mandate rule in West Virginia

2020Va. 623 , 461 S.E.2d 129 (1995) (“Cases involving children must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults’ rights, but also with a regard for the rights of the child(ren).”) 9 In fairness, the circuit court likewise characterized its refusal of petitioners’ motion as one of “standing.” In reality, however, it was clearly attempting to properly effectuate the mandate rule, as more fully described herein. 6 case is remanded for entry of a final dispositional order terminating the mother’s and father’s parental rights pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(6). 242 W.

2020Va. 623 , 461 S.E.2d 129 (1995) (“Cases involving children must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults’ rights, but also with a regard for the rights of the child(ren).”) 9 In fairness, the circuit court likewise characterized its refusal of petitioners’ motion as one of “standing.” In reality, however, it was clearly attempting to properly effectuate the mandate rule, as more fully described herein. 6 For the foregoing reasons, the August 31, 2018, order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County is reversed only insofar as it orders disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-

2017With respect to the law of the case doctrine, we have held as follows: The law of the case doctrine “generally prohibits reconsideration of issues which have been decided in a prior appeal in the same case, provided that there has been no material changes in the facts since the prior appeal, such issues may not be relitigated in the trial court or re-examined in a second appeal.” 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 605 at 300 (1995) (footnotes omitted). “[T]he doctrine is a salutary rule of policy and practice, grounded in important considerations related to stability in the decision making process

2004However, the newly discovered evidence exception to the mandate rule, like the rule's other limited exceptions, is "narrowly configured and seldom invoked [,]" United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1993), being triggered only when "`significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise of due diligence[, has come to light][.]'" United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir.1993)). [14] Here, we do not think St.

2004However, the newly discovered evidence exception to the mandate rule, like the rule’s other limited exceptions, is “narrowly configured and seldom invoked[,]” United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1993), being triggered only when “ ‘significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise of due diligence[, has come to light][.]’” United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir.1993)). 14 Here, we do not think St.

2004However, the newly discovered evidence exception to the mandate rule, like the rule's other limited exceptions, is "narrowly configured and seldom invoked [,]" United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1993), being triggered only when "`significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise of due diligence[, has come to light][.]'" United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir.1993)). [14] Here, we do not think St.

2004However, the newly discovered evidence exception to the mandate rule, like the rule’s other limited exceptions, is “narrowly configured and seldom invoked[,]” United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1993), being triggered only when “ ‘significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise of due diligence[, has come to light][.]’” United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir.1993)). 14 Here, we do not think St.

2004Laitram Corp., 115 F.3d at 951 ("Although the district court cites much authority for the proposition that issues decided implicitly by courts of appeals may not be reexamined by the district court, the rule is actually applicable only to those issues decided by necessary implication."); Simmons v. Culpepper, 937 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) ("The law of the case doctrine does not extend to mere dictum.") [9] We realize that, as a general matter, when we issue writs we do not typically impose limits on the trial courts outside of the context of the specific issue upon which the writ was

2004Evelyn v. Madden, 202 W.Va. 634, 637 , 505 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1998) (per curiam) we refused a prohibition because "[w]hile the circuit court [was] technically in violation of this Court's mandate, it [was] apparent that, based on new information and evidence not available when this Court's prior decision was rendered, the circuit court's motivation [was] to promote the health and welfare of [the child in the case]." See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 , 97 S.Ct. 31, 32 , 50 L.Ed.2d 21, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court does not violate the mandate rule in addr

2004Evelyn v. Madden, 202 W.Va. 634, 637 , 505 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1998) (per curiam) we refused a prohibition because "[w]hile the circuit court [was] technically in violation of this Court's mandate, it [was] apparent that, based on new information and evidence not available when this Court's prior decision was rendered, the circuit court's motivation [was] to promote the health and welfare of [the child in the case]." See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 , 97 S.Ct. 31, 32 , 50 L.Ed.2d 21, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court does not violate the mandate rule in addr

2004However, the newly discovered evidence exception to the mandate rule, like the rule's other limited exceptions, is "narrowly configured and seldom invoked [,]" United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1993), being triggered only when "`significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise of due diligence[, has come to light][.]'" United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir.1993)). [14] Here, we do not think St.

2004However, the newly discovered evidence exception to the mandate rule, like the rule’s other limited exceptions, is “narrowly configured and seldom invoked[,]” United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1993), being triggered only when “ ‘significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise of due diligence[, has come to light][.]’” United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir.1993)). 14 Here, we do not think St.

2004Laitram Corp., 115 F.3d at 951 ("Although the district court cites much authority for the proposition that issues decided implicitly by courts of appeals may not be reexamined by the district court, the rule is actually applicable only to those issues decided by necessary implication."); Simmons v. Culpepper, 937 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) ("The law of the case doctrine does not extend to mere dictum.") [9] We realize that, as a general matter, when we issue writs we do not typically impose limits on the trial courts outside of the context of the specific issue upon which the writ was

2004See United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2000) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine does not bind us with the same rigidity as it binds the district court."); LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 , 1393 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1996) ("[A]n even more powerful version of the doctrine—sometimes called the `mandate rule'—requires a lower court to honor the decisions of a superior court in the same judicial system."). [14] The other two exceptions to the mandate rule include a dramatic change in controlling legal authority or a showing that a blatant error in the prior decision will result in a manifest

2004See United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2000) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine does not bind us with the same rigidity as it binds the district court.”); LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 , 1393 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1996) (”[A]n even more powerful version of the doctrine — sometimes called the ‘mandate rule’ — requires a lower court to honor the decisions of a superior court in the same judicial system.”). .The other two exceptions to the mandate rule include a dramatic change in controlling legal authority or a showing that a blatant error in the prior decision will result in a manifest

2004Therefore, for purposes of the mandate rule, we consider the distinctions between appeals and original jurisdiction proceedings to be inconsequential. [8] We hasten to add that the implied conclusion must be "necessary to a decision in the case" or it is dicta, which neither creates precedent, In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W.Va. 346, 382-83 , 109 S.E.2d 649, 669 (1959), nor establishes law of the case.

2004Therefore, for purposes of the mandate rule, we consider the distinctions between appeals and original jurisdiction proceedings to be inconsequential. [8] We hasten to add that the implied conclusion must be "necessary to a decision in the case" or it is dicta, which neither creates precedent, In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W.Va. 346, 382-83 , 109 S.E.2d 649, 669 (1959), nor establishes law of the case.

2004Evelyn v. Madden, 202 W.Va. 634, 637 , 505 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1998) (per curiam) we refused a prohibition because "[w]hile the circuit court [was] technically in violation of this Court's mandate, it [was] apparent that, based on new information and evidence not available when this Court's prior decision was rendered, the circuit court's motivation [was] to promote the health and welfare of [the child in the case]." See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 , 97 S.Ct. 31, 32 , 50 L.Ed.2d 21, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court does not violate the mandate rule in addr

2004Evelyn v. Madden, 202 W.Va. 634, 637 , 505 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1998) (per curiam) we refused a prohibition because "[w]hile the circuit court [was] technically in violation of this Court's mandate, it [was] apparent that, based on new information and evidence not available when this Court's prior decision was rendered, the circuit court's motivation [was] to promote the health and welfare of [the child in the case]." See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 , 97 S.Ct. 31, 32 , 50 L.Ed.2d 21, 23 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that a trial court does not violate the mandate rule in addr

1992As we have pointed out, “there is substantial Federal authority which indicates the failure to allow inspection does not always constitute prejudicial or reversible error.” State v. Tanner, 175 W.Va. 264, 266 , 332 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1985). 9 In determining reversible error, we stated: “The question of whether the error was harmless or prejudicial hinges upon whether there was a substantial discrepancy between the contents of the prior statement or report and the witness’ testimony during trial.” Id.

1992As we have pointed out, “there is substantial Federal authority which indicates the failure to allow inspection does not always constitute prejudicial or reversible error.” State v. Tanner, 175 W.Va. 264, 266 , 332 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1985). 9 In determining reversible error, we stated: “The question of whether the error was harmless or prejudicial hinges upon whether there was a substantial discrepancy between the contents of the prior statement or report and the witness’ testimony during trial.” Id.