mandate rule (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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mandate rule in Arizona

8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Prentissgreen
ariz · 1989 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1990–2006
2 sentences

2006The mandate of the doctrine is to protect one branch against the overreaching of any other branch. 163 Ariz. at 84-85, 786 P.2d at 935-36 .

2006The mandate of the doctrine is to protect one branch against the overreaching of any other branch. 163 Ariz. at 84-85, 786 P.2d at 935-36 .

12
Kadish v. Arizona State Land Departmentgreen
arizctapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026See Kadish, 177 Ariz. at 327-28 . ¶14 The trial court also noted that it was disregarding the mandate because it considered the court of appeals decision to be “clearly 7 STATE v. LaPORTE Opinion of the Court erroneous under Arizona law.” However, purported legal error cannot be invoked by a lower court as an exception to the mandate rule because our supreme court has directed that an appellate court’s mandate addressing a legal issue, “‘right or wrong[,]’ controls the proceedings in the trial court.” Vance v. Vance, 124 Ariz. 1, 3 (1979) (quoting Tucson Gas & Elec.

11
Vance v. Vancegreen
ariz · 1979 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026See Kadish, 177 Ariz. at 327-28 . ¶14 The trial court also noted that it was disregarding the mandate because it considered the court of appeals decision to be “clearly 7 STATE v. LaPORTE Opinion of the Court erroneous under Arizona law.” However, purported legal error cannot be invoked by a lower court as an exception to the mandate rule because our supreme court has directed that an appellate court’s mandate addressing a legal issue, “‘right or wrong[,]’ controls the proceedings in the trial court.” Vance v. Vance, 124 Ariz. 1, 3 (1979) (quoting Tucson Gas & Elec.

11
Tucson Gas & Electric Company v. Superior Courtgreen
arizctapp · 1969 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Co. v. Superior Court, 9 Ariz. App. 210, 213 (1969)).

11
Harbel Oil Co. v. Superior Court of Maricopa Countygreen
ariz · 1959 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See Arizona Biltmore Hotel Villas Condominiums Ass’n, 249 Ariz. at 333 ¶¶ 33–36; see also Harbel Oil Co. v. Superior Ct. of Maricopa Cnty., 86 Ariz. 303, 306 (1959) (resolving whether trial court violated the mandate required analysis of the appellate court’s decision); 5 Am.

11
State v. Aguilargreen
ariz · 2004 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 48, ¶ 26 (2004) (“Although a comment may clarify a rule’s ambiguous language, a comment cannot otherwise alter the clear text of a rule.”).

11
State v. Whitegreen
ariz · 1989 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

11
State v. Williamsgreen
ariz · 1982 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

11
State v. Johnsongreen
arizctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

11
State v. Lacygreen
ariz · 1996 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

11
State v. Sullivangreen
arizctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

11
State v. Portillogreen
ariz · 1995 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

2015However, “[w]hen an error has been made in the jury instructions, we consider whether the error was harmless.” State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 421, ¶ 27 , 72 P.3d 343, 351 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, ¶ 19 , 69 P.3d 1006, 1010 (App. 2003) (concluding that a trial court’s deviation from the Portillo instruction3 is subject to harmless error analysis); cf. State v. White, 160 Ariz. 24, 31-32 , 770 P.2d 328, 335-36 (1989) (concluding that the trial court’s omission of the final presumption of innocence instruction was “harmless,” and therefore d

11
State Ex Rel. Miller v. Superior Courtgreen
arizctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999Miller v. Superior Ct., 189 Ariz. 228, 230 , 941 P.2d 240, 242 (App.1997). ¶ 7 Under the mandate rule, a trial court may not consider on remand matters decided by an appellate court.

1999Miller v. Superior Ct., 189 Ariz. 228, 230 , 941 P.2d 240, 242 (App.1997). ¶ 7 Under the mandate rule, a trial court may not consider on remand matters decided by an appellate court.

11
Pan-Pacific and Low Ball Cable Television Company v. Pacific Union Company, a Corporation Tower House Associates John H. Beattygreen
ca9 · 1993 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999The trial court, however, may address any issues that the appellate court “did not dispose of either expressly or impliedly.” Pan-Pacific & Low Ball Cable Television Co. v. Pacific Union Co., 987 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir.1993).

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State v. Mendiolagreen
arizctapp · 1975 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977
2 sentences

1977As our Court of Appeals stated in an opinion approved and adopted by this court: “[W]hen a plea bargain has been reached and counsel for both the state and the defendant are present in Court for the purpose of consummating that agreement by obtaining the Court’s acceptance of the bargained-for guilty plea, counsel for both the state and the defendant have an affirmative duty to assist the Court to the end that the appropriate procedural requirements are met.” State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 253 , 532 P.2d 193, 195 (1975), aff’d, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975).

1977As our Court of Appeals stated in an opinion approved and adopted by this court: “[W]hen a plea bargain has been reached and counsel for both the state and the defendant are present in Court for the purpose of consummating that agreement by obtaining the Court’s acceptance of the bargained-for guilty plea, counsel for both the state and the defendant have an affirmative duty to assist the Court to the end that the appropriate procedural requirements are met.” State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 253 , 532 P.2d 193, 195 (1975), aff’d, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975).

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Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Dancing Sunshines Lounge v. Industrial Commission green
ariz · 1986
1 sentence

2026To find the broader exceptions applicable here would “creat[e] a circular process that would provide no end to litigation nor final determination of rights and obligations.” Tovrea, 101 Ariz. at 297 . ¶10 In practice, under the mandate rule, our supreme court has found that a trial court can contravene a direct mandate from an appellate court in the limited circumstance “where the policy of the law has been changed, by legislative enactment or decision of a higher court, while the case is still pending resolution,” see Jordan, 132 Ariz. at 43-44 , or where “the prior appellate decision was not

12026–2026
Jordan v. Jordan green
ariz · 1982
1 sentence

2026To find the broader exceptions applicable here would “creat[e] a circular process that would provide no end to litigation nor final determination of rights and obligations.” Tovrea, 101 Ariz. at 297 . ¶10 In practice, under the mandate rule, our supreme court has found that a trial court can contravene a direct mandate from an appellate court in the limited circumstance “where the policy of the law has been changed, by legislative enactment or decision of a higher court, while the case is still pending resolution,” see Jordan, 132 Ariz. at 43-44 , or where “the prior appellate decision was not

12026–2026
Tovrea v. Superior Court green
ariz · 1966
1 sentence

2026To find the broader exceptions applicable here would “creat[e] a circular process that would provide no end to litigation nor final determination of rights and obligations.” Tovrea, 101 Ariz. at 297 . ¶10 In practice, under the mandate rule, our supreme court has found that a trial court can contravene a direct mandate from an appellate court in the limited circumstance “where the policy of the law has been changed, by legislative enactment or decision of a higher court, while the case is still pending resolution,” see Jordan, 132 Ariz. at 43-44 , or where “the prior appellate decision was not

12026–2026
State v. Mendiola green
ariz · 1975
2 sentences

1977As our Court of Appeals stated in an opinion approved and adopted by this court: “[W]hen a plea bargain has been reached and counsel for both the state and the defendant are present in Court for the purpose of consummating that agreement by obtaining the Court’s acceptance of the bargained-for guilty plea, counsel for both the state and the defendant have an affirmative duty to assist the Court to the end that the appropriate procedural requirements are met.” State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 253 , 532 P.2d 193, 195 (1975), aff’d, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975).

1977As our Court of Appeals stated in an opinion approved and adopted by this court: “[W]hen a plea bargain has been reached and counsel for both the state and the defendant are present in Court for the purpose of consummating that agreement by obtaining the Court’s acceptance of the bargained-for guilty plea, counsel for both the state and the defendant have an affirmative duty to assist the Court to the end that the appropriate procedural requirements are met.” State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. 251, 253 , 532 P.2d 193, 195 (1975), aff’d, 112 Ariz. 165 , 540 P.2d 131 (1975).

11977–1977

Where else courts name it

UT 29 (1995–2025) ND 25 (1999–2026) KS 22 (2007–2026) CA 16 (1946–2026) CO 15 (1998–2026) VA 15 (2004–2025) AR 13 (2005–2025) FL 11 (1980–2018) WV 11 (1992–2024) NV 9 (1979–2022) PA 9 (1958–2021) OH 9 (1993–2024) AZ 8 (1977–2026) MO 7 (1912–2013) IL 7 (1985–2026) RI 6 (1994–2008) MD 6 (1988–2010) KY 6 (1969–2025) NJ 6 (1951–2025) MA 5 (1980–2018) AL 5 (1926–1960) TX 5 (1980–2021) WA 4 (1976–2024) NC 4 (2006–2022) MS 4 (2002–2009) MI 3 (1928–2012) NY 3 (1983–2003) DC 3 (1982–2023) IN 2 (1991–1993) OK 2 (1939–1939) CT 2 (2011–2016) WI 2 (1997–2020) IA 2 (1983–2026) HI 2 (1973–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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