider the proponent’s need to present this evidence given the context of the entire trial.” State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶87 , 361 Wis. 2d 529 , 861 N.W.2d 174 (emphasis added).

2023Contrary to Koenig’s argument, age differences between the defendant and the victim are not dispositive to the Sullivan analysis, State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶32 , 236 Wis. 2d 686 , 613 N.W.2d 629 , nor is remoteness in time of the other acts, State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 16 , 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988).

2023Contrary to Koenig’s argument, age differences between the defendant and the victim are not dispositive to the Sullivan analysis, State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶32 , 236 Wis. 2d 686 , 613 N.W.2d 629 , nor is remoteness in time of the other acts, State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 16 , 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988).

2022See State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62 , 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985) (the danger of unfair prejudice from admission of other- acts evidence “is the potential harm in a jury’s concluding that because an actor committed one bad act, [the actor] necessarily committed the crime with which [the actor] is now charged”). ¶19 “This is the general framework that governs the admissibility of other crimes evidence in all Wisconsin cases.” State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶36 , 236 Wis. 2d 537 , 613 N.W.2d 606 .

2022See State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62 , 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985) (the danger of unfair prejudice from admission of other- acts evidence “is the potential harm in a jury’s concluding that because an actor committed one bad act, [the actor] necessarily committed the crime with which [the actor] is now charged”). ¶19 “This is the general framework that governs the admissibility of other crimes evidence in all Wisconsin cases.” State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶36 , 236 Wis. 2d 537 , 613 N.W.2d 606 .

2020See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). 5 It is sufficient for the State to identify one permissible purpose for which the other-acts evidence was offered and accepted to defeat Tobar’s other-acts-based ineffective assistance argument regarding the first prong of the Sullivan analysis.

2020See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). 5 It is sufficient for the State to identify one permissible purpose for which the other-acts evidence was offered and accepted to defeat Tobar’s other-acts-based ineffective assistance argument regarding the first prong of the Sullivan analysis.

2024In Gee, we noted that the circuit court in that case determined that the evidence sought to be admitted under the prior-conviction statute was subject to the Sullivan test, but we observed that the court “provided no legal authority for this proposition, and we have found none.” Gee, 388 Wis. 2d 68, ¶43 .

2024In Gee, we noted that the circuit court in that case determined that the evidence sought to be admitted under the prior-conviction statute was subject to the Sullivan test, but we observed that the court “provided no legal authority for this proposition, and we have found none.” Gee, 388 Wis. 2d 68, ¶43 .

2025See State v. Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, ¶33 , 391 Wis. 2d 799 , 943 N.W.2d 870 . 8 In reaching our conclusion that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence, we do not hold as a blanket rule that a bench trial renders the third step of the Sullivan analysis obsolete, as Woodberry argues that the State posits.

2025See State v. Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, ¶33 , 391 Wis. 2d 799 , 943 N.W.2d 870 . 8 In reaching our conclusion that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence, we do not hold as a blanket rule that a bench trial renders the third step of the Sullivan analysis obsolete, as Woodberry argues that the State posits.

2018See State v. Speer , 176 Wis. 2d 1101 , 1115, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993). ¶ 12 Nelson contends the other-acts evidence fails the Sullivan analysis and should have been excluded under WIS.

2018See State v. Speer , 176 Wis. 2d 1101 , 1115, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993). ¶ 12 Nelson contends the other-acts evidence fails the Sullivan analysis and should have been excluded under WIS.

2012Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 301 .

2007In support of its argument, the State cites State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 303-04, 310-11 , 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999), wherein this court held that, though the offered evidence was not relevant, and therefore that the third step — the prejudice prong— need not be addressed, we then proceeded to conclude that the balancing of Wis. Stat. § 904.03 considerations must occur. ¶ 31.

2007State v. Hereford, 195 Wis. 2d 1054, 1068 , 537 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Bergeron, 162 Wis. 2d 521, 531 , 470 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1991).

2007State v. Hereford, 195 Wis. 2d 1054, 1068 , 537 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Bergeron, 162 Wis. 2d 521, 531 , 470 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1991).

2026See, e.g., Jensen, 331 Wis. 2d 440, ¶85 (evidence that Jensen left explicit photos around the house “involved the relationship between the [two] principal actors” and explained Jensen’s treatment of victim leading up to her murder). ¶57 Panorama evidence is not subject to the three-prong Sullivan test.

2026See, e.g., Jensen, 331 Wis. 2d 440, ¶85 (evidence that Jensen left explicit photos around the house “involved the relationship between the [two] principal actors” and explained Jensen’s treatment of victim leading up to her murder). ¶57 Panorama evidence is not subject to the three-prong Sullivan test.

2026See State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, ¶47 , 274 Wis. 2d 656 , 683 N.W.2d 31 (unobjected-to errors are reviewed “within the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel” (citation omitted)).

2026See State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, ¶47 , 274 Wis. 2d 656 , 683 N.W.2d 31 (unobjected-to errors are reviewed “within the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel” (citation omitted)).

2026See State v. Wheat, 2002 WI App 153, ¶14 , 256 Wis. 2d 270 , 647 N.W.2d 441 (stating that counsel is not ineffective for failing to make meritless arguments). ¶54 Finally, McCulloch characterized all the motion evidence as evidence that “shows McCulloch to be a difficult, controlling, profane, and angry man generally.” As a result of this characterization, he argued in his postconviction motion that all the evidence had a “very slight probative value” that was “outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the evidence should have been excluded.” ¶55 The motion evidence was not admitted col

2026See State v. Wheat, 2002 WI App 153, ¶14 , 256 Wis. 2d 270 , 647 N.W.2d 441 (stating that counsel is not ineffective for failing to make meritless arguments). ¶54 Finally, McCulloch characterized all the motion evidence as evidence that “shows McCulloch to be a difficult, controlling, profane, and angry man generally.” As a result of this characterization, he argued in his postconviction motion that all the evidence had a “very slight probative value” that was “outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the evidence should have been excluded.” ¶55 The motion evidence was not admitted col

2025See State v. Davis, 2006 WI App 23, ¶14 , 289 Wis. 2d 398 , 710 N.W.2d 514 (explaining that our supreme court approved joinder “because the evidence of each crime would be admissible in separate trials for each”); cf. State v. Leach, 122 Wis. 2d 339, 357 , 363 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 124 Wis. 2d 648 , 370 N.W.2d 240 (1985) (concluding on de novo review that joinder was improper because the commonality between the cases was “insufficient to warrant the introduction of ‘other [acts]’ evidence”). ¶31 Stated more broadly, and consistent with the language of WIS.

2025See State v. Davis, 2006 WI App 23, ¶14 , 289 Wis. 2d 398 , 710 N.W.2d 514 (explaining that our supreme court approved joinder “because the evidence of each crime would be admissible in separate trials for each”); cf. State v. Leach, 122 Wis. 2d 339, 357 , 363 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 124 Wis. 2d 648 , 370 N.W.2d 240 (1985) (concluding on de novo review that joinder was improper because the commonality between the cases was “insufficient to warrant the introduction of ‘other [acts]’ evidence”). ¶31 Stated more broadly, and consistent with the language of WIS.

2025See Clean Wis., Inc. v. PSC, 2005 WI 93 , ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250 , 700 N.W.2d 768 (“We will not address undeveloped arguments.”); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (“Arguments unsupported by references to legal authority will not be considered.”).5 ¶30 Finally, Wendt argues that evidence of the methamphetamine in Schmidt’s home was prejudicial because it confused the issues at trial.

2025See Clean Wis., Inc. v. PSC, 2005 WI 93 , ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250 , 700 N.W.2d 768 (“We will not address undeveloped arguments.”); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (“Arguments unsupported by references to legal authority will not be considered.”).5 ¶30 Finally, Wendt argues that evidence of the methamphetamine in Schmidt’s home was prejudicial because it confused the issues at trial.

2025See Clean Wis., Inc. v. PSC, 2005 WI 93 , ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250 , 700 N.W.2d 768 (“We will not address undeveloped arguments.”); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (“Arguments unsupported by references to legal authority will not be considered.”).5 ¶30 Finally, Wendt argues that evidence of the methamphetamine in Schmidt’s home was prejudicial because it confused the issues at trial.

2025See Clean Wis., Inc. v. PSC, 2005 WI 93 , ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250 , 700 N.W.2d 768 (“We will not address undeveloped arguments.”); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (“Arguments unsupported by references to legal authority will not be considered.”).5 ¶30 Finally, Wendt argues that evidence of the methamphetamine in Schmidt’s home was prejudicial because it confused the issues at trial.