10 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Day v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Section 15-18-65, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part: "[I]t is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof. " (Emphasis added.) Section 15-18-66(1), Ala.Code 1975, defines "criminal activity" as "[a]ny offense with respect to which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant." However, in Best v. State, 895 So.2d 1050, 105 2006Section 15 — 18—65, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part: “[I]t is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof” (Emphasis added.) Section 15-18-66(1), Ala.Code 1975, defines “criminal activity” as “[a]ny offense with respect to which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant.” However, in Best v. State, 895 So.2d 1050, 105 | 2 | 2 |
Strough v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Section 15-18-65, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part: "[I]t is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof. " (Emphasis added.) Section 15-18-66(1), Ala.Code 1975, defines "criminal activity" as "[a]ny offense with respect to which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant." However, in Best v. State, 895 So.2d 1050, 105 2006Section 15 — 18—65, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part: “[I]t is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof” (Emphasis added.) Section 15-18-66(1), Ala.Code 1975, defines “criminal activity” as “[a]ny offense with respect to which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant.” However, in Best v. State, 895 So.2d 1050, 105 | 2 | 2 |
Best v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Section 15-18-65, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part: "[I]t is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof. " (Emphasis added.) Section 15-18-66(1), Ala.Code 1975, defines "criminal activity" as "[a]ny offense with respect to which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant." However, in Best v. State, 895 So.2d 1050, 105 2006Section 15 — 18—65, Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part: “[I]t is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result thereof” (Emphasis added.) Section 15-18-66(1), Ala.Code 1975, defines “criminal activity” as “[a]ny offense with respect to which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant.” However, in Best v. State, 895 So.2d 1050, 105 | 2 | 2 |
Minnifield v. Stategreen2 sentences2004However, the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe the appellant’s physical characteristics, including his size and strength, as compared to M.U.’s size and strength, during the delinquency hearing. “ ‘[N]o one is in a better position’ to determine the issues of force and consent than the [trier of fact].” Parrish, 494 So.2d at 710 , quoting Minnifield v. State, 406 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Ala.Crim.App.1981)(noting that in its deliberations, the jury had the opportunity to consider the relative sizes of the parties). 2004However, the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe the appellant's physical characteristics, including his size and strength, as compared to M.U.'s size and strength, during the delinquency hearing. "`[N]o one is in a better position' to determine the issues of force and consent than the [trier of fact]." Parrish, 494 So.2d at 710 , quoting Minnifield v. State, 406 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Ala.Crim.App.1981)(noting that in its deliberations, the jury had the opportunity to consider the relative sizes of the parties). | 2 | 2 |
CM v. Stategreen1 sentence2011In this case, the juvenile court had the “opportunity to observe the appellant’s physical characteristics, including his size and strength, as compared to [the victim’s] size and strength, during the delinquency hearing.” C.M. v. State, 889 So.2d 57, 63 (Ala.Crim.App.2004). | 1 | 1 |
City of Dothan v. Hollowaygreen2 sentences1998See also Holloway, supra, 501 So.2d at 1137-39 (the fact that Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaints (“UTTCs”) were not properly verified did not deprive trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to accept guilty pleas on the matters alleged in the UTTCs, where the defendant in DUI cases and cases charging the offense of driving with a revoked license appeared in trial court and entered valid guilty pleas to the charges); Bennett, supra, — So.2d at-(“It is clear ... that the circuit court had in personam jurisdiction over Bennett during both the guilty plea and the post-conviction proceedings, 1998See also Holloway, supra, 501 So.2d at 1137-39 (the fact that Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaints (“UTTCs”) were not properly verified did not deprive trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to accept guilty pleas on the matters alleged in the UTTCs, where the defendant in DUI cases and cases charging the offense of driving with a revoked license appeared in trial court and entered valid guilty pleas to the charges); Bennett, supra, — So.2d at-(“It is clear ... that the circuit court had in personam jurisdiction over Bennett during both the guilty plea and the post-conviction proceedings, | 1 | 1 |
S.D. v. Stategreen1 sentence1998We find further support for our analysis of the jurisdictional questions at issue in the present case in our decision in S.D. v. State, 602 So.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 602 So.2d 1209 (Ala.1992), where we held that an alleged irregularity in the filing of a delinquency petition to initiate delinquency proceedings in the juvenile court, see §§ 12-15-50 and 12-15-52, Ala.Code 1975, did not defeat the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matters alleged in the petition, where the juvenile had appeared at the delinquency hearing attended by counsel and had submitte | 1 | 1 |
Vincent v. Stategreen1 sentence1986Compare Vincent v. State , 349 So.2d 1145 (Ala. 1977) (juvenile may be transferred to circuit court for prosecution as an adult based on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Parrish v. State
green
2 sentences2004However, the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe the appellant’s physical characteristics, including his size and strength, as compared to M.U.’s size and strength, during the delinquency hearing. “ ‘[N]o one is in a better position’ to determine the issues of force and consent than the [trier of fact].” Parrish, 494 So.2d at 710 , quoting Minnifield v. State, 406 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Ala.Crim.App.1981)(noting that in its deliberations, the jury had the opportunity to consider the relative sizes of the parties). 2004However, the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe the appellant's physical characteristics, including his size and strength, as compared to M.U.'s size and strength, during the delinquency hearing. "`[N]o one is in a better position' to determine the issues of force and consent than the [trier of fact]." Parrish, 494 So.2d at 710 , quoting Minnifield v. State, 406 So.2d 1055, 1057 (Ala.Crim.App.1981)(noting that in its deliberations, the jury had the opportunity to consider the relative sizes of the parties). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Alabama v. Shelton
green
2 sentences2002We note that should proceedings to revoke C.M.’s probation ever be initiated, Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002), provides that punishment resulting in the loss of liberty cannot be imposed because C.M. was not provided counsel at the delinquency hearing. 2002We note that should proceedings to revoke C.M.’s probation ever be initiated, Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002), provides that punishment resulting in the loss of liberty cannot be imposed because C.M. was not provided counsel at the delinquency hearing. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
S.D. v. State
green
1 sentence1998We find further support for our analysis of the jurisdictional questions at issue in the present case in our decision in S.D. v. State, 602 So.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 602 So.2d 1209 (Ala.1992), where we held that an alleged irregularity in the filing of a delinquency petition to initiate delinquency proceedings in the juvenile court, see §§ 12-15-50 and 12-15-52, Ala.Code 1975, did not defeat the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matters alleged in the petition, where the juvenile had appeared at the delinquency hearing attended by counsel and had submitte | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Burttram v. State
green
1 sentence1986Although the policy considerations for requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony in a delinquency adjudication are compelling, see Burttram v. State , 448 So.2d 497 , 498 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), we have never held § 12-21-222 to be applicable to a delinquency hearing. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Lett v. Liverpool London Globe Ins. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1926J. 328, § 410: “When the policy contains a stipulation that it shall stand suspended during delinquency, but that the holder shall be liable for such delinquent assessment, or that the entire premium note shall be deemed earned upon default, the insurer does not waive the delinquency as a defense to any loss occurring during such periods by demanding or accepting premiums.” Lett v. Liverpool & London & Globe Co., 213 Ala. 488 , 105 So. 553 . 1926J. 328, § 410: “When the policy contains a stipulation that it shall stand suspended during delinquency, but that the holder shall be liable for such delinquent assessment, or that the entire premium note shall be deemed earned upon default, the insurer does not waive the delinquency as a defense to any loss occurring during such periods by demanding or accepting premiums.” Lett v. Liverpool & London & Globe Co., 213 Ala. 488 , 105 So. 553 . | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.